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IAbstract
This thesis explores three aspects of minority shareholder protection in the 
Chinese stock market, where earnings management depends on the split share 
structure reform (SSSREF) and mergers and acquisitions (M&As), as well as 
impact of mutual fund ownership on controlling shareholders’ tunnelling 
behaviour and firm performance. 
More precisely, Chapter 2 empirically shows that China’s SSSREF has not 
fundamentally improved the quality of firm financial information. However, the 
reform exogenously created an incentive alignment effect that influences firm’s 
earnings management behaviour. Specifically, the use of discretionary accruals by 
firm`s has been constrained since the reform and has consequently shifted to less 
detectable and underscrutinized real earnings activities after the SSSREF. This 
shift is similar to that seen with the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) and 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on firm earnings behaviour in 
developed countries with a strong investor protection environment. The results 
also suggest that the shift between firm’s accrual-based and real earnings methods 
is an overlooked area for investors in the Chinese stock market and may require 
regulatory attention. 
Chapter 3 explore fully the role of mutual funds in corporate governance in 
Chinese listed firms through examining whether mutual fund ownership can 
effectively reduce controlling shareholders’ tunnelling behaviour and improve 
firms’ performance. The corresponding results find a non-linear association 
II
between mutual fund ownership and firm performance. In particular, a higher 
level of mutual fund ownership is associated with better firm performance, which 
indicates that mutual funds could serve as sophisticated investors to provide 
useful accounting information to outsiders, and are also capable of monitoring to 
improve the corporate governance mechanism. When the mutual fund ownership 
reaches a certain level, the negative relation between high mutual fund ownership 
and firm performance may imply that mutual fund managers are more likely to 
expropriate value from minority shareholders when they have dominant 
controlling power. In addition, the non-linear relation between mutual fund 
ownership and firm performance is still observable when controlling shareholders 
implement tunnelling behaviours. At last, mutual fund ownership can effectively 
reduce controlling shareholders’ tunnelling behaviour. Therefore, in order to 
realize fully the benefit of mutual fund ownership in improving corporate 
governance, it is necessary to further liberalize the mutual fund industry and to 
decentralize regulation by government agencies.
Chapter 4 extends the study of Chapter 2 and examines the environment of 
investor protection in the Chinese stock market by looking at the relation between 
earnings management and M&As. In details, the findings reveal M&As in China 
have a positive effect on promoting real earnings management and a negative 
effect on limiting accrual-based earnings management during the year of M&As. 
This finding indicates acquirers in China prefer to engage in more real earnings 
management mainly because of strict regulatory supervision by CSRC and the 
high percentage of deals paid by cash. However, accrual-based earnings 
III
management yields a significantly positive correlation with both real earnings 
proxies and their interaction with M&As instead of a substitution effect between 
accrual-based and real earnings management around M&As. This further reflects 
the absence of effective corporate governance and weak investor protection for the 
Chinese stock market. In addition, the results show a decline in earnings 
informativeness in the year of the M&A, and this further supports that the 
adjustment of earnings upwards around M&A can lower firm’s informational 
quality. Finally, due to the increase in real earnings management activities around 
M&As, the market is more likely to react negatively to such earnings strategy, 
especially in the year of the M&A.
Consequently, the empirical evidence in this thesis contributes to the current 
literature and related policy making by expanding our understanding of the 
Chinese stock market and paying more attention to protecting minority 
shareholder interests.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The Chinese capital market has received much attention from researchers, not 
only because of its unprecedented growth, but also because of government 
attempts to correct market imperfections by standardizing proper mechanisms and 
establishing minority shareholder protection, for example through the split share 
structure reform and reform of the mutual fund industry. The literature to date 
provides empirical evidence of the behaviour of Chinese listed firms, with 
different research periods corresponding to different policy regimes. The most 
recent studies have focused on the revised policies regarding the protection of 
minority shareholder interests, to examine the effectiveness of such government 
reforms. 
As a result of state privatization, the Chinese stock market has a split structure that 
separates firm stocks into tradable shares (TS) and non-tradable shares (NTS). 
Nearly two-thirds of all A-shares are non-tradable and are typically held by the 
state (Yeh et al., 2009; Li et al., 2011). Although both TS and NTS have the same 
voting and cash flow rights, the wealth and control held by non-tradable 
shareholders are insulated from firm share price movements. The consequent 
divergence of interests and incentives between controlling non-tradable and 
minority tradable shareholders has created severe corporate governance issues. 
2In 2005, the Chinese government implemented a split share structure reform 
(SSSREF) aimed at converting all NTS into TS. As NTS became tradable, the 
wealth and interests of the original NTS becomes linked to firm stock 
performance, thus significantly increasing incentive alignments between non-
tradable and tradable shareholders. As a result, the question of whether the 
SSSREF fundamentally protects minority shareholder benefits is a main concern 
for Firth et al. (2010) and Li et al. (2011). 
In addition, consistent with the SSSREF’s initial purpose, in 2000 the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) had announced an acceleration in the 
development of the mutual fund industry.  This was due to the initial development 
of ‘old funds’ in China, the extremely high levels of government ownership, and 
recognition of the proper corporate governance role of mutual funds in protecting 
minority shareholder interests (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Woidtke, 2002; 
Almazan et al., 2005; Cornett et al., 2007; Yuan et al., 2008; Hadani et al., 2011). 
However, there are several reasons why mutual fund ownership in China is 
ineffective in corporate governance if the funds’ incentives are aligned with those 
of controlling shareholders. First, although China’s Securities Investment Fund 
Law 2003 states that fund unit holders should have voting rights on crucial 
investment issues, those rights are difficult to exercise, as strict requirements have 
to be met. Secondly, the CSRC has absolute rights to set up fund management 
firms, appoint senior management of those firms, or even revoke the licence of 
fund firms when it deems that necessary. As a consequence, mutual fund 
managers may act in the interest of the CSRC or controlling shareholders, and this 
3may not be in the interest of minority shareholders. In order to explore fully the 
role of mutual funds in corporate governance in Chinese listed firms, this thesis 
looks at controlling shareholders’ tunnelling behaviour and tests whether 
monitoring by mutual fund ownership can effectively reduce such behaviour and 
improve firms’ performance.
In addition to these two main protection policies regulated by the CSRC, Chinese 
investors have demanded greater financial information disclosure and more 
equitable benefits in merger and acquisition (M&A) activities in recent years. 
Although the Chinese government is taking measures to improve the market 
environment and regulate business practice, the overall market transparency 
remains low and disclosure quality continues to be substandard, which indicates 
that the system of investor protection in China is far behind that of most countries 
in the sample used by the substantial studies by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998). 
Moreover, since the introduction of special supervision by the CSRC, not all 
M&As are scrutinized by the regulators, which results in more opportunities and 
incentives for acquirers to overstate their earnings and manipulate accounting 
information prior to M&As to meet or beat the regulatory benchmark 
requirements and reduce the deal costs. Therefore, Chapter 4 aims to examine 
earnings management activities and earnings quality during the M&A as well as 
the corresponding market reactions in the post-M&A period. Hence, this thesis 
concentrates on the SSSREF, mutual fund ownership, and M&As to examine the 
effective protection of minority shareholder interests in China from earnings 
management and tunnelling behaviour.
4As for the main research question for this thesis, Chapter 2 reviews the literature 
(Warfield et al., 1995; Beasley, 1996; Fan and Wong, 2002; Klein, 2002; Xie et 
al., 2003; Armstrong et al., 2012) on how good corporate governance can limit 
opportunistic managerial behaviour and the expropriation of minority shareholder 
interests by controlling shareholders, so mitigating information asymmetry and 
improving earnings quality. Although the SSSREF is recognized as aligning 
incentives to strengthen corporate governance and financial information 
disclosure (Beltratti et al., 2012; Hou et al., 2012; Liu and Tian, 2012), it would 
be premature to conclude that it has resulted in a decrease in earnings 
manipulation. Therefore, Chapter 2 analyses earnings management behaviours and 
trends across the pre- and post-reform periods, in order to examine whether the 
SSSREF has fully improved the quality of listed firms’ financial information. To 
provide persuasive empirical evidence, the chapter uses a sample of Chinese A-
share listed firms from 2002 to 2011, and detects accrual-based and real earnings 
management with a modified Jones model (Hribar and Collins, 2002) and a 
special real earnings individual proxy model (Roychowdhury, 2006), respectively.
The main empirical findings of Chapter 2 suggest that there is a long-run positive 
relationship between real and accruals earnings management throughout the 
sample period, which implies that when engaging in predominantly real or 
accruals-based earnings management Chinese listed firms are likely to use the 
other method to supplement it, a result of ineffective corporate governance and 
weak investor protection. Furthermore, consistent with Cohen et al. (2008) and 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010), the empirical results show that share reform has had 
5an impact on managerial earnings manipulation, which suggests that a significant 
reduction has taken place since the share reform. On the other hand, combined 
real earnings management proxies indicate a significant increase in the post-share 
reform period.
Chapter 3 recognizes the proper corporate governance role of mutual fund 
ownership in monitoring controlling shareholder behaviour to protect minority 
shareholder interests (Almazan et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2007; Cornett et al., 2007; 
Hadani et al., 2011). Wei et al. (2005) and Yuan et al. (2008) also confirm the 
monitoring effect of mutual funds by examining the Chinese stock market, but 
Firth et al. (2010) and Ding et al. (2013) disclose that mutual fund investors are 
more likely to maximize individual benefits than to safeguard minority 
shareholder profit when listed firms are controlled by the state. Such contradictory 
conclusions inspire the main purpose of Chapter 3: to clearly determine the role of 
mutual fund ownership in firm performance in China, especially when controlling 
shareholders implement tunnelling behaviour, which may force mutual fund 
investors to align their incentives similarly. Regarding sample selection, Chapter 3 
uses the China Funds Market Research database of open-end and close-end funds 
from 2003 to 2011 to represent mutual fund ownership from the China Stock 
Market Accounting Research database. In addition, tunnelling behaviour is 
calculated according to Jiang et al. (2010), indicating pervasive Chinese 
tunnelling activity.
The empirical results in Chapter 3 suggest that mutual fund ownership is 
positively related with firm performance, but this relation is non-linear. A 
6reasonable explanation is given by Yuan et al. (2008), who emphasize that the 
corporate governance role of mutual fund ownership in China is beneficial in 
enhancing firm quality. However, highly concentrated mutual fund ownership is 
more likely to be restricted by controlling shareholders, since incentive alignment 
and special Chinese regulations influence the appointment of mutual fund 
managers. Furthermore, this chapter finds that mutual fund ownership itself has a 
non-linear association with tunnelling behaviour, and can effectively prevent the 
occurrence of tunnelling in the Chinese market.
Chapter 4 focuses on earnings management in M&As on the Chinese stock market, 
looking at both accrual- and real-based earnings strategies. Many empirical 
studies have considered accrual-based earnings management as the only channel 
for acquirers to manipulate earnings before M&A. Erickson and Wang (1999) 
explain that accounting earnings manipulation before M&A is beneficial to 
decrease deal costs through employing fewer shares with higher price to purchase 
the target firm. Louis (2004) supports the conclusion of Erickson and Wang (1999) 
and further suggests that underperformance after M&A may be caused by 
manipulated accounting information through earnings management. Managers 
prefer real earnings management to accrual-based earnings management, since it 
is less detectable and departs from normal operational practice. On the one hand, 
in China, firms need to process M&A deals on the basis of local regulations set by 
the CSRC. On the other hand, the majority of M&A payments in China are made 
by cash. The main aim for acquirers is to employ real earnings management to 
increase the firm’s cash flow in a short time, without violating accounting 
7standards. Chapter 4 examines 964 successful M&A deals from 2002 to 2011 
collected from the Thomson One Banker (SDC) database, for a total of 6572 firm-
years.
The empirical evidence in Chapter 4 is consistent with previous studies (Cohen et 
al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Ipino and Parbonetti, 2011).  The results 
show that M&As in China have a positive effect on promoting real earnings 
management and a negative effect on limiting accrual-based earnings management 
during the year of M&A. However, accrual-based earnings management yields a 
significantly positive correlation with both real earnings proxies and their 
interaction with M&A, rather than a substitution effect between accrual-based and 
real earnings management. This further reflects the weak investor protection and 
absence of effective corporate governance in the Chinese stock market. In other 
words, the supervision over M&As cannot fundamentally improve the quality of 
financial information of Chinese listed firms.
Consequently, the main contribution of this thesis is to provide empirical evidence 
of minority shareholder protection in China from different angles. More precisely, 
Chapter 2 extends earnings management studies to both accrual-based and real 
earnings strategies and examines such earnings activities pre- and post-SSSREF. 
Chapter 2 also provides implications for regulators and investors in that, 
compared with SOX and IFRS, the SSSREF has an exogenous effect on earnings 
management preferences, and the dynamic substitution between accrual-based and 
real earnings management in the post-reform period confirms the effect of strict 
scrutiny and incentive alignment among shareholders.
8Chapter 3 contributes to investigation of the ambiguous status of mutual fund 
investors in China as determined by Yuan et al. (2008) and Firth et al. (2010), and 
suggests that mutual fund ownership can be considered to have a proper external 
corporate governance role in improving firm performance, even when controlling 
shareholders exploit minority shareholders through tunnelling behaviour. 
However, this is only the case when mutual funds hold relatively low numbers of 
firm shares. Mutual fund ownership is also helpful in directly controlling 
expropriation by controlling shareholders. Furthermore, Chapter 3 reminds 
regulators and policy makers to focus on the supervision of mutual fund investor 
behaviour, especially when mutual funds comprise a high percentage of 
shareholdings and more authority is delegated to mutual fund managers than to 
regulators. 
Finally, Chapter 4 discusses the research in Chapter 2 and describes earnings 
management around M&A activities in China, clearly indicating acquirers’ 
earnings management preferences and determining the effect on earnings quality 
during the year of the M&A. Policy implications are that cash payment and the 
degree of CSRC supervision during M&A are not enough to force acquirers to 
adjust their earnings strategies, in contrast to the effects of SOX, IFRS, and the 
SSSREF on earnings management.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 examines the 
effects of the SSSREF on earnings management preferences in China. Chapter 3 
investigates the role of mutual fund ownership on firm performance under 
conditions of tunnelling by controlling shareholders. Chapter 4 concentrates on 
9earnings management around M&As in China. Chapter 5 discusses the empirical 
evidence presented in this thesis and analyses its potential implications and 
limitations. Tables are located at the end of each chapter and the variables are 
defined in the Appendix.
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Chapter 2
Real and Accrual-Based Earnings Management 
Behaviours: Evidence from the Split Share 
Structure Reform in China
2.1 Introduction
Split share structures are common and typically warrant different owner rights for 
different types of shares (Faccio and Lang, 2002). The split share structure in 
China includes both tradable shares and non-tradable shares, which cannot be 
traded publicly even if the company is listed. However, in China, the ownership of 
non-tradable shares (NTS) entitles shareholders to the same voting and cash flow 
rights as distributed to shareholders of tradable shares (TS). Nearly two-thirds of 
A-shares are non-tradable and typically held by the state to retain control over 
listed firms in the early economic reform period (Yeh et al., 2009; Li et al., 2011). 
Because of this split ownership structure, shareholders of non-tradable shares may 
exploit such privileges to manipulate firm earnings to maximize their own 
interests, regardless of NT shareholder benefits. For example, controlling 
11
shareholders may conduct either tunnelling or propping, depending on the level of 
the private benefit of control (Johnson et al., 2000a; Glaeser et al., 2001; Friedman 
et al., 2003; Jiang et al., 2010). Fan and Wong (2002) find that earnings become 
less informative when the ownership is more concentrated. Such earnings 
manipulation seriously affects investor valuation and harms minority shareholder 
interests. As a result, in 2005 the China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
carried out a split share structure reform (SSSREF) to convert NTS to TS in order 
to strengthen corporate governance and in turn increase minority shareholder 
protection.
The main purpose of this reform is to coordinate the interests of NTS and TS 
shareholders and improve corporate governance. In detail, previous studies find 
that SSSREF has exogenously created an incentive alignment effect, which 
strengthens corporate governance and improves the quality of corporate financial 
information (see section 2.2.2.2 for more detail). For instance, Liu and Tian (2012) 
indicate that both tunnelling and excess leverage by controlling shareholders with 
excess control rights have been reduced since the SSSREF in China. Beltratti et al. 
(2012) demonstrate a positive stock market reaction upon the announcement of 
the SSSREF, as firms’ profitability and returns are expected to increase with the 
improvement in corporate governance. Furthermore, the split share reform could 
also improve the information environment of firms in the Chinese capital market, 
using share price informativeness as the measure of availability of financial 
information (Hou et al., 2012).
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However, even though the reform brought an increasingly widespread availability 
of information to market participants and improved corporate governance, it might 
be premature to conclude that firms have simultaneously reduced their earnings 
manipulation behaviours. This is because ownership concentration remains high 
after the reform, making it possible for controlling shareholders to manipulate 
earnings in order to inflate share prices and camouflage their intentions for 
expropriation. Contrary to previous literature therefore, this chapter questions 
whether the reform has led to full credibility (quality) of firms’ disclosure of 
financial information, by examining the changes in earnings manipulation 
behaviours. 
This chapter makes several contributions in the context of the Chinese stock 
market. First, following previous literature (Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012), this 
chapter contributes to real earnings management (RM) studies and extends 
previous research by examining accrual-based and real earnings management 
methods in an emerging market. Although previous studies mostly rely on 
discretionary accruals as a proxy to detect earnings manipulation (Fields et al., 
2001; Zang, 2012), firms manage earnings not only through accrual manipulation 
with no direct cash flow consequences to disguise their true economic 
performance, but also through real activities manipulation to affect accounting 
systems. Despite growing interest and recognition of real earnings activities in 
practice, related studies (Graham et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010; 
Zang, 2012) on such activities are still rare in the finance and accounting literature. 
More precisely, in an emerging market context, the investor protection 
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environment is often very weak compared to the situation in developed countries. 
For example, Allen et al. (2005) find the development of the relevant Chinese law 
and institutions are far behind that of most countries in the sample used by the 
substantial literature produced by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), particularly in the 
areas of investor protection systems, corporate governance, accounting standards, 
and quality of government. In the absence of effective corporate governance and 
with weak investor protection, this chapter would expect an increasing trend of 
simultaneous use of both accrual and real earnings management in Chinese firms.
Second, this chapter empirically studies the relation between real and accrual-
based earnings activities in the pre- and post-reform periods. As previous studies 
have indicated that the reform has improved the quality of firms’ financial 
information and incentive alignment, it might be expected that Chinese listed 
firms have reduced their earnings management, including both accrual and real 
earnings management. However, such conclusions might be premature. Despite 
the fact that since SSSREF the shareholdings of the largest shareholders and state 
ownership are significantly reduced, the controlling shareholders still retain a 
large share ownership. In addition, because firms’ operating performance cannot 
be improved overnight, firms may simply change their mix preferences and switch 
from accruals earnings management to real activities, which are less detectable 
and scrutinized, to continue manipulating accounting information in the post-
reform period. 
Third, this chapter provides policy implications for regulators regarding the effect 
of split share structure reform through an examination of earnings management 
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activities in the unique setting of the Chinese stock market. Previous studies have 
examined the impact on firms’ earnings management behaviour of direct 
regulatory changes in corporate disclosure, such as the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and the adoption of IFRS (Cohen et al., 2008). This chapter extends the 
work of Cohen et al. (2008) by hypothesizing that the SSSREF has achieved an 
indirect exogenous effect on the trend of firms’ earnings behaviours in the 
emerging markets. However, despite increased availability of information, there is 
room for firms to continue manipulating earnings information as they can switch 
from the accrual- to real-based earnings methods. This might be an overlooked 
area that regulators need to be aware of while improving accounting information 
and embarking on further reform for minority shareholder protection. Investors 
also need to consider this issue as an additional risk when making investments in 
the context of emerging markets.   
This chapter employs a sample of all Chinese companies listed in the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2002 to 2011. To calculate accrual-based 
earnings management, this chapter uses a Modified Jones (1991) cross-sectional 
model. To measure real earnings management, this study first uses 
Roychowdhury’s (2006) method to estimate abnormal cash flows from operations, 
abnormal discretionary expenses, and  abnormal production costs as proxies. 
Following Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Badertscher (2011), the chapter then 
combines these three variables into three combined proxies to measure real 
earnings management. Since this study examines the impact of the SSSREF on 
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earnings management activities, it also controls for the impact of corporate 
governance and firm-specific variables that affect earnings manipulation activities.
Contrary to previous studies (Badertscher, 2011; Cohen et al., 2008; Ge and Kim, 
2013; Zang, 2012), the empirical results of this chapter demonstrate that there is a 
long-run positive relationship between real and accruals earnings management 
throughout the sample period, which implies that when engaging in 
predominantly real or accruals-based earnings management Chinese listed firms 
are likely to use the other method to supplement it, a result of ineffective 
corporate governance and weak investor protection. Furthermore, consistent with 
Cohen et al. (2008) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010), the empirical results show 
that share reform has had an impact on managerial earnings manipulation. The 
results suggest that a significant reduction has taken place since the share reform. 
On the other hand, combined real earnings management proxies indicate a 
significant increase in the post-share reform period.
This evidence is important because it suggests that managers have shifted away 
from accrual-based management to real earnings management in the post-share 
reform period. This implies that there is an exogenous effect of the SSSREF that 
changes firms’ earnings management behaviours. It has a similar effect to that of 
direct comprehensive regulatory changes in accounting reporting rules in 
developed countries where investor protection is strong, as evidenced by Cohen et 
al. (2008) and Ipino and Parbonetti (2011), who demonstrate that there was a shift 
from AM to RM after the SOX and IFRS.
16
This chapter also considers the impact of accounting flexibility that may limit 
firms’ ability to report discretionary accruals in the sample period (Barton and 
Simko, 2002; Wang and D’Souza, 2006; Zang, 2012). The results in this chapter 
reveal that a decrease in accounting flexibility induces a higher level of real 
earnings management and reduces the use of discretionary accruals. However, the 
effect of the SSSREF on the preference between accrual-based and real earnings 
management remains the same after controlling for the impact of accounting 
flexibility. Robustness tests confirm that indirect policy implementation may 
result in a better information environment and have an exogenous effect on firms’ 
earnings behaviours. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 first provides a 
brief overview of China’s SSSREF and then discusses the link between the split 
share structure reform and earnings management. It then explains how the 
research hypotheses are arrived at in the light of the current literature. Section 2.3 
describes the data sources, methodology, and summary statistics. Section 2.4 
presents the main results for this chapter’s hypotheses on the existence of both 
accrual-based and real earnings management in the Chinese context and their 
substitutive relation in the post-reform period, followed by robustness tests. 
Section 2.5 concludes the chapter.
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2.2 Institutional Background, Literature Review and 
Hypotheses
2.2.1 Institutional Background
In the 1980s, the Chinese government began implementing a decentralizing plan 
to transfer the rights of managers from the central government to the local firm 
level. The main idea of this decentralization is gradually to free firms from central 
government control. In the 1990s, the Chinese government transferred a minority 
of state shares to individual investors for privatization. However, the majority of 
shares were prohibited from sale and kept by various levels of government. This 
formed a split share structure, with the NTS being mainly held by government, 
and the smaller proportion of TS owned mainly by institutional and individual 
investors.
The NTS entitle their holders to exactly the same voting and cash flow rights as 
accompany the TS. Most NTS belong to the state and to legal persons, while 
shareholders of TS are generally institutional investors and domestic individuals. 
Before the share reform in 2005, about two-thirds of domestic A-shares 
outstanding were non-tradable. Because of this unbalanced ownership structure, 
the price of TS is usually controlled by market mechanisms and firm profitability, 
while NTS are traded by negotiation and priced according to firms’ net assets. 
Therefore, NTS shareholders focus their interest on gradually improving net asset 
value per share through initial public offerings (IPOs) or seasoned equity offerings 
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(SEOs), while TS shareholders prefer firms to increase in market value by 
revealing positive accounting information to other investors. As a result, there is a 
conflict of interest between shareholders of NTS and TS. Because of this 
opposition, previous studies find that NTS shareholders have little incentive to 
improve firm performance; instead, they may exploit their controlling rights to 
expropriate the benefits of TS shareholders through tunnelling before the share 
reform, for example through related-party transactions (Aharony et al., 2010), 
asset restructuring (Aharony et al., 2000; Cheng et al., 2010), or cash dividends 
(Huang et al., 2011).
To improve the quality of accounting information as well as protect minority 
shareholder benefits, in June 2001 the CRSC began reducing state ownership 
activity such that NTS owned by the state could be sold at market prices through 
IPOs or SEOs. However, the share market reacted negatively to the reduction in 
the NTS of listed firms, since investors feared the uncertain time window to 
reduce such a large amount of NTS, which would have a serious impact on market 
confidence and lower investor enthusiasm. In October 2002 the government had 
to withdraw this plan in response to strong adverse reaction from TS holders. 
Subsequently, in 2005, the CRSC restarted the split share reform plan and 
announced the first batch of four listed companies to shift their NTS to TS. By the 
end of 2007, 1,254 Chinese listed firms, accounting for 97% of A-share market 
capitalization, had completed the reform and begun gradually to release their NTS 
(Firth et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011). 
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Furthermore, in 2005 the CRSC suspended all financial activities of listed firms 
(IPOs and SEOs), in order to stabilize the stock market during the reform and 
formulate a new and transparent accounting environment for investors. Because 
the exchange from NTS to TS could result in high costs for TS shareholders, the 
CSRC also required that NTS shareholders pay compensation after negotiation 
with TS shareholders. In addition, because of the massive increase in the supply of 
shares, the CSRC imposed a 12-month lockup period before releasing the 
potential impact of original NTS into the stock market. Moreover, NTS 
shareholders with more than 5% of a firm’s shares were further restricted from 
trading more than 5% and 10% of the firm’s total share capital within 12 and 24 
months, respectively. In the two years after the share reform, NTS were permitted 
gradually to transform into TS. By the end of 2007, 1,254 Chinese listed firms, 
accounting for 97 percent of the A-share market capitalization, had completed the 
reform and begun gradually to release their NTS (Firth et al, 2010; Li et al., 2011). 
2.2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
2.2.2.1 Accrual-Based Earnings Management
Previous research mainly focuses on earnings management around financial 
activities such as SEOs, IPOs, share repurchases, and management buyouts. 
Regarding SEOs, Rangan (1998) finds that SEO firms have positive abnormal 
accruals, on average, during the year around the SEO, followed by poor stock 
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performance in the subsequent year. These results suggest that firms manipulate 
earnings upward around SEOs and that the stock market is misled by such 
reformative earnings, which temporarily overvalue issuing firms, leading to 
disappointment with the subsequent estimated earnings decrease, which can result 
in a drop in share price. Shivakumar (2000) also finds evidence to suggest 
accrual-based earnings management around SEOs but, in contrast to Rangan 
(1998), the author finds that the stock market is inefficient towards upwardly 
managed earnings. 
Teoh et al. (1998) consider IPO financial events and find similar results. Their 
findings indicate that more accruals management activities take place during IPOs, 
followed by abnormal negative share returns. However, Brav et al. (2000) suggest 
that the abnormal share returns of IPO firms are not negative. In addition to 
examining the relation between stock returns and accrual-based earnings 
management, the previous literature concentrates on short-term capital market 
reactions around announcements of fraudulent reporting. Studies show that the 
relation between market reactions and the disclosure of manipulation is negative, 
which means investors are surprised and interpret such earnings management 
news as negative (Foster 1979; Dechow et al., 1995; Palmrose et al., 2004).
Extensive research also documents that Chinese listed firms may employ 
discretionary accruals to manage their earnings information. For example, 
Aharony et al. (2000) report that firms manage earnings upward by using 
discretionary accruals to inflate earnings and skew stock market valuations prior 
to an IPO. Chen and Yuan (2004) and Haw et al. (2005) state that Chinese listed 
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firms may use discretionary accruals to meet specific regulatory thresholds to 
maintain listing status, qualify for IPOs and rights issues, or avoid delisting or 
trading restrictions (special treatment). On the other hand, Liu and Lu (2007), 
Chen et al. (2008), Cheng et al. (2010), Jiang et al. (2010), and Jian and Wong 
(2010) suggest that controlling shareholders may tunnel resources or prop up 
earnings through related-party transactions, pricing transfers, or corporate loans 
and subsidies from local governments to beat regulatory benchmarks.
2.2.2.2 Real Earnings Management
The recent literature reveals that listed firms may also use real earnings 
management.  Such real activities manipulation departs from normal operational 
practices and occurs when managers alter the timing or structure of transactions, 
investments, and resource allocations to boost accounting earnings in the current 
period (Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Roychowdhury, 2006). Such practices have a 
direct effect on operating activities and cash flow.
Dechow and Sloan (1991) suggest that chief executive officers (CEOs) prefer to 
reduce costs on research and development (R&D) toward the end of their tenure, 
to increase short-term earnings. Baber et al. (1991) and Bushee (1998) also find 
evidence consistent with the reduction of R&D expenditures to meet earnings 
benchmarks. Bens et al. (2003) suggest that managers partially finance 
repurchased stocks to reduce R&D. 
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Graham et al. (2005) provide survey evidence to show that managers prefer real 
earnings management, even though it may reduce firm value and increase related 
costs. The authors survey 401 financial executives regarding the key factors that 
determine their decisions on reported earnings and voluntary disclosure. Around 
80% of the respondents indicate their willingness to sacrifice firm economic value 
(e.g., decrease discretionary spending on R&D or advertising fees) to manipulate 
accounting reports. In addition, the results of the survey show that more than half 
(55.3%) of the managers prefer to postpone a new investment to meet or beat a 
previous earnings benchmark. 
Roychowdhury (2006) directly measures real earnings management activities and 
their capital market consequences. The author attributes earnings management to 
operational activities and defines real earnings management as the management’s 
deviations from normal business practices, undertaken with the primary objective 
of meeting certain earnings thresholds. Roychowdhury also concludes that 
managers prefer price discounts to temporarily increase sales, reducing 
discretionary expenditures to improve reported margins, and overproducing to 
lower the cost of goods sold. Using cross-sectional analyses, the author finds that 
real earnings management is less prevalent in the presence of sophisticated 
investors. Gunny (2010) suggests that real earnings management is positively 
associated with firms just meeting their earnings benchmarks, but also concludes 
that earnings management through real manipulation is not opportunistic and is 
consistent with managers obtaining benefits to allow for better future performance 
or signalling.
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Several papers look at real earnings management related to SEOs, subsequent 
stock returns, and insider trading, among other factors. Li et al. (2007) find a 
significant relation between real earnings management and subsequent stock 
returns. More specifically, stocks of firms with abnormally low (high) levels of 
operating cash flow underperform (outperform) in the following year and stocks 
of firms with abnormally low (high) levels of production costs outperform 
(underperform) in the following three years. These findings suggest that such a 
relation is stronger among firms with a greater likelihood of earnings management 
and does not exist between returns and normal levels of operating cash flows and 
production costs. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) test the preference of earnings 
management activities around SEOs and conclude this relation is based on a 
firm’s ability to apply accrual management, and its costs. Their results suggest 
that the decline in SEO firms’ post-SEO operating performance is affected not 
only by accrual-based earnings management, but also by real earnings 
management.
In China, split share ownership has provided a direct incentive for controlling 
shareholders to manage earnings to obtain their individual interests. More 
precisely, because NTS owned by controlling shareholders are determined by net 
asset value, increasing capital through financial activities to improve net asset 
value per share is regarded as their main motivation, rather than preserving firm 
quality. Chen et al. (2008) support this argument and indicate that controlling 
shareholders are less concerned with accounting information, since share price is 
irrelevant to their wealth. On the other hand, minority TS shareholders rely on 
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positive accounting information to make investment decisions and expect an 
increase in the market value of their TS. Therefore, controlling shareholders are 
motivated to overstate reported earnings to raise more capital and increase their 
wealth, while minority shareholders are then forced to pay inflated prices for TS 
(Fan et al., 2007). Chan et al. (2008) also find that Chinese listed firms with high 
debt prefer to adjust financial information during the issue of new shares, which 
can result in corrective restatements of earnings back to original levels in the 
following years. Furthermore, controlling shareholders with highly concentrated 
ownership in China often obtain control rights over their cash flow rights. Listed 
firms are then usually motivated to publish less accounting information, to 
camouflage their expropriation of value from minority TS shareholders (Fan and 
Wong, 2002).
To date, few studies have investigated real activities manipulation or the dynamic 
relation between real and accrual-based earnings management in an emerging 
market context with weak investor protection. Based on the arguments above, the 
main purpose of this chapter is to examine whether both earnings management 
methods are used in Chinese firms, and whether there is a positive relationship 
between the two earnings management activities in an environment of weak 
investor protection and a lack of effective corporate governance. Hence, the first 
hypothesis in this study is: 
H1: Chinese listed firms exhibit a long-term positive relationship between real 
and accrual-based earnings management activities
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2.2.2.3 Earnings Management in the SSSREF
Among the various key factors restricting earnings management, the previous 
literature documents that good corporate governance is beneficial in constraining 
listed firms’ opportunistic behaviour, and leads to better information disclosure as 
well as high-quality earnings. Many studies (Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996; 
Klein, 2002; Xie, et al., 2003; Chang and Sun, 2009) indicate that high ownership 
of independent boards and audit committees can effectively limit financial 
statement fraud and earnings management calculated by discretionary accruals. 
Warfield et al. (1995) find that managerial ownership has a negative relation with 
the implementation of accrual-based earnings management and a positive 
association with earnings informativeness. Compared with findings in developed 
countries, Fan and Wong (2002) find that the entrenchment effect of controlling 
shareholders under high ownership concentration can cause low earnings 
informativeness for the countries in East Asia. Hazarika et al. (2012) suggest that 
effective supervision by the board may decrease external costs by limiting the 
activities of top managers who hunt aggressively for earnings to adjust accruals. 
Regarding external corporate governance mechanisms, Armstrong et al. (2012) 
show that anti-takeover laws have an exogenous effect on the market for corporate 
control, as reflected in the decrease in information asymmetry and increased 
financial statement informativeness.
With regard to the Chinese stock market, Ding et al. (2007) and Wang and Yung 
(2011) find that listed firms with private controlling ownership are associated with 
higher accrual-based earnings management than are state-controlled firms, since 
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private listed firms receive little assistance from the state to finance funding. Firth 
et al. (2007b) find that the extent of discretionary earnings is also influenced by 
ownership and board structure. Liu and Lu (2007) illustrate how earnings 
management from tunnelling can result in inefficient corporate governance. Gul et 
al. (2010) provide evidence indicating that corporate transparency and share price 
informativeness in Chinese listed firms are negatively associated with high 
ownership concentration under conditions of high state ownership, less foreign 
ownership, and poor auditor quality, which implies that a firm’s information 
environment is affected by the quality of corporate governance.
The split share reform should exogenously align controlling shareholder 
incentives to restrict earnings management, and consequently strengthen corporate 
governance of Chinese listed firms under a weak investor protection environment. 
After the full-scale implementation of the share conversion in China, the incentive 
alignment between NTS controlling shareholders and TS minority shareholders 
for profit maximization was exogenous (Liu and Tian, 2012). Previous literature 
(Hou et al., 2012; Liu and Tian, 2012; Beltratti et al., 2011) indicates that 
corporate governance-related issues such as corporate transparency, external 
monitoring, and information asymmetry have improved since the SSSREF. Hou et 
al. (2012) examine the effect of the split share reform on share price 
informativeness and find that the reform exogenously improved firm incentive 
alignment, decreasing the incentive of controlling shareholders to control price-
sensitive information. Beltratti et al. (2011) indicate that investors have reacted 
positively to the split share reform, since firm profitability and returns beyond 
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those of previous periods have accompanied improvements in corporate 
governance. Liu and Tian (2012) reveal that the tunnelling behaviour and use of 
excess leverage by controlling shareholders with excess control rights have 
dramatically decreased with the higher quality of corporate governance after 
SSSREF. Therefore, a great deal of evidence shows that the SSSREF has led to 
the improvement of corporate information.
However, the split share reform may not be able effectively to restrict earnings 
management, mainly because of the dynamic relation between real and accrual-
based earnings strategies, discussed earlier. In particular, even after the SSSREF 
ownership concentration remains high in China. In addition, controlling 
shareholders may still have an incentive to increase their wealth by inflating stock 
prices via earnings management activities. In other words, listed firm values and 
earnings expectations can be influenced by earnings management via both 
accrual-based and real earnings strategies. Furthermore, even after the reform it is 
possible for controlling shareholders to continue to manage earnings and to adjust 
the expectations of minority shareholders. In addition, the original NTS 
shareholders have enough time to expropriate earnings for an unfair consideration 
before completing the reform.
Based on the discussion, this chapter postulates that the split share reform may 
have reduced accrual-based earnings management activities, as its incentive 
alignment effect has led to an improvement in corporate governance, improved 
firm financial information and tightened the scrutiny of regulators and agencies, 
resulting in higher costs of accrual-based earnings management. Rather than 
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implementing accrual-based earnings strategies, listed firms may switch to 
implement real earnings activities, which are less scrutinized and detectable, to 
continue their earnings manipulation. As a result, the second and third hypotheses 
are as follows.
H2: After the SSSREF, Chinese listed firms have tended to use less accrual-
based and more real earnings management methods.
H3: After the SSSREF, Chinese listed firms have shifted from accrual-based to 
real earnings management.
2.3 Empirical Methodology
2.3.1 Earnings Management Measurement
2.3.1.1 Accrual-Based Earnings Management
This chapter considers discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings 
management.  There are two reasons for this. First, it is a standard measure of 
earnings management in both the finance and accounting literature. Second, the 
costs of managing discretionary accruals are usually low. Other measures of 
earnings management, such as restatements, AAERs, and securities class action 
lawsuits, capture manipulations that are costlier to shareholders, either directly 
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through expected penalties or indirectly through loss of reputation. In addition, 
this chapter uses annual data to calculate discretionary accruals. First, quarterly 
data are not comparable because the first three quarterly reports may not be 
audited, while the fourth quarter or annual report is. Second, certain accounting 
variables are available only in the annual or fourth quarterly report. Guthrie and 
Sokolowsky (2010) suggest that 40% of accounting information published 
estimates discretionary accruals only in the fourth quarter. Finally, annual accrual 
measures are well established and documented in the earnings management 
literature (Teoh et al., 1998; DuCharme et al., 2004; Bergstresser and Philippon, 
2006). Dechow (1995) decomposes total accruals into non-discretionary and 
discretionary accrual components:
it it itTA NDA DA                                                                                                   (1)
where itTA  is total accruals for firm i  in year t  and itNDA and itDA  are non-
discretionary and discretionary accruals, respectively, for firm i  in year t .
Following Hribar and Collins (2002), this study uses a cross-sectional Jones 
model to compute discretionary accruals. Each year the model is estimated for 
every industry, classified by CSRC industry code. Therefore, the results of 
discretionary accruals in this chapter partially control for industry-wide changes in 
economic conditions that affect total accruals, while allowing the estimated 
coefficients from the Jones model to vary across time. The cross-sectional Jones 
model is described as follows:
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where , 1i tAssets   is total assets for firm i  in year t , itREV  is change in revenue 
for firm i  in year t , itREC  is change in receivables for firm i  in year t , and 
itPPE  is gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i  in year t .
The coefficients from the estimates of equation (2) are used to calculate firm-
specific normal accruals ( itNA ) for the sample firms:
1 2 3
, 1 , 1 , 1
1ˆ ˆ ˆit it
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i t i t i t
SALES PPENA k k k
Assets Assets Assets  
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The measure of discretionary accruals ( itDA ) is the difference between total 
accruals and fitted normal accruals ( itNA ):
, 1
it
it it
i t
TADA NA
Assets 
                                                                                            (4)
2.3.1.2 Real Earnings Management
Based on previous studies, three individual proxies are employed to measure real 
earnings management. Following the method for measuring discretionary accruals, 
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all real earnings management proxies are estimated for different industries and 
with a minimum of eight observations for each year. Following Dechow et al. 
(1998), Roychowdhury (2006), and Cohen et al. (2010), this chapter first models 
cash flow from operations (CFO) and describes it as a linear function of sales and 
changes in sales in the current year:
1 1 2 3
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
1it it it
it
i t i t i t i t
CFO Sales Salesk k k
Assets Assets Assets Assets
 
   
                                (5)
where CFOit is cash flow from operations taken from the statement of cash flows 
of firm i  in year t, Asseti,t-1 represents total assets at the end of year t - 1, Salesit is 
net sales for firm i in year t, ΔSalesit is changes in net sales for firm i between year 
t - 1 and year t, and εit is the error term. Abnormal cash flow from operations 
equals the actual CFO value minus the normal level of CFO, calculated using the 
estimated coefficient from equation (5) for each industry and year. Roychowdhury 
(2006) and Cohen et al. (2010) indicate that managers engage in sales 
manipulation by accelerating sales using price discounts or more lenient credit 
terms in the current period. The temporarily boosted sales volume is likely to 
diminish in the next fiscal year once the firm reverts to the original prices. 
Additional sales increase total earnings in the current period but result in reduced 
margins due to price discounts, lenient credit provision, and higher production 
costs relative to ‘normal’ level. Therefore, this chapter expects a lower abnormal 
CFO (ACFO) in the current period as a result of sales manipulation.
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The second individual proxy is abnormally high production costs, expressed in the 
following regression:
, 1
1 1 2 3 4
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
1 i tit it it
it
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SalesPROD Sales Salesk k k k
Assets Assets Assets Assets Assets
 
    
         (6)
where PRODit is firm i’s production costs in year t, which equals the sum of the 
costs of goods sold plus changes in inventory. All other variables are defined as 
previously. To manage earnings upward, firms can overproduce inventory to 
report a high operational margin, as the fixed cost per unit declines with 
increasing production volume. This chapter expects that a higher value of the 
residual (APROD) estimated from equation (6) indicates greater manipulation 
through overproduction.
The third proxy is abnormal discretionary expenses (ADISX), estimated as:
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i t i t i t
SalesDISX k k
Assets Assets Assets
 
  
                                                      (7)
where itDISX is discretionary expenditures,1 which include selling, general and 
administrative expenses, R&D, and advertising for firm i in year t. Since 
discretionary expenditures do not normally generate immediate firm revenue, 
managers may reduce such expenses to boost current earnings. If firms usually 
1 Due to the differences between the US and China in reporting requirements for the financial statement, this study follows 
Jiang et al. (2013) to define discretionary expenses as the sum of sales expenses and administrative expenses for firm i in 
year t.
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pay such expenditures with cash, they may experience a higher cash flow and an 
abnormal CFO effect in the current period (Roychowdhury, 2006).
Finally, following Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012), this chapter 
constructs two aggregate proxies by combining the aforementioned individual 
proxies to capture the total effects of real earnings management. The first 
aggregate real management proxy is expressed as:
_1RM abnormal cash flow from operations abnormal production costs            (8)
The regression multiplies abnormal cash flow from operations by -1 and then adds 
abnormal production costs. As a consequence, a higher level of RM_1 indicates 
higher levels of real earnings management activities. Abnormal production costs 
would not be multiplied by -1, since a larger value of abnormal production costs 
already implies a higher level of real activities.
The second aggregate measure is: 
_ 2RM abnormal cash flow from operations abnormal discretionary expenses          (9)
In equation (9), the second aggregate RM measure is the sum of abnormal cash 
flow from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses multiplied by -1. A 
larger value of RM_2 suggests a greater use of sales manipulation and 
discretionary expenses reduction; in that case managers may exploit a real 
earnings strategy to a greater extent.
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Following Cohen et al. (2008) and Badertscher (2011), this chapter constructs the 
third aggregate measure, RM_3 by the following equation:
_ 3RM abnormal cash flow from operations abnormal production costs
abnormal discretionary expenses
  
             (10)
In detail, a larger value of RM_3 suggests a greater use of real earnings 
management to manage earnings. 
2.3.2 Research Design
This chapter uses the following two regressions to examine the impact of the split 
share structure reform on both earnings management activities individually, and 
on the relations between them, over time. The first regression model examines a 
firm’s decision to engage in accrual-based earnings management activities:
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15 16 17
_ _
1 4
_ _
DA SSSREF RM PROXY SSSREF RM PROXY DUALITY BIND
PAY TOP STATE TS BIG TOBINQ LEVERAGE FIRMSIZE
BM ROA IPO DUM ST DUM
     
       
   
      
       
            (11)
where the dependent variable, DA, is discretionary accruals and RM_PROXY is 
either three individual real earnings proxies (ACFO, APROD, and ADISX), or the 
three aggregate real earnings management proxies. The indicator variable is 
SSSREF2, which is equal to one in the year when a listed firm is chosen to 
2To fully capture the impact of SSSREF, this chapter will also re-examine regressions (11) and (12) when including the 
year of reform. However, given the special mechanism of SSSREF implemented by the CSRC, it is reasonable to calculate 
the starting point of SSSREF of all listed firms as the year 2006 rather than their announcement year. This is because the 
CSRC’s policy announcement, piloting, and issue of guidelines in 2005 should have sent clear signals to the market about 
the impending reform across all listed firms. Assuming state shareholders are forward-looking and not myopic, these 
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complete the split share reform and zero otherwise. The term 
RM_PROXY*SSSREF is the interaction between the real earnings management 
proxies and the indicator variable, to test the relationship between accrual-based 
and real earnings management in the post-reform period.
This chapter also examines real earnings manipulation with the following 
regression:
 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
13 14 15 16 17
_
1 4
_ _
RM PROXY SSSREF DA SSSREF DA DUALITY BIND
PAY TOP STATE TS BIG TOBINQ LEVERAGE
FIRMSIZE BM ROA IPO DUM ST DUM
     
      
    
      
       
                     (12)
where RM_PROXY is individual or aggregate real earnings management proxy 
and DA*SSSREF is the interaction variable between accrual-based earnings 
management and the SSSREF. The SSSREF dummy variable captures the impact 
of the reform on firm-specific earnings strategies after a firm is chosen for NTS 
share conversion. The terms RM_PROXY (DA) and RM_PROXY*SSSREF 
(DA*SSSREF) capture the long-term relation between the two earnings strategies 
and their relation after the reform. In testing the relation of these two earnings 
management strategies, this chapter expects to observe a positive coefficient 
between RM_PROXY and DA, due to weak investor protection and corporate 
governance. We also expect a negative coefficient of the interactive terms in 
equations (11) and (12) if listed firms prefer to switch from one method to another 
market-wide signals should have started to invoke the incentive alignment effect between them and the private shareholders 
from 2006 onward, even among firms not immediately selected by the CSRC to undergo the reform. Then, as a robustness 
test, these analyses are replicated by substituting SSSREF with another variable, dummy2006, which equals 1 for the years 
2006-2011 and 0 for the years 2002-2005. The results of this robustness test in Tables 2.23 and 2.24 are consistent with 
those in Tables 2.4 and 2.5.
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in the post-reform period, and thus the positive relationship between the two 
earnings activities should be weaker.
To fully examine the effect of SSSREF on Chinese listed firms’ earnings 
management, this chapter also controls for variables related to corporate 
governance and firm characteristics, which have been proven to have explanatory 
power for the choice of earnings management activities. Previous literature states 
that it is difficult for controlling shareholders to manipulate accounting 
information when a firm has stronger corporate governance (Fan et al., 2007; Liu 
and Lu, 2007). Warfield et al. (1995) find that top executives may indulge in 
earnings management to avoid losses and smooth earnings. This chapter also 
considers and includes CEO and top management compensation, which is related 
to firms’ reported earnings in China (Firth et al., 2006), and we use as a proxy 
PAY, which is the natural logarithm of the total cash compensation received by the 
top three executives.  Option-based compensation is not considered in this study, 
since it is rarely used by the Chinese listed firms (Aharony et al., 2000). 
Following Firth et al. (2007b), this chapter uses Duality to control for situations 
when the CEO is also the board chair, which may weaken the board’s monitoring 
role and increase the possibility of earnings management. Klein (2002) and Gul et 
al. (2010) conclude that board independence, proxied by the ratio of independent 
directors on the board, and external audits by Big 4 auditors, have a positive effect 
on limiting controlling shareholders’ earnings manipulation, and improve 
corporate transparency and accounting quality. This chapter uses BIG4 as a 
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dummy variable that is set to one if the annual report is audited by Big 4 auditors 
or their joint ventures, and zero otherwise.
Ownership concentration, TOP1, is measured by the percentage of shares held by 
the largest shareholder. However, controlling NTS shareholders may have 
maximized their wealth before the SSSREF through increasing earnings per share, 
which depends on the number of TS involved. To control for this effect on 
earnings strategies, this chapter uses TS in a fashion similar to Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010) and Zang (2012) as they control for outstanding shares. More precisely, TS 
is calculated by the natural logarithm of tradable shares. 
The type of ownership is another factor that has effects on earnings management. 
Ding et al. (2007) and Armstrong et al. (2010) suggest that private firms prefer to 
use more earnings management than state-owned firms, since they cannot obtain 
subsidies from state or local government to invest to improve the firm’s quality. 
This chapter uses STATE as a dummy variable; it is equal to one if the largest 
shareholder is the government and zero otherwise. In addition, Aharony et al. 
(2000) and Cheng et al. (2010) conclude that Chinese firms are more likely to 
engage in earnings management in financial activities such as IPOs or the process 
of losing their special treatment status, which provide incentive for managers to 
meet or beat an earnings benchmark in order to obtain additional benefits from 
overstated earnings, or to keep the firm’s listed status corresponding to the 
earnings requirement regulated by the CSRC. This chapter includes the indicator 
variables IPO_DUM and ST_DUM respectively, if firms engage in such activities. 
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The firm characteristics, including size, capital structure and performance, may 
also affect earnings management (Fan et al., 2007; Firth et al., 2007b; Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010). Compared with small, rapidly growing firms, whose business 
activities are hard to observe, large firms may have more costs associated with 
manipulating earnings due to the greater scrutiny by regulators and auditors. The 
variable FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of each fiscal 
year; LEVERAGE, which has been found to affect the earnings response 
coefficient, is defined as total debt divided by total assets; BM is the book-to-
market ratio to control for firm growth rate; TOBINQ is a proxy for investment 
opportunities and is the market value of assets divided by reproduction cost; ROA, 
return on assets, measures firm profitability. This chapter also uses industry 
dummies, constructed according to the CSRC classification, to control for the 
impact of industry-wide performance, and Huber-White adjusted t-statistics to 
control for heteroskedasticity.
2.3.3 Data Selection and Summary Statistics
Information about the annual financial accounting of Chinese listed companies 
from 1998 to 2011 is extracted from the China Stock Market Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database. Although the publication of cash flow statements 
has been compulsory for all Chinese listed firms since 1998, the regressions in 
equations (2) to (7) require sales in year t - 2 and assets in year t - 1 to calculate 
the real and accrual-based earnings management proxies; the variables from cash 
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flow statements are therefore from 2000. Hovakimian (2009) excludes the 
financial industry, since investments in the form of capital assets vary 
significantly between financial and other industries. Therefore, this chapter also 
restricts the sample to non-financial firms with at least eight observations in each 
CSRC industrial code grouping per year. In addition, because corporate 
governance variables are available from the CSMAR database gradually from 
2002, the final sample period for the regression analyses ranges from 2002 to 
2011. After excluding firms with missing data for control variables and 
calculating discretionary accruals as well as real earnings proxies, this study 
obtains a total of 13,840 firm–year observations. There are 12,610 observations 
for RM_1(3), and 13,602 for RM_2, due to the data requirements to calculate 
them.
[Insert Table 2.1 around here]
Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics of the final sample from 2002 to 2011. 
Panel A reports the sample distribution of firm-years. The number of firms 
dramatically increased from 2002 to 2011, reflecting the rapid growth of the 
Chinese stock market. Panel B provides summary measures of various accounting 
and financial variables in the regressions mentioned above. The median and mean 
of the majority of variables are quite similar to the results of Firth et al. (2007b), 
Gul et al. (2010), and Hou et al. (2012), although the sample periods are different 
in these studies. The mean of ROE is 0.036, with a standard deviation of 0.596. 
About 7% of firms use one of the international Big 4 auditors or their joint 
ventures. The mean and median values of the book-to-market (BM) ratio are very 
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close, 0.377 and 0.388, respectively. The ownership structure of Chinese listed 
firms is highly concentrated compared to the structure in developed markets; its 
mean is  38%, which is slightly lower than the results of Ding et al. (2007) and 
Gul et al. (2010), who find 41.9% and 42.8%, respectively. The difference might 
be due to the different sample periods and the decrease in the number of NTS held 
by controlling shareholders after the reform. The mean of STATE is 47.9%, which 
reveals that the state is the largest shareholder and continues to play an important 
role in Chinese listed companies. More importantly, Panel B also reports the 
descriptive statistics of earnings management variables. For the discretionary 
accrual part, the mean value is 0.001, which is close to the 0.002 reported by Firth 
et al. (2007b), and its median is 0.003, slightly higher than the mean. Regarding 
the three individual real earnings management proxies, the average of APROD is 
negative, with a zero median; ADISX has a negative median and the largest 
magnitude of the three individual real earnings management proxies. The median 
of the three aggregate real proxies are all positive and equal to 0.013.
Table 2.2 shows the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables in the main tests 
during 2002-2011. Consistent with our expectation, DA and RM are highly and 
positively correlated. Specifically, the correlation figures between DA and RM_2 
and between DA and RM_3 are 0.492 and 0.309, respectively. This indicates that 
firms prefer to use both real and accrual-based earnings strategies to supplement 
each other. The three aggregate real earnings management proxies are highly 
correlated, in the range from 0.655 to 0.911. This result suggests that these 
proxies are indicative of real earnings management and can be substituted for each 
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other. They are also highly correlated with the three individual real earnings 
management proxies. For example, the correlation coefficient between RM_3 and 
the three individual measures is between 0.601 and 0.896, which is much higher 
than in the US market as reported by Cohen et al. (2008). Of the three individual 
real proxies, APROD has a positive correlation with DA and the aggregated 
proxies RM_1 and RM_3, while the correlations between ACFO and DA and 
between ACFO and RM_2 and RM_3 are all significantly negative. These results 
suggest that firms attempt to achieve high earnings by manipulating production 
activities and related cash flows. Consistent with the results of Firth et al. (2006), 
the compensation of the top three senior managers is significantly positively 
correlated with DA, but negatively correlated with real earnings management 
activities. A reverse relation can be found for leverage. The number of TS is 
positively correlated with real earnings management but insignificantly with 
accrual-based management. Overall, these preliminary results based on Pearson 
correlation are in line with previous studies, as well as with the hypotheses that 
listed firms in China may engage in both accrual-based and real earning strategies, 
and that their earnings management activities are correlated with firm 
characteristics and corporate governance features.
[Insert Table 2.2 around here]
To examine whether the incentive alignment of the split share structure reform 
can improve firm corporate governance in the Chinese market, this chapter tests 
the significance of differences in the corporate governance variables used in the 
study between the pre- and post-reform periods. Table 2.3 reports the mean values 
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of the corporate governance variables and the results of t-tests on the significance 
of the differences in variables between the two periods. Consistent with previous 
results and hypotheses, the results in Table 2.3 reveal an improvement in these 
corporate governance proxies. More specifically, ownership concentration 
significantly decreased. The largest shareholder’s holding declined by 5%, from 
40% to 35%. Similarly, state ownership also significantly decreased, from 54.3% 
to 40.5%. Regarding board independence and CEO duality, a significant increase 
in the value of the former, and a decrease in the value of the latter, are observed.
These results indicate that the SSSREF has effectively improved the quality of 
firms’ corporate governance in China, where the institutional environment, 
particularly minority shareholder protection, is weaker than in the developed 
countries. Therefore, the regressions in this chapter include these variables to 
control for their effect on earnings management. However, the ownership of the 
largest shareholders in China is still high after the reform. Hence, this chapter 
perceives that the split share reform may not have sufficiently increased the 
quality of financial information, because controlling shareholders have an 
incentive to manipulate earnings to increase their own wealth by inflating the 
share price after their NTS are converted into TS.
[Insert Table 2.3 around here]
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2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Main Tests of the Hypotheses for Accrual-Based Earnings 
Activities
Table 2.4 reports the results of regression (11) for accrual-based earnings 
management in Chinese listed firms. Models 1, 2, and 3 use aggregate real 
earnings management proxies, RM_1, RM_2, and RM_3, respectively. We also 
control for industry effects across all models and report regression results with 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. In addition, this chapter applies 
bootstrap median regressions to eliminate the influence of outliers in the 
estimation. In Table 2.4, there is a significant positive correlation between 
accrual-based and aggregate real earnings management proxies at the 1% level 
across all models. The results imply that Chinese listed firms with higher levels of 
real earnings management tend to engage in more accrual-based earnings 
management. The results also support H1, that Chinese listed firms use both 
abnormal accrual-based and real earnings management at the same time and there 
is a positive relation between these two earnings strategies. This finding may 
reflect weak protection of minority shareholders in China.
As discussed earlier, this chapter assumes that improved corporate transparency 
and incentive alignment between NTS and TS shareholders have resulted in a 
decrease in accrual-based earnings management since the split share reform. 
Accordingly, Table 2.4 reports a significantly negative coefficient for SSSREF for 
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all models. These results indicate that since the reform listed firms in China have 
preferred to reduce accrual-based management, although they also use real 
earnings management. This finding is consistent with H2, and reveals that accrual-
based earnings management with weak external corporate governance 
mechanisms in emerging markets could be effectively constrained by improving 
incentive alignment rather than by accounting reporting rules. Furthermore, the 
results are similar to the findings of Cohen et al. (2008) and Ipino and Parbonetti 
(2011), that there has been a significant decrease in accrual-based earnings 
management since SOX and the adoption of IFRS in developed markets. Unlike 
the direct regulatory changes in accounting reporting practice such as SOX and 
IFRS, the split share structure reform aligned interests between majority and 
minority shareholders rather than imposing direct comprehensive regulatory 
changes in firms’ accounting reporting practices. Moreover, unlike the SOX and 
IFRS reforms, the SSSREF took place in a market with weak corporate 
governance and investor protection. However, the results show that the SSSREF 
can constrain Chinese listed firms’ accrual-based earnings activities. 
For H3, this chapter also finds a significant negative relation between accrual-
based earnings management and RM_PROXY*SSSREF across all regressions with 
various real earnings management proxies. This empirical evidence indicates that 
the positive relation between accrual-based and real earnings management has 
decreased in the post-reform period. This may be because firms are more likely to 
replace accrual-based earnings management with less detectable and less 
scrutinized real earnings management activities.
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The results in Table 2.4 are also robust to the control of corporate governance 
variables, firm characteristics, and industry effects. Discretionary accruals are 
significantly and negatively associated with the number of tradable shares (TS), 
while the coefficient of the salary of top management (PAY) is significant and 
positive. In addition, the significantly negative coefficient of TS is similar to the 
results of Cohen and Zarowin (2010), and implies that the larger the number of TS, 
the greater the monitoring effects from minority shareholders. Furthermore, the 
cost of earnings management to improve earnings per share depends on the 
number of TS. The positive coefficient on PAY implies that top managers are 
more likely to use discretionary accruals since their salary is closely linked to 
reported earnings. Regarding firm characteristics, the results indicate that large 
firms or firms with a lower book-to-market ratio (BM), a lower leverage ratio 
(LEVERAGE), and a higher Tobin’s Q (TOBINQ) are more likely to manage 
accruals.
[Insert Table 2.4 around here]
2.4.2 Main Tests of the Hypotheses for Real Earnings Activities
Table 2.5 reports the results of the effects of the SSSREF on firm real earnings 
management behaviour. This study estimates regression (12) with three aggregate 
real earnings management proxies as the dependent variables in models 1 to 3, 
respectively. Consistent with H1, the empirical results in both Tables 2.4 and 2.5 
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indicate a positive and significant association between real and accrual-based 
earnings management, and they are significant at the 1% level. The discretionary 
accrual (DA) coefficients in Table 2.5 are all positive and significant across all 
aggregate real earnings management proxies. Specifically, the magnitude of the 
coefficient for DA is greatest for the measure RM_3, which is the combination of 
ACFO, APROD, and ADISX, and smallest for RM_1. This result further confirms 
H1, that there is a positive relation between accrual-based and real earnings 
management in Chinese listed firms over the whole sample period. Combined 
with the results of Table 2.4, these results show that Chinese listed firms engaging 
in either real or accrual-based earnings management are more likely than not to 
also use the other method as a supplement.
In contrast to the results for accrual-based earnings management in Table 2.4, the 
signs of the coefficients of SSSREF in Table 2.5 are all positive and significant at 
the 1% level when the three aggregate real earnings management proxies are 
employed as dependent variables. This indicates the increasing use of real 
earnings management since the reform. Together with the accrual-based earnings 
management results in Table 2.4, which shows a significantly negative coefficient 
on SSSREF, the above findings provide additional evidence to support H2, that 
since the reform Chinese listed firms use more RM and less AM. More 
importantly, the coefficient of the interactive term between DA and the SSSREF 
dummy is significantly negative for all the aggregate RM proxies. This finding 
implies that since the reform, firms are more likely to switch from AM to RM, 
thus supporting H3. Although previous studies indicate that the quality of firms’ 
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information and incentive alignments for profit maximization have improved due 
to the reform, earnings quality has not fundamentally changed. Managers of 
Chinese listed firms take advantage of the dynamic relation between the two 
earnings strategies to avoid detection and scrutiny by the capital market and 
regulators.
The coefficient estimates of the control variables in Table 2.5 have signs opposite 
to those from the regressions with DA as the dependent variable in Table 2.4, 
which further supports the previous findings. Compared with the results in Table 
2.4, those in Table 2.5 indicate that top managers with higher salaries tend to use 
more AM than RM. The positive and significant coefficients of TOP1 in Table 2.5 
suggest that greater ownership concentration is more likely to allow controlling 
shareholders to engage in more RM and camouflage their expropriation of the 
value of minority shareholders. Moreover, the significant negative coefficient of 
BIG4 in Table 2.5 indicates that firms are less likely to manipulate real earnings 
given the presence of one of the international Big 4 firms or their joint ventures. 
In contrast to the results for accruals in Table 2.4, the aggregate RM proxies are 
lower in large firms or in firms with lower BM, lower LEVERAGE, and higher 
TOBINQ. Moreover, the results show that firms with more tradable shares (TS) 
prefer RM over AM, since the latter is more likely to be detected.
[Insert Table 2.5 around here]
As a result, previous research suggests the reform exogenously improved 
incentive alignment between NTS and TS shareholders. Both are now gradually 
48
focusing on improving firm quality for profit maximization, as the stock held by 
NTS controlling shareholders becomes tradable and linked to stock performance. 
These shareholders may have an incentive to supply information to reap the 
benefits of market-based capital allocation and avoid adverse stock pricing. The 
need for controlling shareholders to withhold or manipulate stock price sensitive 
information should also be reduced (Hou et al., 2012).
However, controlling shareholders may be tempted to increase wealth by inflating 
stock prices in the post-reform period. Since a firm’s operating performance 
cannot be improved within a short time, most managers prefer to manipulate 
accounting performance and camouflage their expropriation intentions. The 
results of this chapter indicate that since the reform listed firms in China have 
chosen to switch from AM to RM, as the costs of manipulating accruals increase 
with heightened scrutiny by the capital market. This finding is consistent with the 
results of Zang (2012), who shows that managers treat AM and RM strategies as 
substitutes. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 reveal that, similar to SOX and IFRS, the incentive 
alignment brought about by the SSSREF has had a positive impact on Chinese 
listed firms’ earnings behaviour in terms of AM. However, a fundamental 
improvement in the quality of firm financial information is not sufficient, since 
dominant shareholders still retain a large ownership share, even though the 
shareholdings of the largest shareholders and state ownership are significantly 
reduced.
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2.4.3 Robustness Checks
2.4.3.1 Individual Real Earnings Proxies
In Table 2.6, the three aggregate real earnings management proxies are replaced 
with three individual proxies, ACFO, APROD, and ADISX. The results are quite 
similar to those in Table 2.4 and support the predictions of the three hypotheses. 
More specifically, the negative coefficients of ACFO and ADISX and the positive 
coefficient of APROD are all significant at the 1% level, which reveals a positive 
relation between AM and RM. Furthermore, the coefficients of SSSREF remain 
negative while the interaction terms of SSSREF*ACFO, and SSSREF*ADISX are 
positive. This evidence further confirms the predicted substitutive relation 
between AM and RM since the reform that is presented in Table 2.4.
[Insert Table 2.6 around here]
To fully discover the effect of real earnings management, this chapter replicates 
the analysis of Table 2.6 by replacing the aggregate real earnings management 
proxies with their three components. The results in Table 2.7 support the 
hypotheses above and are similar to those in Tables 2.4 to 2.6. Consistent with H1, 
the coefficients of DA for ACFO and ADISX are significant and negative, while 
that for APROD is significantly positive, indicating a positive relation between 
discretionary accruals and individual real earnings management proxies. The 
coefficients of SSSREF are significant and have similar signs as above, implying a 
greater use of real earnings management after SSSREF and supporting H2. The 
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coefficients of DA*SSSREF show a significant positive association with the 
values of ACFO and ADISX after the reform and further confirm H3. For the 
control variables, results are similar to those reported in Table 2.5.
[Insert Table 2.7 around here]
2.4.3.2 Accounting Flexibility
Previous studies suggest that managers do not have unlimited discretion to 
manipulate earnings upward, due to the reversing nature of accrual accounting and 
flexibility within firms’ internal accounting systems. Barton and Simko (2002) 
point out that the extent of earnings management is constrained by accounting 
choices in previous periods, and the net asset values on the balance sheet reflect 
the level of past earnings management. Firms with higher levels of overstated net 
assets relative to sales will be less able to engage in further accruals management. 
On the other hand, Wang and D'Souza (2006) build on this research and show that 
firms are more likely to engage in real earnings manipulation by reducing R&D 
expenditures when accounting flexibility is low. Therefore, this chapter follows 
Barton and Simko (2002) and uses net operating assets scaled by sales at the 
beginning of the year to proxy for accounting flexibility. Then, this chapter 
incorporates the accounting flexibility proxy and its interactive term with SSSREF, 
to test whether empirical results on earnings management are induced by changes 
in accounting flexibility or by the effect of the SSSREF:
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1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15 16 17 18 19
_ _
1 4
_ _
DA SSSREF BSC BSC SSSREF RM PROXY SSSREF RM PROXY
DUALITY BIND PAY TOP STATE TS BIG TOBINQ
LEVERAGE FIRMSIZE BM ROA IPO DUM ST DUM
     
       
     
       
       
     
          (13)
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15 16 17 18 19
_
1 4
_ _
RM PROXY SSSREF BSC BSC SSSREF DA SSSREF DA
DUALITY BIND PAY TOP STATE TS BIG TOBINQ
LEVERAGE FIRMSIZE BM ROA IPO DUM ST DUM
     
       
     
       
       
                    (14)
where the dependent variable is discretionary accruals in equation (13) and the 
aggregate real earning proxies in equation (14). For the independent variables, 
BSCa is computed as the ratio 1 1/t tNOA Sales  . Following Defond (2002), this 
ratio is divided by its corresponding industry median value to account for its high 
dependence on the industry.
Consistent with the findings of Barton and Simko (2002), Wang and D'Souza 
(2006), and Zang (2012), the BSCa coefficient in the third row of Table 2.8 is 
significantly and negatively correlated with discretionary accruals, confirming that 
firms with low accounting flexibility tend to have lower levels of discretionary 
accrual. At the same time, the coefficients of BSCa with aggregate real earning 
proxies are positive and significant in Table 2.9, which implies that firms are more 
likely to engage in real earnings manipulation when the option to use accruals is 
constrained by lower accounting flexibility. However, the coefficients of the 
interactive term between BSCa and SSSREF are all insignificant in Table 2.8, 
across all models, while they are significantly positive in Table 2.9. These results 
suggest that changes in accounting flexibility have a similar effect on accrual-
based earnings manipulation, both before and after the reform, and a decrease in 
52
accounting flexibility is more likely to induce higher levels of real earnings 
management, which has indeed increased since the SSSREF.
Therefore, after controlling for accounting flexibility, the results for the 
hypotheses in both Tables 2.8 and 2.9 are consistent with the finding in previous 
tables that a long-term positive relation exists between AM and RM. In addition, 
in the post-reform period the use of discretionary accruals has declined, while real 
earnings management activities have increased; hence the positive relation 
between those two earnings strategies has reduced since the reform. The signs and 
magnitudes of the control variables remain very similar to the results in the 
previous tables.
[Insert Tables 2.8 and 2.9 around here]
2.4.3.3 Difference-in-Difference Design
To employ the difference-in-difference method, this chapter splits the listed firms 
into two groups, one with and one without NTS, to compare them under similar 
market conditions. If the reform does not improve the incentive alignment 
between shareholders for the group of firms without NTS, then it is treated as the 
control group and no changes in related earnings management activities are 
expected. On the other hand, the group of firms with NTS is considered the 
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treatment group, and SSSREF is expected to have a significant effect on their 
earnings management behaviour.
Table 2.10 reports the results of regressing DA on the SSSREF dummy, real 
earnings proxies, the interaction term between these two, and the same set of 
control variables used in the main tests. Consistent with our expectations, Table 
2.10 shows that for the treatment group the coefficients of SSSREF are still 
significantly negative, which indicates that DA is lower after the reform. 
Furthermore, the RM coefficient is still positive and significant, while the 
interaction term coefficient is still significantly negative. This shows that the long-
term positive relation between accrual-based and real earnings management is 
lower after the reform. These results imply that these firms have shifted from AM 
to less detectable RM activities, which is in line with the results in Table 2.4. In 
contrast, the coefficients of both SSSREF and the interaction terms are 
insignificant for the control group, which implies that the SSSREF had no impact 
on the control group (firms without NTS), since they are unaffected by the 
aforementioned incentive alignment effect. In Table 2.11, the results also reveal 
that the SSSREF had an impact on the treatment group but not on the control 
group when regressing real earnings on the three main explanatory variables, as 
well as the same set of control variables.
[Insert Tables 2.10 and 2.11 around here]
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2.4.3.4 The Suspect Firm Analysis
To test whether earnings proxies capture firms’ earnings activities, this chapter 
follows Cohen et al. (2008) to apply suspect firm analysis to the incentive 
variables proposed by Roychowdhury (2006) and Graham et al. (2005). 
Specifically, the chapter tests two groups of suspect firms: one includes those 
firms that managed their earnings to avoid reporting a loss, and the other 
comprises firms that managed their earnings to maintain the same level as or 
slightly higher level than the prior year’s earnings, as firms prefer to engage in 
earnings management according to these benchmarks. The former group includes 
those firms with net income divided by total assets in the interval [0, 0.005], while 
the latter group includes those firms with a change in net income divided by total 
assets in the interval [0, 0.005]. The results in Table 2.12 indicate that the firms in 
these two suspect groups manifest significant changes in their AM and RM 
proxies. According to the hypothesis of this chapter, accrual-based earnings 
management activities are significantly decreased after the SSSREF, while real 
earnings management proxies are significantly increased, as shown with all three 
alternative measures. This suspect firm analysis also demonstrates that those firms 
that engaged in earnings management shifted from accrual-based earnings 
management to real earnings management after the SSSREF.
[Insert Table 2.12 around here]
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2.4.3.5 Sensitivity Tests
This chapter conducts various sensitivity tests to further check the robustness of 
the empirical results shown in previous tables.
2.4.3.5.1 Alternative Modified Jones Model
Following Kothari et al. (2005) and Cohen et al. (2008), this chapter employs the 
alternative modified Jones model and computes discretionary accruals with the 
denominator in the second term of equation (1) replaced with the difference 
between changes in sales revenue and changes in account receivables. The results 
strongly support the main hypotheses, indicating an increasing trend in the 
implementation of real earnings management and a reduction in accrual-based 
earnings strategies after the SSSREF, while there is a long-term positive 
relationship between these two earnings activities.
[Insert Tables 2.13 and 2.14 around here]
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2.4.3.5.2 The Effect of IFRS
Ipino and Parbonetti (2011) find a decrease in discretionary accruals and an 
increase in real earnings management activities after the adoption of IFRS in 
countries with better enforcement regimes. However, the SSSREF is more 
exogenous than SOX/IFRS for the following reasons. First, the SSSREF is not a 
direct regulatory change in accounting reporting rules, whereas both SOX and 
IFRS are. Second, the Chinese SSSREF does not impose comprehensive 
regulatory changes on the accounting reporting practices of firms, but enhances 
incentive alignment to influence earnings management behaviour. Third, the IFRS 
requirement for all listed firms may partially influence the impact of the SSSREF 
on earnings management. To control for the confounding IFRS effect, two 
methods are adopted. First, to avoid the problem of multicollinearity, this study 
follows Hou et al. (2012) and includes observations from 2002 to 2007, since the 
effect of IFRS is expected to occur from 2008 in China.
The related results for equations (11) and (12) are reported in Tables 2.15 and 
2.16, respectively. Similar to previous robustness checks, the main results remain 
unchanged. Table 2.15 shows a positive relation between AM and RM, and the 
coefficients of SSSREF and the interaction term between SSSREF and RM proxies 
remain significantly negative. These results confirm that there has been a 
significant reduction in AM and firms have shifted to RM since the reform. In 
Table 2.16, DA and all the interaction term coefficients are significant with the 
expected signs. More importantly, the coefficient of SSSREF is significantly 
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positive, which confirms that Chinese listed firms engage in more real earnings 
management since the reform.
[Insert Tables 2.15 and 2.16 around here]
The second method is to incorporate an IFRS dummy variable set to one after 
2007 and zero otherwise. The results in Tables 2.17 and 2.18 are all consistent 
with the main hypotheses described above and the coefficients remain significant.
[Insert Tables 2.17 and 2.18 around here]
2.4.3.5.3 Firm Clustering3
This chapter also provides empirical results when the coefficients and t-stats are 
computed using firm clustering standard errors robust to H1, H2 and H3. From 
Table 2.19, the coefficients of real earnings management are significantly positive, 
which implies that firms with higher levels of real earnings management also tend 
to engage in more accrual-based earnings management. In addition, both SSSREF 
and the interaction term between SSSREF and RM coefficients remain 
significantly negative. This finding further confirms that since the reform Chinese 
3 Following Bond and Meghir (1994) and Harrison and McMillan (2003), this chapter also induces fixed effects to control 
for all unobserved time-invariant variables to re-examine the hypotheses. The results when fixed effects for panel data are 
controlled for are still consistent with the findings in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. 
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listed firms have used less discretionary accruals and the positive relation between 
accrual-based and real earnings management has weakened. On the other hand, 
the results in Table 2.20 also reveal that the coefficients of DA and the interaction 
term between DA and SSSREF are significantly positive and negative, respectively. 
The coefficient of SSSREF is statistically significant and positive, which confirms 
an increase in real earnings management since the reform and a shift from accrual-
based earnings management to real earnings management.
 [Insert Tables 2.19 and 2.20 around here]
2.4.3.5.4 Regression with Outliers
The results for the observations with all outliers are given in Tables 2.21 and 2.22. 
The results remain consistent with the main findings reported in previous tables.
[Insert Tables 2.21 and 2.22 around here]
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter contributes to the earnings management literature by providing 
empirical evidence on firms’ accrual-based and real-based earnings behaviours 
and their relationship in the Chinese stock market. In addition, compared with the 
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impact of the direct regulatory changes in accounting reporting rules such as SOX 
and IFRS on earnings management in developed markets, this chapter explores 
the unique setting of China’s split share structure reform and investigates the 
effect of exogenous incentive alignment between NTS and TS shareholders on 
Chinese listed firms’ earnings strategies. 
Specifically, the chapter considers firms’ earnings management as a dynamic 
process, as it can employ multiple earnings measures with any combination of 
accrual- or real-based methods to achieve the desired accounting outcomes. The 
results show that there is a long-term positive relationship between the two 
earnings management activities throughout the sample period from 2002 to 2011. 
Furthermore, after the SSSREF, it is also interesting to note the tendency of firms 
to use more real earnings management and less accrual-based earnings 
management, and the significant reduction in the long-term positive relation 
between the two earnings activities. These findings suggest that firms may have 
shifted their focus from accrual-based to real earnings activities to avoid detection 
and scrutiny by the capital market after the SSSREF.
Furthermore, although previous studies show that the incentive alignment effect 
created by the reform has improved the quality of financial information, the 
positive relation between accrual-based and real earnings management is still 
observed in the post-reform period, which implies that SSSREF may not have 
fundamentally improved firms’ quality. The main reason for this is that even in 
the post-reform period, controlling shareholders in China still own the largest 
percentage of total shares.
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There are several policy implications based on the empirical evidence from this 
chapter. First of all, under the weak investor protection mechanism, the incentive 
alignment created by SSSREF could have a similar effect to that of a direct 
regulatory change in accounting reporting rules in developed countries, in terms of 
limiting accrual-based earnings management. However, because the incentive 
alignment created by SSSREF has led controlling shareholders to focus on stock 
performance, the incentives for earnings management may also increase. While 
firm operating performance cannot be improved overnight, accounting 
performance can be achieved through earnings manipulation in a short period. As 
a result, managers or controlling shareholders in Chinese listed firms may have 
incentives to manipulate earnings using less detectable real activities, which can 
be costly and difficult to monitor for outside investors. 
Therefore, investors in China need to pay more attention to earnings management, 
since increasing scrutiny or costs of accounting discretion cannot prevent firms 
from engaging in earnings management activities. Controlling shareholders may 
simply switch to a different earnings management method to camouflage their 
expropriation of minority shareholders. Regulators need to be aware of both forms 
of earnings activity, and tackle such opportunistic behaviours by introducing 
mechanisms that curb the power of controlling shareholders. This study represents 
an important extension to the current literature on the earnings management 
behaviours in a fast growing capital market.
61
Table 2.1 Sample and Summary Statistics
Panel A. Annual Number of Firm Observations
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Observations 1,048 1,117 1,198 1,293 1,285 1,320 1,432 1,524 1,620 2,003
Panel B. Summary Statistics
Standard 25th 50th 75th
Variable Observations Mean
deviation percentile percentile percentile
DA 13840 0.001 0.092 -0.045 0.003 0.049
RM_1 12610 -0.005 0.159 -0.086 0.013 0.094
RM_2 13602 0.007 0.111 -0.059 0.012 0.076
RM_3 12610 -0.003 0.205 -0.113 0.013 0.123
ACFO 13840 -0.003 0.095 -0.054 -0.002 0.052
APROD 12831 -0.01 0.128 -0.07 0 0.058
ADISX 13602 -0.003 0.064 -0.045 -0.014 0.023
BSCa 13196 1.376 1.306 0.565 1 1.676
SSSREF 13840 0.468 0.499 0 0 1
TOP1 13840 0.38 0.161 0.254 0.358 0.502
PAY 13840 13.372 0.928 12.78 13.43 13.998
BIND 13840 0.348 0.062 0.333 0.333 0.372
DUALITY 13840 0.152 0.359 0 0 0
BIG4 13840 0.07 0.256 0 0 0
STATE 13840 0.479 0.5 0 0 1
TS 13840 19.012 1.067 18.264 18.915 19.619
LEVERAGE 13840 0.522 0.29 0.353 0.507 0.645
TOBINQ 13840 2.268 1.711 1.257 1.727 2.602
ROA 13838 0.036 0.596 0.01 0.033 0.063
BM 13840 0.377 0.279 0.2 0.338 0.525
FIRMSIZE 13840 21.457 1.177 20.676 21.338 22.107
IPO_DUM 13840 0.142 0.349 0 0 0
ST_DUM 13840 0.064 0.245 0 0 0
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix.
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Table 2.2 Correlation Matrix
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RM_1 0.106 1
RM_2 0.492 0.655 1
RM_3 0.309 0.911 0.871 1
ACFO -0.540 -0.331 -0.844 -0.681 1
APROD 0.090 0.943 0.573 0.896 -0.399 1
ADISX -0.103 -0.734 -0.587 -0.601 0.081 -0.484 1
BSCa -0.043 0.097 0.065 0.084 -0.020 0.081 -0.093 1
SSSREF -0.012 0.002 0.031 0.012 -0.023 -0.005 -0.015 0.037 1
TOP1 0.068 0.030 0.003 0.014 0.022 0.022 -0.035 -0.129 -0.153 1
PAY 0.107 -0.153 -0.088 -0.131 0.024 -0.135 0.129 -0.144 0.345 -0.067 1
BIND 0.003 -0.011 0.025 0.004 -0.030 -0.014 -0.001 0.018 0.256 -0.072 0.207 1
DUALITY 0.004 -0.055 -0.034 -0.047 0.005 -0.047 0.048 0.016 -0.010 -0.091 0.030 0.062 1
BIG4 0.019 -0.032 -0.046 -0.038 0.027 -0.023 0.045 -0.059 -0.078 0.088 0.117 -0.031 -0.037 1
STATE 0.005 0.071 -0.004 0.045 0.027 0.078 -0.030 -0.058 -0.174 0.310 -0.144 -0.159 -0.116 0.081 1
TS -0.013 0.044 0.043 0.043 -0.019 0.032 -0.047 0.017 0.420 -0.043 0.438 0.170 -0.049 0.204 -0.092 1
LEVERAGE -0.250 0.120 0.102 0.149 -0.130 0.164 0.003 -0.073 0.022 -0.107 -0.118 0.036 0.003 -0.049 -0.057 -0.028 1
TOBINQ -0.020 -0.206 -0.159 -0.210 0.124 -0.214 0.117 0.016 0.158 -0.114 -0.011 0.051 0.084 -0.060 -0.164 -0.096 0.111 1
ROA 0.231 -0.111 -0.076 -0.144 0.135 -0.174 -0.052 -0.134 0.073 0.057 0.189 0.040 -0.022 0.035 -0.013 0.084 -0.270 0.072 1
BM 0.116 0.161 0.120 0.147 -0.050 0.135 -0.149 0.012 -0.170 0.137 0.007 -0.015 -0.077 0.053 0.183 0.118 -0.398 -0.591 0.083 1
FIRMSIZE 0.072 0.081 0.047 0.075 -0.031 0.086 -0.033 -0.101 0.216 0.238 0.454 0.081 -0.103 0.235 0.117 0.732 -0.034 -0.402 0.130 0.342 1
IPO_DUM 0.076 -0.059 -0.025 -0.049 0.004 -0.058 0.039 -0.064 -0.226 0.064 0.013 -0.016 0.065 -0.015 -0.019 -0.232 -0.135 0.017 0.045 0.014 -0.085 1
ST_DUM -0.065 0.009 -0.003 0.005 0.010 0.009 0.001 0.061 0.012 -0.027 -0.144 0.029 0.050 -0.040 -0.037 -0.098 0.173 0.133 0.016 -0.170 -0.198 -0.074 1
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2.3 Differences in Corporate Governance between the Pre- and Post-Reform Periods
Variable Pre-reform Post-reform Difference (post–pre) p-Value of t-test
TOP1 0.403 0.354 -0.05 0.000***
PAY 13.105 13.674 0.568 0.000***
BIND 0.335 0.362 0.027 0.000***
DUALITY 0.165 0.137 -0.028 0.000***
BIG4 0.078 0.061 -0.017 0.000***
STATE 0.543 0.405 -0.138 0.000***
TS 18.588 19.492 0.904 0.000***
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is from 2002 to 2011.
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Table 2.4 Impact of the SSSREM on Accrual-Based Earnings Management (DA) with 
Aggregate Real Earnings Proxies
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
RM_1 RM_1 RM_2 RM_2 RM_3 RM_3
SSSREF -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(-2.635) (-2.902) (-4.804) (-5.106) (-4.596) (-7.712)
RM_PROXY*SSSREF -0.032*** -0.022* -0.094*** -0.105*** -0.049*** -0.042***
(-2.726) (-1.897) (-6.601) (-5.381) (-5.691) (-3.866)
RM_PROXY 0.123*** 0.105*** 0.522*** 0.527*** 0.215*** 0.200***
(13.626) (11.079) (52.133) (46.291) (32.261) (22.291)
TOP1 -0.004 -0.009 -0.010** -0.012*** -0.006 -0.012**
(-0.765) (-1.500) (-2.275) (-5.767) (-1.146) (-1.961)
PAY 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.010***
(7.474) (5.815) (11.995) (8.257) (10.945) (11.045)
BIND 0.012 0.003 -0.012 -0.010 0.006 -0.005
(0.910) (0.317) (-1.107) (-0.962) (0.444) (-0.663)
DUALITY 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.602) (-0.015) (0.797) (0.564) (1.134) (0.993)
BIG4 -0.005 -0.004 0.003 0.006* -0.002 -0.001
(-1.624) (-1.497) (1.056) (1.932) (-0.578) (-0.537)
STATE -0.005*** -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.005*** -0.004**
(-3.030) (-1.017) (-0.481) (0.242) (-3.079) (-2.367)
TS -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.022*** -0.018*** -0.022*** -0.018***
(-12.527) (-9.335) (-17.416) (-13.877) (-14.760) (-10.765)
LEVERAGE -0.095*** -0.098*** -0.107*** -0.098*** -0.112*** -0.108***
(-24.222) (-13.329) (-30.168) (-12.907) (-28.637) (-13.268)
TOBINQ 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.006***
(6.713) (4.295) (13.299) (12.205) (11.034) (6.582)
ROA 0.002 0.033 0.005 0.059 0.002 0.054
(0.637) (0.736) (1.443) (1.144) (0.716) (0.975)
BM -0.029*** -0.022*** -0.032*** -0.021*** -0.037*** -0.027***
(-8.341) (-6.642) (-10.706) (-5.575) (-11.114) (-7.399)
FIRMSIZE 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.017***
(11.332) (9.056) (14.986) (8.656) (12.872) (6.235)
IPO_DUM 0.002 0.002 -0.006*** -0.005** 0.001 0.001
(0.795) (0.502) (-3.142) (-2.168) (0.182) (0.501)
ST_DUM -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003
(-0.898) (-0.806) (-0.452) (-1.507) (-0.817) (-0.586)
Intercept -0.081*** -0.046** -0.111*** -0.076*** -0.097*** -0.085***
(-4.016) (-1.999) (-6.755) (-2.998) (-5.166) (-3.397)
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bsqreg No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.119 0.401 0.245
Pseudo-R-squared 0.061 0.226 0.128
Observations 12,524 12,524 13,402 13,402 12,524 12,524
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variable is 
DA. Models 1, 2, and 3 are the regressions that use RM_1, RM_2, and RM_3 as the aggregate RM proxies, respectively. 
This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes. The coefficients 
and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.5 Impact of the SSSREM on Aggregate Real Earnings Management Proxies 
(Aggregate RM)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
RM_1 RM_1 RM_2 RM_2 RM_3 RM_3
SSSREF 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.030*** 0.034***
(6.675) (7.063) (7.619) (7.032) (7.716) (9.455)
DA*SSSREF -0.110*** -0.086** -0.160*** -0.100*** -0.155*** -0.083*
(-3.121) (-2.029) (-8.094) (-4.826) (-3.804) (-1.868)
DA 0.366*** 0.339*** 0.800*** 0.860*** 0.992*** 1.047***
(15.122) (11.563) (61.435) (57.497) (35.534) (36.033)
TOP1 0.023** 0.025** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.024** 0.037***
(2.357) (2.304) (3.277) (3.063) (2.095) (4.421)
PAY -0.034*** -0.032*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.039*** -0.037***
(-18.340) (-29.728) (-15.515) (-12.080) (-17.378) (-16.435)
BIND 0.014 0.006 0.034** 0.024** 0.035 0.013
(0.611) (0.267) (2.557) (2.288) (1.283) (0.434)
DUALITY -0.009** -0.010*** -0.004* -0.006*** -0.010** -0.006
(-2.184) (-2.854) (-1.948) (-3.329) (-2.198) (-1.300)
BIG4 -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.024*** -0.023***
(-3.006) (-3.957) (-4.338) (-3.772) (-3.283) (-3.073)
STATE 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.004** -0.003* 0.007** 0.005*
(3.107) (3.402) (-2.411) (-1.790) (2.035) (1.650)
TS 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.024*** 0.020*** 0.037*** 0.034***
(8.078) (5.948) (15.711) (10.351) (11.576) (7.954)
LEVERAGE 0.118*** 0.100*** 0.114*** 0.104*** 0.220*** 0.207***
(18.185) (15.233) (28.076) (15.671) (26.513) (12.749)
TOBINQ -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.029*** -0.027***
(-15.752) (-11.674) (-19.782) (-13.956) (-19.116) (-13.748)
ROA -0.002 -0.018 -0.007** -0.042 -0.005 -0.066
(-0.533) (-0.610) (-2.188) (-0.870) (-0.825) (-0.641)
BM 0.072*** 0.056*** 0.040*** 0.028*** 0.097*** 0.072***
(12.672) (11.470) (11.622) (8.323) (13.982) (13.664)
FIRMSIZE -0.009*** -0.003 -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.026*** -0.022***
(-3.193) (-0.889) (-12.206) (-6.970) (-7.849) (-4.829)
IPO_DUM 0.004 0.004 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.012* 0.010
(0.810) (0.801) (7.035) (4.317) (1.885) (1.121)
ST_DUM 0.009 0.013 -0.001 0.000 0.004 0.001
(1.395) (1.604) (-0.392) (0.103) (0.575) (0.183)
Intercept 0.119*** 0.095** 0.127*** 0.140*** 0.186*** 0.239***
(3.346) (2.260) (6.075) (5.783) (4.341) (5.421)
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bsqreg No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-Squared 0.143 0.387 0.264
Pseudo-R-squared 0.077 0.253 0.153
Observations 12,524 12,524 13,402 13,402 12,524 12,524
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variables are 
aggregate RM proxies. Models 1, 2, and 3 are the regressions that use RM_1, RM_2, and RM_3 as the aggregate RM 
proxies, respectively. This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial 
codes. The coefficients and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in 
parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.6 Impact of the SSSREM on Accrual-Based Earnings Management (DA) with 
Individual Real Earnings Proxies 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ACFO ACFO APROD APROD ADISX ADISX
SSSREF -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.004** -0.004*** -0.002 -0.002
(-4.313) (-6.599) (-2.425) (-3.099) (-1.125) (-1.369)
RM_PROXY*SSSREF 0.066*** 0.060*** -0.014 -0.005 0.125*** 0.111***
(3.989) (3.323) (-0.864) (-0.363) (4.550) (3.675)
RM_PROXY -0.624*** -0.659*** 0.129*** 0.118*** -0.250*** -0.234***
(-54.901) (-77.494) (10.330) (8.662) (-13.223) (-9.787)
TOP1 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006
(-0.238) (-0.398) (-0.456) (-1.178) (-1.187) (-1.455)
PAY 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.005***
(5.942) (3.211) (6.683) (4.887) (6.192) (4.637)
BIND -0.009 -0.006 0.015 0.008 0.004 0.002
(-0.891) (-0.656) (1.146) (0.557) (0.294) (0.217)
DUALITY -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.002
(-0.601) (0.050) (0.457) (0.496) (-0.060) (-0.824)
BIG4 0.002 0.005** -0.005* -0.003 -0.004 -0.004
(0.723) (1.980) (-1.684) (-1.153) (-1.283) (-1.394)
STATE 0.000 0.000 -0.005*** -0.002 -0.004** 0.001
(0.115) (0.212) (-3.109) (-0.889) (-2.326) (0.449)
TS -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.015***
(-15.275) (-8.491) (-12.148) (-8.849) (-12.599) (-10.751)
LEVERAGE -0.115*** -0.106*** -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.081*** -0.083***
(-30.752) (-13.331) (-24.366) (-13.715) (-21.287) (-15.196)
TOBINQ 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002**
(13.051) (9.969) (6.635) (5.003) (4.883) (2.079)
ROA 0.003 0.074 0.001 0.037 0.003 0.023
(0.970) (1.358) (0.503) (1.013) (1.022) (0.756)
BM -0.027*** -0.016*** -0.029*** -0.019*** -0.023*** -0.017***
(-9.184) (-3.591) (-8.140) (-5.710) (-6.534) (-5.653)
FIRMSIZE 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.014***
(15.320) (8.327) (11.241) (6.756) (11.320) (8.376)
IPO_DUM -0.006*** -0.005*** 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003
(-3.298) (-3.370) (0.883) (0.749) (1.373) (1.077)
ST_DUM 0.002 -0.000 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007**
(0.478) (-0.065) (-0.724) (-1.032) (-0.938) (-2.146)
Intercept -0.074*** -0.047*** -0.075*** -0.047** -0.075*** -0.037**
(-4.640) (-2.717) (-3.759) (-2.540) (-3.871) (-2.552)
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bsqreg No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-Squared 0.448 0.116 0.107
Pseudo-R-squared 0.270 0.060 0.056
Observations 13,638 13,638 12,745 12,745 13,402 13,402
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variable is 
DA. Models 1, 2, and 3 are the regressions that use ACFO, APROD, and ADISX as RM proxies, respectively. This chapter 
uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes. The coefficients and t-statistics 
are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.7 Impact of the SSSREM on Individual Real Earnings Management Proxies 
(Individual RM)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent variable ACFO ACFO APROD APROD ADISX ADISX
SSSREF -0.009*** -0.012*** 0.016*** 0.015*** -0.006*** -0.005***
(-6.003) (-7.189) (6.295) (6.465) (-4.488) (-5.184)
DA*SSSREF 0.042** 0.049*** 0.011 0.018 0.108*** 0.068***
(2.413) (2.895) (0.359) (0.550) (7.331) (5.032)
DA -0.688*** -0.794*** 0.224*** 0.180*** -0.151*** -0.092***
(-56.169) (-53.906) (11.123) (8.097) (-14.216) (-10.898)
TOP1 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.014** -0.019*** -0.014***
(0.123) (1.004) (0.806) (2.076) (-5.073) (-3.828)
PAY 0.004*** 0.005*** -0.022*** -0.019*** 0.013*** 0.012***
(4.733) (5.455) (-14.691) (-13.876) (17.368) (16.189)
BIND -0.024** -0.026*** 0.003 -0.006 -0.014 -0.017*
(-2.156) (-3.242) (0.158) (-0.335) (-1.454) (-1.886)
DUALITY -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 -0.006** 0.004*** 0.006***
(-0.445) (-0.334) (-1.376) (-2.084) (2.658) (4.386)
BIG4 0.009*** 0.008*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 0.010*** 0.005*
(3.329) (2.594) (-2.640) (-4.508) (4.110) (1.869)
STATE 0.004*** 0.001 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.001 0.001
(3.013) (0.534) (4.020) (4.193) (0.496) (1.168)
TS -0.015*** -0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013*** -0.012*** -0.007***
(-11.253) (-5.964) (5.309) (5.260) (-10.752) (-6.794)
LEVERAGE -0.110*** -0.106*** 0.114*** 0.097*** -0.011*** -0.010***
(-29.627) (-16.005) (21.499) (14.175) (-3.840) (-3.459)
TOBINQ 0.011*** 0.009*** -0.016*** -0.014*** 0.004*** 0.003***
(17.785) (13.388) (-15.936) (-10.318) (9.437) (5.227)
ROA 0.003 0.060 0.001 -0.020 0.003*** 0.003
(1.173) (1.456) (0.414) (-0.576) (10.409) (1.026)
BM -0.026*** -0.015*** 0.057*** 0.046*** -0.018*** -0.015***
(-8.387) (-3.959) (12.166) (9.912) (-7.925) (-7.166)
FIRMSIZE 0.017*** 0.016*** -0.005** -0.006** 0.006*** 0.000
(12.328) (6.203) (-2.341) (-2.414) (4.952) (0.113)
IPO_DUM -0.015*** -0.013*** 0.004 0.002 -0.005*** -0.005***
(-7.227) (-3.601) (0.975) (0.631) (-2.901) (-2.631)
ST_DUM 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.001 -0.001 -0.004*
(1.602) (0.915) (1.070) (0.283) (-0.402) (-1.767)
Intercept -0.069*** -0.104*** 0.088*** 0.098*** -0.059*** -0.021
(-3.845) (-4.369) (3.099) (3.107) (-4.143) (-1.278)
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bsqreg No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-Squared 0.423 0.146 0.080
Pseudo-R-squared 0.265 0.076 0.045
Observations 13,638 13,638 12,745 12,745 13,402 13,402
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variables are 
ACFO, APROD, and ADISX. Models 1, 2, and 3 are the regressions that use ACFO, APROD, and ADISX as the aggregate 
RM proxies, respectively. This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC 
industrial codes. The coefficients and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-
Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.8 Impact of the SSSREM on Accrual-Based Earnings Management (DA), Controlling 
for Accounting Flexibility
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Real proxy RM_1 RM_1 RM_2 RM_2 RM_3 RM_3
SSSREF -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(-2.844) (-3.137) (-3.703) (-4.146) (-4.162) (-4.341)
BSCa*SSSREF 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001
(1.508) (1.174) (0.338) (0.392) (1.284) (0.968)
BSCa -0.004*** -0.002** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.003***
(-3.805) (-2.053) (-4.928) (-4.031) (-5.126) (-2.971)
RM_PROXY*SSSREF -0.038*** -0.021* -0.096*** -0.111*** -0.052*** -0.045***
(-3.212) (-1.865) (-6.584) (-6.772) (-6.025) (-5.304)
RM_PROXY 0.131*** 0.110*** 0.528*** 0.535*** 0.221*** 0.205***
(14.501) (12.593) (52.782) (45.052) (33.499) (30.991)
TOP1 -0.004 -0.007 -0.011** -0.012*** -0.007 -0.012**
(-0.752) (-1.344) (-2.347) (-2.593) (-1.328) (-2.551)
PAY 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.009***
(5.815) (4.786) (9.510) (11.671) (8.680) (7.639)
BIND 0.019 0.008 -0.003 -0.007 0.014 -0.001
(1.406) (0.684) (-0.285) (-0.532) (1.121) (-0.061)
DUALITY 0.002 -0.000 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.000
(0.821) (-0.009) (1.052) (0.828) (1.380) (0.138)
BIG4 -0.001 0.001 0.007** 0.009*** 0.003 0.000
(-0.205) (0.271) (2.536) (2.650) (0.818) (0.192)
STATE -0.005*** -0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.004*** -0.003
(-2.730) (-1.017) (-0.193) (1.272) (-2.692) (-1.603)
TS -0.018*** -0.014*** -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.016***
(-10.829) (-9.344) (-14.989) (-10.771) (-12.570) (-10.903)
LEVERAGE -0.088*** -0.086*** -0.100*** -0.091*** -0.104*** -0.100***
(-23.016) (-18.913) (-28.102) (-25.778) (-27.416) (-27.550)
TOBINQ 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006***
(5.943) (3.739) (12.653) (9.434) (10.220) (7.381)
ROA 0.061*** 0.103*** 0.058*** 0.126*** 0.068*** 0.129***
(4.497) (5.728) (5.743) (7.035) (5.239) (6.153)
BM -0.029*** -0.020*** -0.030*** -0.019*** -0.036*** -0.025***
(-8.140) (-5.512) (-9.986) (-6.495) (-10.632) (-7.685)
FIRMSIZE 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.013*** 0.018*** 0.014***
(9.769) (7.137) (12.929) (8.406) (10.971) (9.366)
IPO_DUM 0.003 0.002 -0.007*** -0.005*** 0.001 0.001
(0.851) (0.573) (-3.314) (-2.606) (0.329) (0.404)
ST_DUM -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.369) (-0.334) (0.230) (-1.196) (-0.152) (-0.165)
Intercept -0.071*** -0.021 -0.062*** -0.050** -0.091*** -0.034*
(-3.266) (-0.961) (-3.552) (-2.417) (-4.539) (-1.778)
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bsqreg No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-Squared 0.130 0.413 0.260
Pseudo-R-squared 0.067 0.235 0.138
Observations 12,053 12,053 12,898 12,898 12,053 12,053
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variable is 
DA. Models 1, 2, and 3 are the regressions that use RM_1, RM_2, and RM_3 as the aggregate RM proxies, respectively. 
This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes. The coefficients 
and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.9 Impact of the SSSREM on Real Earnings Management (RM), Controlling for 
Accounting Flexibility
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent variable RM_1 RM_1 RM_2 RM_2 RM_3 RM_3
SSSREF 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.025*** 0.028***
(3.061) (2.794) (4.380) (5.526) (4.466) (3.863)
BSCa*SSSREF 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.002** 0.002* 0.005* 0.004
(2.835) (3.787) (2.087) (1.799) (1.940) (1.235)
BSCa 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.007***
(4.534) (5.533) (5.254) (4.941) (5.988) (4.427)
DA*SSSREF -0.141*** -0.117*** -0.179*** -0.128*** -0.199*** -0.111***
(-3.935) (-3.029) (-8.912) (-7.088) (-4.799) (-2.731)
DA 0.394*** 0.364*** 0.816*** 0.880*** 1.034*** 1.069***
(16.045) (16.902) (61.911) (72.298) (36.699) (31.841)
TOP1 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.032*** 0.036***
(2.879) (2.767) (3.722) (3.750) (2.766) (2.996)
PAY -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.033*** -0.033***
(-15.637) (-22.340) (-13.165) (-15.699) (-14.471) (-13.534)
BIND -0.001 0.000 0.023* 0.023 0.013 -0.001
(-0.030) (0.025) (1.727) (1.350) (0.465) (-0.073)
DUALITY -0.009** -0.010*** -0.005** -0.006*** -0.011** -0.006
(-2.300) (-2.623) (-2.056) (-3.561) (-2.293) (-0.906)
BIG4 -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.026*** -0.025***
(-2.898) (-2.714) (-4.653) (-5.172) (-3.201) (-2.696)
STATE 0.009*** 0.008*** -0.004** -0.002 0.006* 0.005
(2.862) (2.926) (-2.508) (-1.523) (1.653) (1.247)
TS 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.031*** 0.029***
(6.151) (5.251) (13.373) (11.531) (9.256) (7.596)
LEVERAGE 0.114*** 0.093*** 0.110*** 0.101*** 0.210*** 0.186***
(15.827) (14.459) (25.470) (28.701) (23.218) (23.230)
TOBINQ -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.028*** -0.026***
(-15.431) (-14.222) (-19.299) (-15.370) (-18.648) (-17.685)
ROA -0.061*** -0.082*** -0.053*** -0.085*** -0.116*** -0.196***
(-3.611) (-3.735) (-6.327) (-3.479) (-5.115) (-3.898)
BM 0.067*** 0.051*** 0.035*** 0.024*** 0.089*** 0.066***
(11.462) (11.940) (10.199) (6.400) (12.595) (16.709)
FIRMSIZE -0.005* 0.001 -0.017*** -0.013*** -0.021*** -0.018***
(-1.839) (0.295) (-10.331) (-10.066) (-6.012) (-4.438)
IPO_DUM 0.001 0.003 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.009 0.011*
(0.263) (0.438) (6.714) (5.932) (1.358) (1.783)
ST_DUM 0.005 0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 0.001
(0.761) (0.775) (-1.034) (-1.321) (-0.118) (0.140)
Intercept 0.121*** 0.003 0.068*** 0.133*** 0.195*** 0.110**
(3.178) (0.075) (3.128) (5.985) (4.268) (2.111)
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bsqreg No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-Squared 0.152 0.397 0.277
Pseudo-R-squared 0.082 0.260 0.160
Observations 12,053 12,053 12,898 12,898 12,053 12,053
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variables are 
aggregate RM proxies. Models 1, 2, and 3 are the regressions that use RM_1, RM_2, and RM_3 as the aggregate RM 
proxies, respectively. This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial 
codes. The coefficients and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-statistics are in 
parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.10 Difference-in-Difference design for the Accrual-Based Earning Management 
(DA)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Non-
tradable Tradable
Non-
tradable Tradable
Non-
tradable Tradable
SSSREF -0.004** 0.004 -0.005*** -0.001 -0.007*** 0.002
(-2.034) (0.644) (-3.158) (-0.234) (-3.819) (0.345)
RM_PROXY*SSSREF -0.034*** 0.014 -0.092*** 0.087 -0.052*** 0.044
(-2.753) (0.298) (-6.039) (1.329) (-5.667) (1.547)
RM_PROXY 0.123*** 0.088* 0.526*** 0.339*** 0.217*** 0.131***
(13.462) (1.916) (51.981) (5.343) (31.880) (4.809)
TOP1 -0.000 -0.026* -0.006 -0.019 -0.002 -0.020
(-0.018) (-1.671) (-1.279) (-1.429) (-0.413) (-1.359)
PAY 0.009*** 0.006 0.011*** 0.008** 0.012*** 0.008**
(7.373) (1.510) (11.613) (2.431) (10.696) (2.373)
IND 0.021 -0.053 -0.011 -0.058 0.012 -0.047
(1.460) (-1.224) (-0.979) (-1.414) (0.888) (-1.110)
DUALITY -0.001 0.016** -0.001 0.015** 0.001 0.015**
(-0.288) (2.375) (-0.377) (2.426) (0.218) (2.438)
BIG4 -0.004 -0.013 0.003 -0.005 -0.001 -0.006
(-1.324) (-1.362) (1.248) (-0.586) (-0.424) (-0.711)
STATE -0.007*** 0.066 -0.003* 0.049 -0.007*** 0.048
(-3.696) (0.976) (-1.851) (1.596) (-4.018) (1.010)
TS -0.020*** -0.004 -0.021*** -0.014*** -0.022*** -0.008*
(-12.129) (-0.915) (-15.399) (-3.354) (-13.818) (-1.951)
LEVERAGE -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.102*** -0.124*** -0.111*** -0.116***
(-23.764) (-5.867) (-29.277) (-8.099) (-28.057) (-7.173)
TOBINQ 0.004*** 0.005** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.008***
(6.042) (2.376) (12.075) (4.380) (10.133) (3.464)
ROA 0.001 0.088** 0.004 0.102** 0.002 0.110***
(0.598) (2.519) (1.460) (2.321) (0.680) (2.687)
BM -0.028*** -0.040*** -0.029*** -0.047*** -0.035*** -0.052***
(-7.716) (-3.016) (-9.651) (-4.117) (-10.282) (-4.184)
FIRMSIZE 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.015***
(10.335) (3.209) (13.321) (4.179) (11.746) (3.343)
ST_DUM -0.005 0.009 -0.002 0.010 -0.004 0.007
(-1.234) (0.650) (-0.659) (0.857) (-1.074) (0.573)
Intercept -0.081*** -0.252*** -0.095*** -0.147*** -0.118*** -0.189***
(-3.760) (-3.835) (-5.441) (-2.629) (-5.854) (-3.099)
R-squared 0.123 0.111 0.412 0.339 0.251 0.228
Observations 11,019 1,505 11,896 1,506 11,019 1,505
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variable is 
DA. Models 1, 2, and 3 are the regressions that use RM_1, RM_2, and RM_3 as the aggregate RM proxies, respectively. 
This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes. The coefficients 
and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.11 Difference-in-Difference design for Real Earnings Management (RM)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
 Non-tradable Tradable Non-tradable Tradable Non-tradable Tradable 
SSSREF 0.021*** -0.008 0.010*** 0.005 0.028*** 0.004
(6.338) (-0.635) (5.221) (0.570) (6.934) (0.251)
DA*SSSREF -0.111*** -0.213 -0.166*** -0.126 -0.164*** -0.189
(-2.934) (-0.821) (-7.817) (-0.572) (-3.727) (-0.477)
DA 0.359*** 0.520** 0.802*** 0.786*** 0.986*** 1.100***
(14.792) (2.066) (62.060) (3.640) (35.480) (2.841)
TOP1 0.025** 0.001 0.016*** -0.001 0.026** -0.017
(2.430) (0.030) (2.668) (-0.056) (2.114) (-0.480)
PAY -0.034*** -0.028*** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.038*** -0.033***
(-17.603) (-4.656) (-14.617) (-3.628) (-16.508) (-4.469)
IND 0.026 -0.024 0.046*** 0.043 0.050* 0.001
(1.069) (-0.309) (3.377) (0.771) (1.772) (0.007)
DUALITY -0.010** 0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.010** -0.006
(-2.318) (0.312) (-1.226) (-0.665) (-2.011) (-0.417)
BIG4 -0.015** -0.040** -0.015*** -0.017 -0.021*** -0.046**
(-2.342) (-2.219) (-3.939) (-1.469) (-2.693) (-2.042)
STATE 0.011*** 0.109*** -0.002 0.018 0.011*** 0.105*
(3.409) (6.544) (-0.909) (0.383) (2.981) (1.706)
TS 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.018*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.042***
(6.678) (2.901) (11.626) (5.459) (9.470) (3.931)
LEVERAGE 0.111*** 0.180*** 0.104*** 0.160*** 0.211*** 0.282***
(16.554) (8.283) (25.793) (9.711) (24.898) (9.292)
TOBINQ -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.028*** -0.028***
(-14.727) (-4.463) (-17.798) (-6.516) (-17.875) (-5.238)
ROA -0.001 -0.205** -0.006** -0.117 -0.004 -0.303**
(-0.484) (-2.164) (-2.274) (-1.495) (-0.800) (-2.067)
BM 0.068*** 0.122*** 0.035*** 0.064*** 0.091*** 0.163***
(11.413) (6.595) (10.055) (4.991) (12.589) (6.787)
FIRMSIZE -0.008*** -0.009 -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.025*** -0.017
(-2.645) (-1.077) (-10.136) (-3.119) (-7.123) (-1.553)
ST_DUM 0.008 0.01 -0.003 -0.006 0.002 0.006
(1.170) (0.506) (-0.659) (-0.470) (0.283) (0.226)
Intercept 0.197*** -0.045 0.141*** -0.129* 0.332*** -0.213
(5.102) (-0.376) (6.444) (-1.788) (7.190) (-1.452)
R-squared 0.142 0.19 0.392 0.384 0.265 0.308
Observations 11,019 1,505 11,896 1,506 11,019 1,505
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variables are 
aggregate RM proxies. Models 1, 2, and 3 are the regressions that use RM_1, RM_2, and RM_3 as the aggregate RM 
proxies, respectively. This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial 
codes. The coefficients and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in 
parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.12 Suspect Firm Analysis
Panel A. Just Avoid
Variable Pre-reform Post-reform Difference (post–pre) p-Value of t-test
DA 0.004 -0.010 -0.013 0.013**
RM_1 0.061 0.075 0.014 0.088*
RM_2 0.047 0.063 0.016 0.011**
RM_3 0.079 0.111 0.032 0.003***
Panel B. Meet or Beat
Variable Pre-reform Post-reform Difference (post–pre) p-Value of t-test
DA 0 .009 -0.001 -0.010 0.004***
RM_1 0.011 0.027 0.016 0.025**
RM_2 0.011 0.027 0.017  0.001***
RM_3 0.008 0.040 0.032 0.000***
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is from 2002 to 2011. This chapter constructs two 
groups of suspect firms from the sample, since they may be more likely to engage in earnings management according to 
these benchmarks: Just Avoid are those firms that managed their earnings to avoid reporting a loss, and Meet or Beat are 
those that managed their earnings to maintain earnings at the same level as or slightly higher than the previous year’s 
earnings. The former group includes firms with value of net income divided by total assets in the interval [0, 0.005], 
while the latter group includes those firms with a change in net income divided by total assets in the interval [0, 0.005].
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Table 2.13 Impact of the SSSREM on Accrual-Based Earnings Management (DA) with 
Aggregate Real Earnings Management Proxies, Modified Jones Model
RM_PROXY RM_1 RM_2 RM_3
SSSREF -0.005** -0.007*** -0.009***
(-2.572) (-4.061) (-4.452)
RM_PROXY*SSSREF -0.032** -0.085*** -0.048***
(-2.522) (-5.464) (-5.216)
RM_PROXY 0.122*** 0.538*** 0.223***
(12.772) (49.710) (31.811)
TOP1 0.008 0.001 0.006
(1.179) (0.140) (0.957)
PAY 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.012***
(6.594) (9.964) (10.006)
IND 0.017 -0.017 0.010
(1.143) (-1.356) (0.697)
DUALITY -0.004 -0.006*** -0.002
(-1.329) (-2.735) (-0.964)
BIG4 -0.007** 0.003 -0.004
(-2.008) (0.868) (-1.065)
STATE -0.008*** -0.001 -0.008***
(-4.199) (-0.902) (-4.328)
TS -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.019***
(-9.739) (-13.054) (-11.793)
LEVERAGE -0.078*** -0.087*** -0.096***
(-19.717) (-25.956) (-25.434)
TOBINQ 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.007***
(5.535) (12.652) (10.159)
ROA 0.002 0.004 0.002
(0.675) (1.607) (0.757)
BM -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.039***
(-8.106) (-9.698) (-11.104)
FIRMSIZE 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(10.030) (12.658) (11.551)
IPO_DUM -0.006* -0.019*** -0.008**
(-1.648) (-7.041) (-2.375)
ST_DUM 0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.033) (0.462) (0.157)
Intercept -0.133*** -0.141*** -0.158***
(-5.631) (-7.167) (-7.167)
Industry Y Y Y
R-Squared 0.076 0.313 0.193
Observations 12,522 13,400 12,522
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variable is 
DA. Models 1, 2, and 3 are the regressions that use RM_1, RM_2, and RM_3 as the aggregate RM proxies, respectively. 
This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes. The coefficients 
and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.14 Impact of the SSSREM on Aggregate Real Earnings Management Proxies 
(Aggregate RM, Modified Jones Model)
Dependent variable RM_1 RM_2 RM_3
SSSREF 0.022*** 0.014*** 0.030***
(6.682) (7.334) (7.689)
DA*SSSREF -0.138*** -0.145*** -0.244***
(-4.486) (-7.527) (-6.507)
DA 0.321*** 0.650*** 0.896***
(14.601) (48.430) (33.585)
TOP1 0.019** 0.011* 0.014
(1.969) (1.856) (1.169)
PAY -0.034*** -0.015*** -0.038***
(-18.226) (-13.906) (-16.970)
IND 0.014 0.038*** 0.033
(0.596) (2.756) (1.196)
DUALITY -0.007* 0.000 -0.006
(-1.813) (0.170) (-1.282)
BIG4 -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.024***
(-3.011) (-4.429) (-3.230)
STATE 0.009*** -0.004*** 0.008**
(3.163) (-2.589) (2.341)
TS 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.032***
(7.386) (12.444) (10.065)
LEVERAGE 0.109*** 0.090*** 0.195***
(17.110) (24.604) (25.484)
TOBINQ -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.028***
(-15.640) (-19.575) (-19.092)
ROA -0.001 -0.006*** -0.004
(-0.519) (-2.610) (-0.843)
BM 0.071*** 0.036*** 0.095***
(12.542) (10.731) (14.049)
FIRMSIZE -0.007** -0.015*** -0.021***
(-2.538) (-9.675) (-6.626)
IPO_DUM 0.008 0.027*** 0.021***
(1.414) (9.694) (3.106)
ST_DUM 0.007 -0.004 0.001
(1.218) (-1.038) (0.138)
Intercept 0.168*** 0.130*** 0.268***
(4.653) (6.098) (6.164)
Industry Y Y Y
R-Squared 0.138 0.335 0.247
Observations 12,522 13,400 12,522
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variables are 
aggregate RM proxies. Models 1, 2, and 3 are the regressions that use RM_1, RM_2, and RM_3 as the aggregate RM 
proxies, respectively. This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial 
codes. The coefficients and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in 
parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.15 Impact of the SSSREM on Accrual-Based Earnings Management (DA) with 
Aggregate Real Earnings Management Proxies (IFRS, 2002–2007)
RM_PROXY RM_1 RM_2 RM_3
SSSREF -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.017***
(-3.514) (-6.300) (-5.520)
RM_PROXY*SSSREF -0.034** -0.081*** -0.062***
(-1.991) (-5.494) (-5.663)
RM_PROXY 0.232*** 0.836*** 0.400***
(18.189) (91.944) (51.999)
TOP1 0.001 -0.002 0.002
(0.070) (-0.182) (0.147)
PAY 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.018***
(4.962) (8.878) (8.877)
IND 0.017 0.001 0.014
(0.822) (0.053) (0.783)
DUALITY 0.005 0.006** 0.004
(1.037) (2.217) (0.989)
BIG4 0.005 -0.008 -0.004
(0.603) (-1.590) (-0.641)
STATE -0.013** -0.010*** -0.012***
(-2.568) (-3.219) (-2.922)
TS -0.012** -0.018*** -0.012***
(-2.496) (-6.197) (-2.845)
LEVERAGE -0.095*** -0.069*** -0.101***
(-12.481) (-14.722) (-16.170)
TOBINQ 0.002* 0.006*** 0.004***
(1.939) (8.304) (4.828)
ROA 0.027** 0.019** 0.018*
(2.262) (2.547) (1.865)
BM -0.038*** -0.024*** -0.042***
(-6.044) (-6.191) (-8.006)
FIRMSIZE 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.022***
(7.031) (10.893) (6.328)
IPO_DUM -0.000 0.001 -0.002
(-0.021) (0.302) (-0.568)
ST_DUM 0.007 0.012*** 0.013***
(1.529) (4.100) (3.328)
Intercept -0.496*** -0.390*** -0.422***
(-4.792) (-6.210) (-4.951)
Number of stkcd 1,352 1,413 1,352
R-Squared 0.125 0.656 0.406
Observations 6,670 7,023 6,670
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is from 2002 to 2007. The dependent variable is 
DA. Models 1, 2, and 3 are the regressions that use RM_1, RM_2, and RM_3 as the aggregate RM proxies, respectively. 
This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes. The coefficients 
and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.16 Impact of the SSSREM on Aggregate Real Earnings Management Proxies 
(Aggregate RM; IFRS, 2002–2007)
Dependent variable RM_1 RM_2 RM_3
SSSREF 0.021*** 0.014*** 0.032***
(4.907) (6.421) (6.440)
DA*SSSREF -0.013 -0.105*** -0.077**
(-0.385) (-6.244) (-2.094)
DA 0.300*** 0.802*** 0.970***
(16.969) (88.938) (48.796)
TOP1 -0.045** -0.001 -0.022
(-2.115) (-0.133) (-0.920)
PAY -0.024*** -0.014*** -0.036***
(-8.413) (-9.201) (-11.085)
IND -0.004 0.003 -0.013
(-0.180) (0.220) (-0.459)
DUALITY 0.003 -0.006** -0.001
(0.485) (-2.014) (-0.148)
BIG4 0.014 0.012** 0.025**
(1.431) (2.533) (2.382)
STATE 0.005 0.008*** 0.011
(0.808) (2.598) (1.568)
TS 0.000 0.017*** 0.010
(0.084) (5.792) (1.540)
LEVERAGE 0.003 0.042*** 0.100***
(0.355) (9.142) (10.032)
TOBINQ -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.012***
(-6.703) (-10.605) (-8.552)
ROA -0.056*** -0.016** -0.024
(-4.007) (-2.169) (-1.553)
BM 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.050***
(2.608) (3.804) (6.063)
FIRMSIZE 0.009* -0.019*** -0.004
(1.894) (-7.677) (-0.754)
IPO_DUM 0.005 0.000 0.008
(0.935) (0.054) (1.219)
ST_DUM 0.005 -0.012*** -0.020***
(0.958) (-4.304) (-3.175)
Intercept 0.131 0.260*** 0.322**
(1.092) (4.242) (2.388)
Number of stkcd 1,352 1,413 1,352
R-Squared 0.093 0.640 0.380
Observations 6,670 7,023 6,670
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is from 2002 to 2007. The dependent variables are 
aggregate RM proxies. Models 1, 2, and 3 are the regressions that use RM_1, RM_2, and RM_3 as the aggregate RM 
proxies, respectively. This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial 
codes. The coefficients and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in 
parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.17 Impact of the SSSREM on Accrual-Based Earnings Management (DA) with 
Aggregate Real Earnings Management Proxies (IFRS Dummy)
RM_PROXY RM_1 RM_2 RM_3
SSSREF -0.007** -0.006*** -0.009***
(-2.440) (-2.850) (-3.491)
RM_PROXY*SSSREF -0.055*** -0.149*** -0.087***
(-4.907) (-13.214) (-11.291)
RM_PROXY 0.182*** 0.729*** 0.329***
(17.356) (78.027) (47.427)
IFRS -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.008***
(-3.142) (-3.373) (-2.931)
TOP1 0.028** 0.019** 0.027**
(2.400) (2.157) (2.565)
PAY 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.015***
(5.855) (9.980) (9.619)
IND 0.023 0.021* 0.026*
(1.363) (1.685) (1.782)
DUALITY 0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.020) (0.463) (-0.135)
BIG4 0.002 -0.002 -0.000
(0.293) (-0.438) (-0.045)
STATE -0.007*** -0.001 -0.006**
(-2.582) (-0.410) (-2.497)
TS -0.015*** -0.024*** -0.018***
(-6.033) (-13.314) (-8.240)
LEVERAGE -0.096*** -0.093*** -0.108***
(-19.455) (-25.617) (-24.588)
TOBINQ 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.006***
(5.301) (12.600) (9.454)
ROA -0.000 0.003*** -0.000
(-0.107) (3.129) (-0.158)
BM -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.033***
(-6.682) (-9.245) (-8.916)
FIRMSIZE 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.015***
(9.561) (10.224) (7.356)
IPO_DUM 0.004 -0.002 -0.002
(1.071) (-0.881) (-0.448)
ST_DUM 0.006* 0.011*** 0.010***
(1.777) (4.376) (3.151)
Intercept -0.275*** -0.048 -0.129***
(-5.501) (-1.306) (-2.889)
Number of stkcd 1,761 2,043 1,761
R-Squared 0.092 0.482 0.281
Observations 12,524 13,402 12,524
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variable is 
DA. Models 1, 2, and 3 are the regressions that use RM_1, RM_2, and RM_3 as the aggregate RM proxies, respectively. 
This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes. The coefficients 
and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.18 Impact of the SSSREM on Aggregate Real Earnings Management Proxies 
(Aggregate RM, IFRS dummy)
Dependent variable RM_1 RM_2 RM_3
SSSREF 0.018*** 0.006*** 0.021***
(4.753) (2.672) (4.597)
DA*SSSREF -0.074*** -0.140*** -0.125***
(-3.143) (-10.225) (-4.384)
DA 0.288*** 0.764*** 0.913***
(15.942) (73.851) (41.907)
IFRS -0.002 0.002 -0.000
(-0.423) (1.023) (-0.014)
TOP1 -0.024 -0.009 -0.027
(-1.593) (-0.958) (-1.455)
PAY -0.026*** -0.014*** -0.037***
(-11.288) (-10.616) (-13.102)
IND -0.011 -0.020 -0.037
(-0.500) (-1.599) (-1.425)
DUALITY 0.004 -0.002 0.002
(0.822) (-0.976) (0.333)
BIG4 0.006 0.003 0.007
(0.859) (0.639) (0.820)
STATE 0.009*** -0.003 0.006
(2.700) (-1.636) (1.602)
TS 0.007** 0.027*** 0.029***
(2.272) (14.333) (7.359)
LEVERAGE 0.050*** 0.074*** 0.144***
(7.597) (19.238) (18.237)
TOBINQ -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.016***
(-9.293) (-15.119) (-14.234)
ROA 0.002 -0.004*** 0.001
(1.312) (-3.739) (0.448)
BM 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.050***
(4.446) (7.721) (7.642)
FIRMSIZE 0.008*** -0.006*** 0.009***
(2.853) (-3.603) (2.623)
IPO_DUM 0.011** 0.012*** 0.023***
(2.236) (4.778) (3.776)
ST_DUM -0.000 -0.012*** -0.016***
(-0.047) (-4.295) (-2.860)
Intercept 0.007 -0.201*** -0.313***
(0.109) (-5.288) (-3.968)
Number of stkcd 1,761 2,043 1,761
R-Squared 0.062 0.463 0.263
Observations 12,524 13,402 12,524
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variables are 
aggregate RM proxies. Models 1, 2, and 3 are the regressions that use RM_1, RM_2, and RM_3 as the aggregate RM 
proxies, respectively. This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial 
codes. The coefficients and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in 
parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.19 Impact of the SSSREM on Accrual-Based Earnings Management (DA) with 
Aggregate Real Earnings Management Proxies (Firm Clustering)
RM_PROXY RM_1 RM_2 RM_3
SSSREF -0.005** -0.007*** -0.008***
(-2.340) (-3.992) (-3.892)
RM_PROXY*SSSREF -0.032** -0.094*** -0.049***
(-2.568) (-6.150) (-5.015)
RM_PROXY 0.123*** 0.522*** 0.215***
(12.174) (40.869) (25.422)
TOP1 -0.004 -0.010* -0.006
(-0.640) (-1.673) (-0.915)
PAY 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.012***
(6.539) (9.475) (9.092)
IND 0.012 -0.012 0.006
(0.810) (-0.897) (0.382)
DUALITY 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.528) (0.641) (0.965)
BIG4 -0.005 0.003 -0.002
(-1.255) (0.721) (-0.425)
STATE -0.005*** -0.001 -0.005**
(-2.644) (-0.368) (-2.554)
TS -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.022***
(-11.219) (-14.390) (-12.612)
LEVERAGE -0.095*** -0.107*** -0.112***
(-22.255) (-25.815) (-24.394)
TOBINQ 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(6.236) (11.082) (9.697)
ROA 0.002 0.005 0.002
(0.635) (1.444) (0.714)
BM -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.037***
(-7.915) (-9.879) (-10.409)
FIRMSIZE 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.020***
(9.893) (12.114) (10.716)
IPO_DUM 0.002 -0.006*** 0.001
(0.805) (-2.835) (0.182)
ST_DUM -0.004 -0.002 -0.003
(-0.866) (-0.436) (-0.776)
Intercept -0.081*** -0.111*** -0.097***
(-3.482) (-4.947) (-4.145)
Firm ID y y y
R-Squared 0.119 0.401 0.245
Observations 12,524 13,402 12,524
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variable is 
DA. Models 1, 2, and 3 are the regressions that use RM_1, RM_2, and RM_3 as the aggregate RM proxies, respectively. 
This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes. The coefficients 
and t-statistics are computed using firm clustering standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.20 Impact of the SSSREM on Aggregate Real Earnings Management Proxies 
(Aggregate RM, Firm Clustering)
Dependent variable RM_1 RM_2 RM_3
SSSREF 0.022*** 0.014*** 0.030***
(4.869) (5.598) (5.545)
DA*SSSREF -0.110*** -0.160*** -0.155***
(-2.972) (-7.680) (-3.680)
DA 0.366*** 0.800*** 0.992***
(13.927) (57.392) (33.441)
TOP1 0.023 0.018* 0.024
(1.274) (1.860) (1.151)
PAY -0.034*** -0.016*** -0.039***
(-11.054) (-9.679) (-10.626)
IND 0.014 0.034* 0.035
(0.434) (1.784) (0.903)
DUALITY -0.009 -0.004 -0.010
(-1.414) (-1.284) (-1.434)
BIG4 -0.018 -0.015** -0.024*
(-1.541) (-2.353) (-1.722)
STATE 0.009* -0.004 0.007
(1.944) (-1.518) (1.284)
TS 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.037***
(5.126) (10.402) (7.393)
LEVERAGE 0.118*** 0.114*** 0.220***
(11.855) (20.302) (17.434)
TOBINQ -0.019*** -0.014*** -0.029***
(-10.801) (-14.155) (-13.425)
ROA -0.002 -0.007** -0.005
(-0.530) (-2.192) (-0.823)
BM 0.072*** 0.040*** 0.097***
(10.451) (9.732) (11.574)
FIRMSIZE -0.009* -0.019*** -0.026***
(-1.958) (-8.008) (-4.909)
IPO_DUM 0.004 0.018*** 0.012*
(0.768) (5.761) (1.781)
ST_DUM 0.009 -0.001 0.004
(1.247) (-0.359) (0.508)
Intercept 0.119* 0.127*** 0.186**
(1.858) (3.544) (2.467)
Firm ID y y y
R-Squared 0.143 0.387 0.264
Observations 12,524 13,402 12,524
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variables are 
aggregate RM proxies. Models 1, 2, and 3 are the regressions that use RM_1, RM_2, and RM_3 as the aggregate RM 
proxies, respectively. This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial 
codes. The coefficients and t-statistics are computed using firm clustering standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.21 Impact of the SSSREM on Accrual-Based Earnings Management (DA) with 
Aggregate Real Earnings Management Proxies (with Outliers)
RM_PROXY RM_1 RM_2 RM_3
SSSREF -0.004** -0.005*** -0.005***
(-1.974) (-2.941) (-2.914)
RM_PROXY*SSSREF -0.041*** -0.121*** -0.053***
(-3.590) (-8.086) (-6.185)
RM_PROXY 0.101*** 0.469*** 0.180***
(11.379) (45.130) (27.434)
TOP1 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.048***
(7.298) (8.975) (8.648)
PAY 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.022***
(14.745) (21.312) (19.582)
IND -0.023 -0.047*** -0.034**
(-1.594) (-3.942) (-2.539)
DUALITY 0.001 0.002 0.003
(0.590) (1.233) (1.134)
BIG4 0.002 0.011*** 0.007**
(0.743) (3.983) (2.190)
STATE -0.001 0.002 -0.001
(-0.766) (1.271) (-0.610)
TS -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(-1.455) (-1.148) (-0.920)
LEVERAGE -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000**
(-2.854) (-1.877) (-2.565)
TOBINQ -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000
(-2.406) (-4.234) (-1.516)
ROA 0.004 0.007 0.004
(0.778) (1.112) (0.762)
BM 0.009** 0.009*** 0.006*
(2.482) (2.830) (1.933)
FIRMSIZE -0.007*** -0.011*** -0.010***
(-4.169) (-7.565) (-6.479)
IPO_DUM 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.021***
(6.403) (9.666) (7.346)
ST_DUM -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.019***
(-4.496) (-4.919) (-4.956)
Intercept -0.051** -0.032* -0.047**
(-2.521) (-1.845) (-2.434)
R-Squared 0.050 0.309 0.154
Observations 12,524 13,402 12,524
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variable is 
DA. Models 1, 2, and 3 are the regressions that use RM_1, RM_2, and RM_3 as the aggregate RM proxies, respectively. 
This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes. The coefficients 
and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.22 Impact of the SSSREM on Aggregate Real Earnings Management Proxies 
(Aggregate RM, with Outliers)
Dependent variable RM_1 RM_2 RM_3
SSSREF 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.019***
(3.743) (4.466) (4.246)
DA*SSSREF -0.094** -0.147*** -0.104**
(-2.428) (-6.187) (-2.142)
DA 0.302*** 0.762*** 0.891***
(11.965) (51.120) (28.945)
TOP1 -0.030*** -0.045*** -0.080***
(-2.782) (-6.906) (-5.983)
PAY -0.047*** -0.030*** -0.062***
(-23.266) (-22.921) (-24.699)
IND 0.060** 0.077*** 0.125***
(2.429) (5.012) (3.988)
DUALITY -0.013*** -0.007** -0.015***
(-2.920) (-2.571) (-2.689)
BIG4 -0.034*** -0.029*** -0.048***
(-4.850) (-6.894) (-5.595)
STATE 0.009*** -0.007*** 0.003
(2.746) (-3.544) (0.774)
TS 0.001 -0.001 -0.004
(0.268) (-0.427) (-1.185)
LEVERAGE 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.912) (0.901) (1.409)
TOBINQ -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000***
(-8.189) (4.603) (-3.249)
ROA -0.002 -0.008 -0.007
(-0.374) (-1.320) (-0.600)
BM 0.033*** 0.000 0.024***
(5.857) (0.055) (3.682)
FIRMSIZE 0.027*** 0.020*** 0.041***
(10.056) (11.593) (12.061)
IPO_DUM -0.021*** -0.010*** -0.031***
(-3.465) (-3.586) (-4.266)
ST_DUM 0.020*** 0.012*** 0.028***
(3.096) (3.014) (3.551)
Intercept -0.022 -0.015 -0.034
(-0.594) (-0.640) (-0.736)
R-Squared 0.085 0.303 0.170
Observations 12,524 13,402 12,524
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variables are 
aggregate RM proxies. Models 1, 2, and 3 are the regressions that use RM_1, RM_2, and RM_3 as the aggregate RM 
proxies, respectively. This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial 
codes. The coefficients and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in 
parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.23 Impact of the SSSREM on Accrual-Based Earnings Management (DA) with 
Aggregate Real Earnings Management Proxies (Dummy2006)
RM_PROXY RM_1 RM_2 RM_3
Dummy2006 -0.005** -0.012*** -0.008***
(-2.439) (-7.490) (-4.104)
RM_PROXY*Dummy2006 -0.044*** -0.164*** -0.076***
(-3.243) (-10.770) (-7.661)
RM_PROXY 0.136*** 0.593*** 0.243***
(11.645) (47.092) (28.072)
TOP1 -0.004 -0.011** -0.005
(-0.707) (-2.411) (-0.951)
PAY 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(7.456) (12.835) (10.908)
IND 0.014 -0.001 0.008
(1.008) (-0.101) (0.632)
DUALITY 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.577) (0.967) (1.078)
BIG4 -0.005 0.002 -0.001
(-1.502) (0.863) (-0.276)
STATE -0.005*** -0.002 -0.005***
(-3.095) (-1.415) (-3.207)
TS -0.019*** -0.022*** -0.021***
(-12.361) (-16.905) (-14.510)
LEVERAGE -0.094*** -0.105*** -0.110***
(-23.789) (-29.656) (-28.077)
TOBINQ 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(6.557) (13.325) (10.662)
ROA 0.002 0.004 0.002
(0.677) (1.374) (0.756)
BM -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.034***
(-7.775) (-9.849) (-10.226)
FIRMSIZE 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.019***
(11.056) (14.676) (12.422)
IPO_DUM 0.004 -0.002 0.003
(1.284) (-1.080) (1.028)
ST_DUM -0.003 -0.000 -0.002
(-0.813) (-0.135) (-0.624)
Intercept -0.081*** -0.134*** -0.097***
(-3.958) (-8.002) (-5.074)
R-squared 0.119 0.407 0.247
Observations 12,524 13,402 12,524
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variable is 
DA. Models 1, 2, and 3 are the regressions that use RM_1, RM_2, and RM_3 as the aggregate RM proxies, respectively. 
This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes. The coefficients 
and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.24 Impact of the SSSREM on Aggregate Real Earnings Management Proxies 
(Aggregate RM, Dummy2006)
Dependent variable RM_1 RM_2 RM_3
Dummy2006 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.028***
(5.805) (10.884) (6.969)
DA*SSSREF -0.142*** -0.161*** -0.203***
(-4.012) (-8.611) (-5.117)
DA 0.404*** 0.829*** 1.047***
(14.596) (60.657) (34.806)
TOP1 0.022** 0.019*** 0.023**
(2.287) (3.506) (2.024)
PAY -0.034*** -0.018*** -0.039***
(-18.058) (-16.069) (-17.189)
IND 0.008 0.019 0.026
(0.342) (1.375) (0.931)
DUALITY -0.010** -0.005** -0.012**
(-2.372) (-2.252) (-2.416)
BIG4 -0.019*** -0.014*** -0.026***
(-3.225) (-3.930) (-3.508)
STATE 0.010*** -0.003* 0.008**
(3.293) (-1.742) (2.278)
TS 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.037***
(8.130) (15.281) (11.611)
LEVERAGE 0.116*** 0.113*** 0.217***
(17.829) (27.938) (26.274)
TOBINQ -0.019*** -0.014*** -0.029***
(-15.665) (-20.188) (-18.980)
ROA -0.002 -0.007** -0.005
(-0.655) (-2.355) (-0.927)
BM 0.068*** 0.036*** 0.090***
(11.710) (10.359) (12.846)
FIRMSIZE -0.008*** -0.019*** -0.025***
(-2.904) (-11.913) (-7.499)
IPO_DUM -0.004 0.013*** 0.001
(-0.676) (5.014) (0.176)
ST_DUM 0.008 -0.002 0.004
(1.380) (-0.552) (0.555)
Intercept 0.109*** 0.153*** 0.174***
(3.028) (7.221) (4.041)
R-squared 0.143 0.389 0.264
Observations 12,524 13,402 12,524
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variables are 
aggregate RM proxies. Models 1, 2, and 3 are the regressions that use RM_1, RM_2, and RM_3 as the aggregate RM 
proxies, respectively. This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial 
codes. The coefficients and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in 
parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Chapter 3
Mutual Fund Ownership and Controlling 
Shareholders’ Tunnelling Behaviour
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the objective is to investigate the impact of mutual fund ownership 
on controlling shareholders’ tunnelling behaviour and firm performance in the 
Chinese stock market. The corporate governance role of institutional or mutual 
fund investors in monitoring corporate management and improving firm 
performance has been widely discussed in the literature. For example, Ng et al. 
(2009) use past firm performance as an indicator of managerial effectiveness, and 
suggest that mutual fund ownership provides weaker support for management 
proposals in firms that underperform. They conclude that this finding is consistent 
with mutual funds playing a monitoring role, as the funds take into account a 
firm’s prior performance when casting proxy votes. Chou et al. (2011) indicate 
that mutual fund ownership is significantly positively related with better corporate 
governance, since those funds prefer to invest in well-governed firms and would 
continue to actively monitor firms in which they invest. Another strand of 
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literature concentrates on the relation between mutual fund ownership and firm 
performance, but results are inconclusive. McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a 
significant positive correlation between Tobin’s Q and mutual fund ownership. 
Woidtke (2002) classifies mutual fund ownership into two categories, private and 
public pension funds, and shows that these two types of mutual funds have 
opposite effects on firm performance based on minority shareholder incentives 
and political or social influence. Cornett et al. (2007) study the effect of 
institutional ownership on corporate operating performance and suggest that only 
pressure-insensitive institutional investors with a low level of business 
relationship with the invested firm have a positive impact on firm performance. 
Among Chinese studies, Yuan et al. (2008) find that mutual fund ownership in 
China is effective in monitoring controlling shareholders and has a positive effect 
on firm performance. The evidence given by Yuan et al. (2008) clarifies previous 
assumptions about the role of mutual fund ownership on the Chinese stock market 
and provides policy implications for related government agencies. 
Therefore, based on previous literature, there are two main incentives for mutual 
fund managers to enhance firm performance. First, mutual fund managers conduct 
quality investigation in order to identify efficient firms to invest in, so directing 
limited capital to the most efficient investment. Second, large institutional stakes 
in public firms may provide strong economic incentives for mutual fund investors 
to monitor managers, and such monitoring could, in turn, improve managerial 
efficiency and the quality of firms’ decision making. 
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However, recent studies find that mutual fund ownership is ineffective in 
corporate governance if the funds’ incentives are aligned with those of controlling 
shareholders. In China, expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling 
shareholders and mutual fund investors is more likely than in other countries, for 
the following reasons. First, although fund unit holders should have voting rights 
on crucial investment issues according to China’s Securities Investment Fund Law 
2003, those rights are difficult to exercise, as strict requirements have to be met. 
In fact, most decisions are transferred to the investment decision committee, 
which is directly appointed by the CSRC. Such lack of power associated with the 
nominal voting rights may induce mutual funds to exert less influence on 
management actions or firm corporate governance (Morgan et al., 2011). 
Secondly, the CSRC has absolute rights to set up fund management firms, appoint 
senior management of those firms, or even revoke the licence of fund firms when 
it deems that necessary. In addition, the CSRC is under pressure to have close 
relations with controlling shareholders, especially in the case of state-owned firms, 
in order to save the costs of capital. As a consequence, mutual fund managers may 
act in the interest of the CSRC or controlling shareholders, and this may not be in 
the interest of minority shareholders.  In their empirical research, Firth et al. (2010) 
conclude that mutual fund ownership is negatively related with the compensation 
given to tradable shareholders when non-tradable shares are converted to tradable 
shares during the process of split share structure reform. This finding implies that 
mutual fund managers prefer to align themselves with the interests of controlling 
shareholders and thus reduce the costs of share structure reform, in order to keep 
their own positions and increase individual profits. 
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In order to explore fully the role of mutual funds in corporate governance in 
Chinese listed firms, this chapter looks at controlling shareholders’ tunnelling 
behaviour and tests whether monitoring by mutual fund ownership can effectively 
reduce such behaviour and improve firms’ performance. On the one hand, 
controlling shareholders may pursue private interests through various self-dealing 
transactions, such as selling assets, goods and services to listed firms at high price, 
or stripping assets from listed firms to their affiliates at low price; such activities 
are defined as tunnelling behaviour by Johnson et al. (2000b). In addition, highly 
concentrated ownership is prevalent among Chinese listed firms, with 40% of 
shares held by the largest shareholders (Allen et al., 2005). This highly 
concentrated ownership, together with the existence of non-tradable shares, means 
that tunnelling behaviour is a particular feature of the Chinese market (Gao and 
Kling, 2008; Berkman et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2010; Li, 2010a). However, high 
levels of tunnelling activities will result in poorer firm performance (Jiang et al., 
2010; Wang and Xiao, 2011), and this is contrary to the interests of mutual fund 
managers. In other words, the performance of Chinese listed firms is influenced 
by the negotiation between mutual fund managers and controlling shareholders 
when mutual fund managers aim to improve the firm’s quality.  
Another incentive for mutual fund managers to play an effective role in corporate 
governance and to protect minority shareholders’ interest is based on the fact that 
Chinese governance and the CSRC – the administrative role of which has been 
revised several times since the 2000s – strive to standardize the mutual fund 
industry and to control tunnelling behaviour to protect minority shareholder 
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interests. Furthermore, the rapidly developing mutual fund industry in China 
requires a transparent and fair management mechanism to protect minority 
investors’ interests in order to expand its fund pool. In addition, with the 
improved investment environment for mutual funds, the number of fund 
management companies (mutual funds) in China has dramatically increased, from 
6 (5) in 1998 to 57 (323) in 2006, with an increase in total net assets from RMB 
469 billion in 2005 to RMB 1796.9 billion in 2007 (Yuan et al., 2008; Firth et al., 
2010). The CSRC also issues several policies to restrict controlling shareholders’ 
tunnelling behaviour, and since 2001 has required listed firms to gradually reduce 
other receivables (proxy of tunnelling behaviour) balances, a move which forced 
399 listed firms to resolve other receivable balances of around RMB 39 billion by 
the end of 2006 (Jiang et al., 2010). As a result, with regard to the main research 
question of this chapter, it is expected that the external governance role of mutual 
funds in China will continue to be effective in improving firms’ quality, even 
when controlling shareholders extract resources out of the listed firms. 
The second research question addressed by this chapter is whether mutual fund 
ownership directly affects the tunnelling behaviour of controlling shareholders. 
Most previous literature on the determinants of tunnelling behaviour concentrates 
on firm characteristics and corporate governance, but few studies explain the 
relation between mutual fund ownership and tunnelling behaviour for the Chinese 
stock market. From empirical evidence, Gao and Kling (2008) find a significant 
negative relation between mutual fund ownership and tunnelling. Berkman et al. 
(2009) find the likelihood of expropriation by controlling shareholders is affected 
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by the presence of various blockholders. Jiang et al. (2010) discover that high 
levels of mutual fund ownership are associated with low tunnelling proxies and 
vice versa. Based on these empirical analyses, this chapter conjectures that mutual 
fund ownership can directly reduce tunnelling behaviour. 
To answer the two main research questions above, this chapter follows Jiang et al. 
(2010) and constructs a measure of tunnelling behaviour, using other receivables 
as a proxy, for Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2011. The multivariate 
regression includes mutual fund ownership, firm characteristics, and corporate 
governance variables. The results are in line with our expectations, indicating that 
mutual fund ownership is positively related with firm performance, but this 
relation is non-linear. Furthermore, this chapter finds that mutual fund ownership 
itself has a non-linear association with tunnelling behaviour. More precisely, 
mutual funds can effectively prevent the occurrence of tunnelling in the Chinese 
market. The results are robust to various measures of mutual fund ownership and 
firm performance.
This chapter contributes to the literature in the following aspects. First, compared 
with the linear relationship found in the previous literature for developed markets 
(McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Woidtke, 2002; Cornett et al., 2007), we find a 
non-linear association between mutual fund ownership and firm performance. In 
particular, a higher level of mutual fund ownership is associated with better firm 
performance, which indicates that mutual funds could serve as sophisticated 
investors to provide useful accounting information to outsiders, and are also 
capable of monitoring to improve the corporate governance mechanism. When the 
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mutual fund ownership reaches a certain level, the negative relation between high 
mutual fund ownership and firm performance may imply that mutual fund 
managers are more likely to expropriate value from minority shareholders when 
they have dominant controlling power (La Porta et al., 1999).  In addition, in the 
case of appointment or dismissal of highly concentrated mutual fund managers 
there is a  requirement to notify the supervision department, such as the CSRC or 
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), 
which have close relations with controlling shareholders of listed firms, especially 
for state-owned listed firms. As a result, those managers may have an incentive to 
flatter controlling shareholders or the appointment commission of the supervision 
department, in order to maintain their position or avoid strict supervision. Second, 
the non-linear relation between mutual fund ownership and firm performance is 
still observable when controlling shareholders implement tunnelling behaviours, 
which indicates that mutual fund managers will protect minority shareholders’ 
interests against controlling shareholders. Third, mutual fund ownership can 
effectively reduce controlling shareholders’ tunnelling behaviour. The main policy 
implication of this chapter is that mutual fund ownership should be further 
promoted in order to improve its independent supervision of firms’ quality. 
However, to realize fully the benefit of mutual fund ownership in improving 
corporate governance, it is necessary to further liberalize the mutual fund industry 
and to decentralize regulation by government agencies.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the literature 
and explains the hypothesis development. Section 3.3 describes the methodology, 
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which comprises several regressions. Section 3.4 presents the data and primary 
data statistics. The empirical results are discussed in Section 3.5, and Section 3.6 
concludes the chapter.
3.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
3.2.1 Institutional Ownership
Existing studies have focused on the role of institutional investors in monitoring 
or influencing corporate managers. This may reflect the fact that they are willing 
to exert pressure on managers to make decisions in favour of boosting 
shareholders’ wealth, while simultaneously increasing the percentage of their 
shareholding in the firm. The rationale for the role of institutional investors or 
mutual funds as corporate monitors is that, compared with individual investors, 
they have a dramatically larger incentive to monitor managers. This would prompt 
managers to be more concerned about their firms’ performance and about 
shareholders, and thus discourage them from opportunism.  
Brickley et al. (1988) divide institutional investors into three groups based on 
whether they have related business with the firm and are susceptible to 
management influence: pressure-insensitive institutions (public pension funds, 
mutual funds), pressure-sensitive institutions (insurance companies, banks, and 
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nonbank trusts owning at least 1% of the firm’s stock), and pressure-indeterminate 
institutions (corporate pension funds, brokerage houses, investment counsel firms 
and miscellaneous firms, plus institutions owning less than 1% of the firm’s 
stock). Their findings suggest that pressure-sensitive institutions are more likely 
to support management, as most will try to avoid losing business with the firms. 
In contrast, pressure-insensitive institutions prefer to protect minority shareholder 
interests, and are more likely to vote against management as experienced investors.
Following Brickley et al. (1988), Almazan et al. (2005) classify institutional 
investors into two main groups based on monitoring costs. The first group 
comprises active investors, who are better informed and less restricted during 
investment. The second consists of passive investors named by bank trust 
departments and insurance companies. Their results reveal that active institutional 
investors may provide stricter monitoring than passive institutional investors. 
Chen et al. (2007) consider institutional investors who might keep potential 
business relations with firms as grey investors, while those who do not seek such 
relations are defined as independent investors. Using pressure-insensitive and 
pressure-sensitive institutional investors as their two elementary groups, Cornett 
et al. (2007) find that a positive relation between institutional ownership and 
operating cash flow return is only observed where the institutional investors are 
pressure-insensitive. In other words, pressure-sensitive institutional investors are 
compromised as monitors by their desire to protect business relations.
Another main aspect to determining the degree of firm monitoring, as well as 
minority shareholder protection, is testing the relation between firm performance 
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and institutional investors. Pound (1988) proposes three hypotheses on the 
relation between institutional ownership and corporate value, based on main 
incentives: the efficient monitoring hypothesis, the conflict of interest hypothesis, 
and the strategic alignment hypothesis. In the efficient monitoring hypothesis, 
Pound expects a positive relation between institutional ownership and corporate 
value, since compared to individual investors, institutional investors have more 
experience to help them monitor firms with lower costs. According to the conflict 
of interest hypothesis, institutional investors are forced to agree with management 
decisions due to their business relations with the firm. The third, strategic 
alignment, hypothesis suggests that mutual benefits between institutional 
investors and managers may reduce the effect of monitoring by institutional 
investors. Therefore, the second and third of Pound’s hypotheses predict a 
negative relation between institutional ownership and corporate value. 
Researching proxy contests, Pound (1988) finds that institutional investors may 
align with management against minority shareholder interests. However, 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) support the efficient monitoring hypothesis by 
finding a positive relation between Tobin’s Q and institutional ownership. 
Woidtke (2002) finds mixed results to support both the above assumptions of 
Pound (1988). Firm value measured by Tobin’s Q is positively associated with 
private pension fund ownership and negatively associated with activist public 
pension fund ownership. In other words, minority shareholders may not be 
properly protected by institutional investors; instead, their benefits may be 
exploited when conflicts of interest exist between institutional investors and 
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minority shareholders. Elyasiani and Jia (2010) adjust measures of institutional 
ownership according to shareholding stability, since they note that the 
proportional ratio neglects ownership dimensions other than ownership level. 
Instead, shareholding stability may effectively strengthen institutional investors’ 
monitoring of firms, and also helps firms to concentrate on longer-term 
investments and to improve performance. The authors’ results indicate a positive 
relation between firm performance and institutional ownership stability. In 
addition, long-term institutional ownership is positively related to firm 
performance through the restriction of information asymmetry and the revision of 
executive incentives.
While a number of studies examine the correlation between institutional 
ownership and firm performance, many focus on other areas to examine how 
institutional ownership reflects and monitors opportunistic managerial behaviour. 
Chung et al. (2002) demonstrate that institutional ownership deters managers from 
adjusting earnings to beat or meet desired levels. In other words, institutional 
investors play an active role in monitoring opportunistic managerial behaviour. 
Koh (2003) indicates that managerial earnings management is non-linearly 
associated with the level of institutional ownership. A positive relation is found 
when institutional ownership is low and a negative relation reveals that long-term 
institutional investors care more about limiting listed firms’ earnings management. 
In contrast, Velury and Jenkins (2006) provide evidence revealing a positive 
relation between institutional ownership and earnings quality, but the relation may 
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become negative when ownership increases dramatically. Koh (2007) summarizes 
that institutional investors may have various attitudes to monitoring managerial 
opportunistic behaviour based on their investment horizons. Specifically, 
institutional investors with a long-term horizon may constrain aggressive earnings 
management, while transient institutional ownership is associated with such 
behaviour only when earnings are adjusted upward to meet or beat earnings 
benchmarks. Cornett et al. (2008) put forward a similar argument, whereby 
managerial earnings management is decreased by more monitoring by institutional 
shareholders. Hadani et al. (2011) determine that the highest levels of institutional 
ownership effectively protect minority shareholder interests through a negative 
relation with firm earnings management.
Voting is recognized as the most direct and cost-effective channel through which 
mutual funds can pressure corporate managers into taking account of 
shareholders’ interests in investment decisions. Using the SEC’s 2003 mandatory 
voting disclosure requirement as a mechanism for revealing mutual funds’ 
governance activities, a number of studies have attempted to shed light on the 
effect of mutual funds or their voting decisions on corporate governance. Morgan 
et al. (2011) find that voting by mutual fund investors is indeed more supportive 
of shareholder-initiated proposals. This provides a potential opportunity for 
increasing shareholders’ wealth, especially when portfolio firms manifest weaker 
corporate governance. Based on the proxy voting records of the 100 largest 
mutual fund families in the US between 2003 and 2006, Duan and Jiao (2011) 
find that mutual funds are more likely to vote against management when 
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management recommendations on proposals conflict with those of the 
independent proxy advisory firm (Institute Shareholder Services), which is 
consistent with the finding that mutual funds play an active role in monitoring 
managers’ behaviour.
The evidence provided by Davis and Kim (2007) suggests that voting decisions 
have an impact on the quality of corporate governance in their targeted firms. In 
particular, the quality of a firm’s corporate governance can be further 
strengthened by mutual fund investment, since their supportive voting can act as 
an essential determinant of a proposal’s passage, as well as of the board 
implementing that proposal (Ertimur et al., 2010; Thomas and Cotter, 2007). 
Using the Morningstar stewardship grade and individual governance component 
grade, Chou et al. (2011) suggest that mutual funds with better quality governance 
practices are more likely to exercise their shareholder rights and their voting and 
investment decisions in favour of their fund investors. More importantly, they 
show that those portfolio firms invested in by mutual funds with higher quality 
governance tend to exhibit correspondingly higher corporate governance 
standards. This results not only from the tendency of such mutual funds to invest 
in firms with healthier governance, but also from the fact that they are more 
effective corporate monitors.
Prior findings on the role of institutional investors in corporate governance are 
mostly based on developed countries. Similar research for emerging markets is 
very limited, although the number of institutional investors in these markets has 
increased significantly in the past 10 years, as in the Chinese capital market. Wei 
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et al. (2005) study the correlation between ownership structure and firm 
performance from 1991 to 2001 for Chinese private listed firms. Their findings 
indicate that mutual fund ownership is significantly negatively related with firm 
performance, but positively related in terms of proper supervision to protect 
minority shareholders. The contradictory results are mainly due to the initial 
development of ‘old funds’ in China and extremely high levels of government 
ownership. Yuan et al. (2008) find that mutual ownership is positively related to 
firm performance, consistent with CSRC regulatory efforts to promote mutual 
funds as a proper corporate governance tool to protect minority shareholder 
interests. 
In contrast with previous findings, Firth, Lin, and Zou (2010) suggest that mutual 
fund managers may seek to maximize their own benefits by helping listed 
companies complete the split share reform quickly, rather than protecting minority 
shareholder interests. In particular, that helping hand has been geared to the state-
owned firms since the CSRC transferred fund managers’ voting rights to the 
investment decision committee, with approval needed from the CSRC. Therefore, 
there is still the underlying question of whether institutional managers would 
protect minority shareholder interests or follow the direction of the CSRC to save 
their voting rights. Ding et al. (2013) discuss the effect of mutual ownership on 
improving stock price informativeness in China. Since state ownership can 
decrease firms’ independence from capital, the results reveal that the relation 
between institutional ownership and stock price informativeness is weaker for 
99
state-owned firms, although such an association is much more positive for the 
listed firms as a whole in China.
3.2.2 Tunnelling Behaviour
Compared with the uncertain findings regarding mutual ownership, a great deal of 
empirical evidence indicates that controlling shareholders can expropriate the 
wealth of minority shareholders through tunnelling behaviour (La Porta et al., 
1997, 1998, 1999; Jonson et al., 2000). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) find that the 
major conflict between management and shareholders has been replaced by the 
problem of preventing principal shareholders from exploiting minority 
shareholders. In a later study (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), the authors state that 
controlling shareholders can expropriate more firm resources from minority 
shareholders when there are serious discrepancies between voting rights and cash 
flow rights. Claessens et al. (2000) confirm previous studies and find that pyramid 
structures and cross-holding are usually present in East Asian countries. In 
addition, listed firms would have lower market valuation when controlling 
shareholders have greater control rights, especially when cash flow rights are 
weak and control rights strong. However, agency costs due to the separation of 
ownership are not the main factor in corporate governance and the exploitation of 
minority shareholders; instead, high ownership concentration among controlling 
shareholders is considered the primary issue. 
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According to Jonson et al. (2000b), who first defined such transfers of firm 
resources as tunnelling, several types of expropriation by controlling shareholders 
have been researched. First, controlling shareholders can expropriate corporate 
opportunities from a firm; second, most controlling shareholders can obtain 
abnormal benefits from selling assets, goods, or services in self-dealing 
transactions; third, preferential firm assets can be used as collateral for loan 
guarantees; fourth, firm assets can be transferred at unfair market prices to 
controlling shareholders; finally, controlling shareholders can dilute minority 
shareholder shares to protect their obsolete ownership by acquiring additional 
shares at low prices. The literature focused on China’s stock market studies 
several types of tunnelling behaviour. Jonson et al. (2000b) also find that, under 
highly concentrated ownership, controlling shareholders can expropriate minority 
shareholder interests in several ways. In contrast, low ownership of controlling 
shareholders may provide less incentive to exploit the benefits of minority 
shareholders. Instead, such ownership would normally be observed under strong 
investor protection (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and 
Lang, 2002; Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; Djankov et al., 2008).
Another strand of research concerns the ways in which controlling shareholders 
may expropriate minority shareholders based on different legal origins. La Porta 
et al. (1998) use a sample of 49 countries and find that investors in common law 
systems are more efficiently protected than are those in civil law countries. 
Countries that implement German civil law and Scandinavian law are in the 
middle in terms of investor protection. The empirical evidence confirms that 
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minority shareholder interests are distinctly based on laws rather than on the 
securities themselves. The authors conclude that a legal approach is an effective 
way to clarify how shareholders and creditors are protected from expropriation by 
managers and controlling shareholders. They also point out that financial market 
reform alone is not sufficient to protect minority shareholder benefits. Instead, 
investor protection reform based on legal regimes may require significant 
improvements to combat interference by those with related interests, such as 
controlling shareholders. 
Jonson et al. (2000b) find that common law countries require more detail about 
related-party transactions. Their protection of minority shareholders is comparable 
with that in civil law countries. In addition, the expropriation of minority 
shareholders in civil law countries is usually consistent with board duties, 
especially if controlling shareholders keep their status in the group. Related results 
indicate that common law countries can properly predict their stock price due to 
the fair information disclosure required under the law, which concentrates mainly 
on market discipline and private litigation. La Porta et al. (2006) find differences 
in the protection of investors according to different legal origins, based on the 
effects of securities laws. They reveal that legal origins have a bearing on stock 
market development. Djankov et al. (2008) provide an anti-self-dealing index, 
comprising legal origins, politics and media, for studying the legal protection of 
minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders; their empirical 
evidence suggests the index is more effective than previous anti-director rights to 
predict stock market outcomes. 
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Compared with the markets in developed economies, China’s stock market is 
considered to feature tunnelling behaviour. There are several reasons why 
controlling shareholders expropriate benefits from listed firms, and why such 
tunnelling behaviour cannot be properly eliminated from the Chinese stock market. 
First, most of China’s listed firms are spin-offs from state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), which are usually treated as controlling shareholders. Therefore, the 
central or local government has the absolute right to appoint firm management. 
The management thus appointed often expropriates benefits from minority 
shareholders as payback for obeying controlling shareholders or SOEs. Second, 
since China’s special privatization in the early 1990s, only 30% of listed firm 
shares are tradable, with about 40% of shares belonging to controlling 
shareholders. Therefore, controlling shareholders’ decisions are seldom 
challenged by other shareholders. Third, controlling shareholders may try to find 
other channels to increase their benefits, since most of their shares are non-
tradable, with limited price appreciation. Fourth, minority shareholders cannot 
properly protect their interests, due to limited fines and a lack of pertinent security 
laws. Related empirical research also supports previous theories and indicates that 
tunnelling behaviour in China is serious and has been a major concern of 
government agencies and researchers.
Jiang et al. (2005) primarily use inter-corporate loans from financial statements to 
represent tunnelling.  Their revised 2010 study makes a thorough analysis of 
tunnelling problems in China and the economic consequences on firm operating 
performance, market reaction, and corporate governance. The authors argue that 
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inter-corporate loans used as other receivables are traceable through sources and 
do not need a ‘fair value’ test.  They find that firms with high tunnelling 
tendencies would experience worse operating performance and that investors 
cannot properly value the earnings of such firms. In addition, legal governance in 
China is still inadequate to prevent tunnelling behaviour. As an effective proxy for 
the protection of minority shareholder interests, institutional investor ownership is 
highest only in groups that are low in other receivables as a percentage of total 
assets (ORECTA). 
Unlike La Porta et al. (2002) and Claessens et al. (2002), Cheung et al. (2006) use 
specific connected transactions as a proxy to investigate whether minority 
shareholders experience losses during the implementation of connected 
transactions by listed firms on the Hong Kong stock market. They divide 
connected transactions into three groups: transactions more likely to result in 
expropriation by controlling shareholders, transactions that may benefit minority 
shareholders, and transactions with a strategic plan. The results indicate that stock 
excess returns are negative when firms prefer to use connected transactions rather 
than neglect them. In addition, companies from mainland China are more likely to 
use connected transactions. Liu and Lu (2007) find that tunnelling behaviour 
accounts for a significant proportion of earnings management in China’s stock 
market. Their evidence also indicates that capital raised by SEOs is diverted to 
controlling shareholders to accumulate interests from listed firms. Gao and Kling 
(2008) analyse the importance of corporate governance in managing tunnelling 
behaviour on China’s stock market. Their results show that audits without non-
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clean options signal financial health and that sound governance helps decrease the 
extent of asset appreciation. 
The ownership of senior managers and institutional investors plays a crucial role 
in corporate governance by effectively restricting tunnelling behaviour. From the 
policy maker’s perspective, Gao and Kling (2008) suggest that greater 
implementation of economic reforms and less state influence in public listed 
companies can also help improve corporate governance. Cheung et al. (2009) 
show that although minority shareholders in China may be expropriated by 
controlling shareholders through related-party transactions, they can also benefit 
from the propping up of firm performance. However, expropriation by controlling 
shareholders involves more than interests obtained from propping up. Furthermore, 
the authors conclude that information disclosure is greater when firms use related-
party transactions with tunnelling than when the transactions are used with 
propping. Berkman et al. (2009) use the issuance of loan guarantees by listed 
firms to analyse which types of firms in China’s stock market prefer tunnelling 
behaviour. They find that smaller firms, more profitable firms, and firms with 
greater growth prospects are more likely to be expropriated by controlling 
shareholders. Furthermore, they combine firm financial performance and 
tunnelling to find that these firms’ performance is significantly lower when the 
firms issue related guarantees. Jian and Wong (2010) conclude that listed firms in 
China use abnormal related sales by controlling shareholders as a tunnelling proxy 
to prop up earnings, and this phenomenon is more serious among state-owned 
institutions and in areas with weaker economic institutions. 
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Aharony et al. (2010) use the non-repayment of net outstanding corporate debt by 
parent companies to newly listed companies as a proxy for tunnelling, mainly 
because parent companies seldom pay back such debt to listed companies. The 
authors conclude that earnings management before initial public offerings (IPOs) 
is mainly due to opportunistic tunnelling in the post-IPO period. The results also 
indicate that investors in China cannot properly perceive such earnings 
management due to tunnelling before IPOs. Li (2010a) chooses other receivables 
from financial statements as a tunnelling proxy to study such behaviour in public 
and private listed companies. The author’s findings suggest that privately 
controlled public companies in China are more likely to adopt tunnelling, 
although they have better corporate governance than state-controlled public 
companies. Wang and Xiao (2011) explain board compensation through the 
contradiction between controlling and minority shareholders. They show that pay-
performance sensitivity is lower when controlling shareholders transfer private 
benefits through tunnelling. Peng et al. (2011) consider connected and non-
connected transactions as tunnelling proxies to detect market reactions based on 
various firm conditions. They classify transactions into five groups: asset 
acquisitions, assets sales, asset displacements, equity transfers, and cash payments. 
The results reveal that connected transactions are used by controlling shareholders 
to expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders under sound financial 
conditions. In contrast, controlling shareholders prefer to prop up listed firms to 
continually expropriate minority shareholder interests when the firm’s financial 
condition is poor. From the perspective of investors, market reactions to the 
announcement of connected transactions are negative (positive) when firms start 
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to finance from rights issues (and face the threat of delisting).  Du et al. (2012) use 
total related-party transactions over total assets as a tunnelling proxy to study 
stock market reactions when firms go private in the Hong Kong stock market. 
They find that controlling shareholders use connected transactions before 
privatization, which can cause negative abnormal returns, especially under 
conditions of weak corporate governance and more related-party transactions. In 
other words, controlling shareholders prefer privatization when they find that 
there is no need to keep a firm public to obtain spin-off benefits.
3.2.3 Institutional Background in China
3.2.3.1 Mutual Fund Ownership
In the early stages of its development, China’s capital market was dominated by 
individual investors, which created unfavourable conditions for its long-term 
development. To formalize the fund industry and provide the capital market with 
international experience, in 1998 the CSRC launched reforms to speed up the 
growth of China’s fund management industry, after clearing up old funds. During 
the initial stage of development, the fund industry suffered from low operational 
efficiency due to lack of experience, combined with high speculation and irregular 
trading. A number of fund scandals led the CSRC to investigate the fund 
management industry and punish the relevant parties.
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In 2000, the CSRC made a strategic decision to accelerate the development of the 
mutual fund industry and to recognize the role of mutual funds in corporate 
governance, as well as in helping individual investors back to a formal channel to 
manage their funds. In the same year, the CSRC initiated an expert review system 
for auditing fund products more precisely. In 2002, it implemented the gradual 
liberalization of the funds approval system. In its ‘Notification on Relevant Issues 
Concerning the Examination and Approval of Securities Investment Funds’, the 
CSRC proposed simplifying the approval process and reducing control to initiate 
market reform in the mutual fund industry. In 2003, the CSRC issued the 
‘Administrative Measures of Expert Review System for Securities Investment 
Fund’ to converge with internationally accepted registration systems. From the 
beginning of 2002 to the end of 2005, the mutual fund reforms unlocked the fund 
industry’s potential, despite an overall downturn in the market. During this time, 
the total net value of funds increased from US$10 billion to US$57 billion, while 
the market value of tradable shares held by securities investment funds also 
increased from 5% to about 20% of the total market capitalization of tradable 
shares. In 2006, with the gradual recovery of the market US$50.5 billion of new 
funds were raised by the fund industry. By 2007, the mutual funds under 
management by fund companies had reached US$448.5 billion (CSRC 2008).
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3.2.3.2 Tunnelling Behaviour
Previous studies indicate that controlling shareholders may expropriate minority 
shareholder interests when ownership structure is highly concentrated or when 
minority shareholders have few legal and regulatory channels to protect their 
benefits (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999, 2000, 2006; Claessens et al., 2000; Jonson et 
al., 2000b; Freidman et al., 2003). China’s stock market is considered an 
appropriate environment for investigating tunnelling behaviour, based on both 
those factors, and others.
First, highly concentrated share ownership is the main incentive of controlling 
shareholders. At the beginning of the economic reforms, around 1978, Chinese 
firms were all governed by the state to protect a weak industry foundation. To 
accelerate reform, open up the economy and enrich the people of China, during 
the 1990s the Chinese government initiated the share-issuance privatizations, 
privatizing more than 1,000 large SOEs listed through two main stock exchanges. 
However, privatization in China has so far failed to achieve its original intention 
to fully authorize investors, rather than state agencies, to control listed firms. 
More than 80% of listed firms are still state owned (Peng et al., 2011). In addition, 
before the split share reform (from 1998 to 2004), most shares in listed firms were 
controlled by the states or legal persons. 
With regard to ownership structure, major differences exist between the largest 
and second largest shareholders, who usually account for 40% and 10% of total 
shares, respectively. From the angle of corporate governance, listed firms’ chief 
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executive officers are sometimes directly or indirectly appointed by the 
government or a government-related agency (Fan et al., 2007). Therefore, 
minority shareholders are unable to challenge the status of SOEs to protect 
themselves. Furthermore, there are few formal channels for minority shareholders 
to take actions against controlling shareholder decisions. MacNeil (2002) and 
Allen et al. (2005) both point out that the courts in China have a long tradition of 
protecting state interests and little experience with private plaintiff-driven 
litigation. Moreover, since the 2000s, corporate governance mechanisms have 
been proposed and executed by administrative regulations and laws, such as the 
‘Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of 
Listed Companies (2001)’, ‘Circular of the State Council on its Approval of the 
CSRC’s Option on Improving the Quality of Listed Companies (2005)’, the 
revised ‘Company Law’, and the ‘Securities Law’ (2006). In terms of the public 
corporate governance role, institutional investors account for only a small 
ownership percentage and have an ambiguous attitude towards limiting 
controlling shareholder tunnelling behaviour (Yuan et al., 2008; Firth et al., 2010). 
In addition, Jiang et al. (2010) demonstrate that public enforcement mechanisms 
in China have been limited by the security market regulators. Finally, to prevent 
national assets from draining away, until the end of 2004 about 64% of shares in 
China’s stock market were non-tradable. Nearly 70% of these non-tradable shares 
were owned by the government, state agencies, and other legal entities, and could 
be transferred only to related parties, or traded through exchanges. Therefore, 
controlling shareholders could not obtain private interests from share price 
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appreciation related to improving firm performance, and most preferred to find 
other channels (e.g., tunnelling behaviour) to transfer firm benefits to themselves.
Since 1997, the CSRC has issued various administrative regulations regarding the 
management of controlling shareholder tunnelling behaviour to protect minority 
shareholder interests. Among these regulations, the split share structure reform is 
regarded as the most important reform towards improving the investment 
environment in the Chinese capital market. This is because the Chinese 
government required listed firms to convert all non-tradable shares into tradable 
shares, tying the benefits of the original controlling shareholders to firm 
performance; in other words, to the interests of the original tradable shareholders. 
Since this reform, few incentives remain for controlling shareholders to 
expropriate the interests of minority shareholders.
In addition to the split share structure reform, the CSRC first began governing 
related-party transactions with the regulation ‘Content and Format Standards of 
Information Disclosure for Securities Issuing Companies No. 7 – Announcement 
on Related Party Transactions (1997)’. In the same year, the Chinese Ministry of 
Finance promulgated an accounting standard for issuing related-party transactions 
to the public based on the degree of such transactions. Where related-party 
transactions between a listed firm and its parent company are greater than 
RMB 300,000 (US$36,300), the firm must report the transaction agreement to its 
stock exchange within two workings days. If the related-party transaction is 
greater than RMB 3 million (US$363,000) or 0.5% of net assets, then the firm 
should publish this amount in its annual report. Finally, if a related-party 
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transaction between a firm and its parent company is greater than RMB 30 million 
(US$3.63 million) or 5% of net assets, the transaction price should be audited and 
discussed at the general shareholder meeting. 
However, enforcement of these regulations was very limited, as the CSRC lacks 
the necessary investigative and prosecuting power, as well as resources. After a 
series of unsuccessful regulations on tunnelling behaviour and faster development 
in the stock market, the CSRC began eliminating and preventing such behaviour 
with more authority from the 2000s onwards, despite enormous resistance from 
state-owned firms. To take effective action against tunnelling behaviour, in 2003 
the CSRC and the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) jointly promulgated the ‘Notice on Regulating Fund 
Transactions between Public Companies and Related Parties and Provisions of 
Loan Guarantees by Public Companies’, to restrict fund transfers and loans 
between controlling shareholders and related parties. The regulation required 
listed firms to decrease other receivables (OREC) of controlling shareholders by 
30% per year. In 2004, the State Council published a board directive underlining 
the importance of limiting tunnelling behaviour of controlling shareholders. 
Following these instructions, in the same year the CSRC mandated that listed 
companies with insufficient funds could repay their loans through debt for equity 
swaps. To strengthen the penalties, in 2005 the CSRC proposed disclosing the 
names of listed firms that could not reduce their loans to below RMB 100 million 
by the end of that year. Also in 2005, the State Council announced the ‘Options 
on Improving the Quality of Public Companies’, written by the CSRC. This 
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regulation states that any means of funds extraction by controlling shareholders 
are prohibited and current funds extracted from listed firms must be paid back by 
the end of 2006. Because of the close relation between controlling shareholders 
and top management, in late 2006 eight government ministries issued an 
announcement to control the tunnelling behaviour of top management. According 
to the announcement, the top management of controlling entities would face 
disciplinary punishment or even arrest if they could not fulfil the repayment by the 
deadline. However, despite the great efforts to protect minority shareholder 
interests by limiting tunnelling behaviour, empirical evidence indicates that there 
was only slow progress by controlling shareholders and top management in 
paying back funds. According to the CSRC’s public report in mid-2005, 480 listed 
firms still had around RMB 48 billion in funds extracted by controlling 
shareholders. Yu (2006) reports that around RMB 36.5 billion in funds were 
tunnelled from 234 listed firms.
3.2.4. Hypothesis Development
This chapter begins by assuming that mutual fund ownership has a positive effect 
on improving firm performance in Chinese listed firms, for several reasons. First 
of all, mutual fund ownership is regarded as playing an effective role in 
monitoring financial activities, since it usually involves few business relations 
with portfolio firms and mutual funds are less pressure-sensitive than other 
institutions (Cornett et al., 2007). Secondly, according to instructions from the 
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National People’s Congress (2003), mutual funds in China are now required 
quarterly to reveal more information to the public, such as investment styles and 
prospective returns, which directly increases the scrutiny from regulators. Thirdly, 
mutual fund managers would face pressure to deliver high returns to public 
investors, as their commission fees depend on the investment performance and 
fund size. Previous empirical studies support these assumptions based on various 
evidence. McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Elyasiani and Jia (2010) both find 
empirically that institutional ownership has a positive effect on adjusting firms’ 
Tobin’s Q. Yuan et al. (2008) clarify previous findings and conclude that mutual 
fund ownership in China can play an effective role in protecting minority 
shareholder interests. Their results are consistent with those of McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) and Elyasiani and Jia (2010) in confirming that the corporate 
monitoring of mutual fund ownership is evidenced by a positive relation between 
mutual fund ownership and firm performance. Therefore, this chapter argues that 
mutual fund managers have strong incentives to monitor their portfolio 
performance to protect their investment against erosion in value. 
This chapter also tests whether mutual fund ownership can effectively strengthen 
corporate governance in Chinese listed firms and prevent tunnelling behaviours by 
controlling shareholders that extract firm resources to maximize personal interests. 
Since tunnelling behaviours can induce poor firm performance, as has been 
proved by previous studies (Cheung et al., 2006; Gao and Kling, 2008; Berkham 
et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2010; Wang and Xiao, 2011), mutual fund managers 
would have an incentive to improve firm performance and reduce the tunnelling 
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behaviours of controlling shareholders. As a result, controlling shareholders 
engaging in tunnelling behaviours may have less incentive to transfer more voting 
rights to mutual fund managers to supervise their self-interested behaviour. Firm 
performance would then become less informative of mutual fund managers’ effort, 
and thus less useful in setting those managers’ compensation. This raises a 
contradictive issue about the role of mutual fund ownership in improving firms’ 
quality. Consistent with the recent development of the mutual fund industry from 
the 2000s and the gradual restriction of the tunnelling behaviour of controlling 
shareholders by Chinese regulators, this chapter argues that mutual fund 
ownership would not only have a strong incentive to play a corporate governance 
role, but along with minority shareholder protection polices implemented by the 
CSRC, it would also enhance firm quality, protecting against controlling 
shareholder tunnelling behaviour. The aforementioned findings induce the 
following hypothesis:
H1(a): Mutual fund ownership has a positive effect on firm performance.
H1(b): For firms with tunnelling, the improvement in firm performance given 
by mutual fund ownership is higher. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that ownership concentration above a certain level 
would force managers to become entrenched and expropriate the wealth of 
minority shareholders. This issue has led researchers into a hot debate about the 
non-linear relation of ownership concentration and firm performance. For 
example, according to the monitoring theory, Shlerifer and Vishny (1986) argue 
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that monitoring incentives would increase with the rise of ownership 
concentration. However, Wu (2004) supports the private benefits hypothesis, and 
explains that monitoring incentives would not necessarily be improved if 
ownership were highly concentrated among passive shareholders. In other words, 
highly concentrated ownership would give more power to the corresponding 
shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders’ interests (La Porta et al., 1999). 
Thomsen et al. (2006) find a negative impact of blockholder ownership on firm 
performance for continental Europe, which is explained as the conflict of interest 
between large investors and minority shareholders. In addition, in an empirical 
study in the field of institutional investment, Kim (1993) finds that institutional 
investors with high ownership are more likely to exploit private information to 
maximize their benefits, which could be expropriated for trading purposes. 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) indicate that although institutional ownership has a 
positive effect on bond rating yields, they find a negative effect when institutional 
ownership is so high that it ignores its original responsibility. The findings of 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) suggest that the corporate governance mechanism 
associated with institutional ownership is perceived as positive by bondholders, 
while concentrated ownership may be perceived to result in more self-interested 
behaviour on the part of institutions. Velury and Jenkins (2006) also suggest that 
highly concentrated institutional ownership has a negative effect on earnings 
quality, which implies that larger institutional investors are more likely to be 
perceived as engaging in self-interested behaviour and disclosing less information 
to the public, thereby harming earnings quality.
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High levels of mutual fund ownership may induce expropriation for the following 
reasons. First, nearly all mutual fund management firms are funded by state-
controlled agencies, such as securities, banks, and insurance companies (Kim et 
al., 2003). Therefore, the management of mutual fund firms needs to fully 
consider those ultimate controlling shareholders’ interests, rather than acting in an 
external corporate governance role to independently improve firm quality. Second, 
the CSRC has the authority to require mutual fund firms to give notification of 
changes to concentrated shareholders as part of proper supervision; sometimes it 
even has the authority to appoint the senior manager of a mutual fund company. 
As a consequence, top managers of mutual fund firms may be restricted from 
following their original investment plan, and instead may need to pursue their 
political prospects, supporting government agencies and the related controlling 
shareholders. Although Wei et al. (2005) suggest that a highly concentrated 
mutual fund ownership improves firm value, their sample covers only private 
listed firms in China. Gul et al. (2010) also state that a high ownership 
concentration can weaken corporate transparency for Chinese listed firms. 
Therefore, when the mutual fund ownership is high, there can be more incentive 
for mutual fund managers to pursue their own interest rather than impede 
tunnelling behaviours of controlling shareholders. 
As a result, this chapter studies the non-linear association between mutual fund 
ownership and firm performance. In addition to predicting a positive linear 
relation between mutual fund ownership and performance, we expect to find a 
negative relation between mutual fund ownership and firm performance when it 
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reaches a certain level (as a consequence of the expropriation effect).  Hence the 
second hypothesis is as follows:
H2 (a): There is a concave association between mutual fund ownership and 
firm performance.
H2(b): The incremental effect of mutual fund ownership on firm performance 
is also concave for firms with tunnelling behaviour.
Furthermore, this chapter expects that higher mutual fund ownership can reduce 
firms’ tunnelling behaviour in China and protect minority shareholders’ interests. 
This is not only because mutual fund ownership is considered to play an effective 
corporate governance role in protecting minority shareholder interests and in 
helping managers enhance listed firm disclosure information, but also due to the 
increase in policy regulations on the mutual fund industry and tunnelling 
behaviours. Since 2000, the Chinese government has gradually revised several 
policies aimed at formalizing the mutual fund industry to protect minority 
shareholder interests and restrict controlling shareholder expropriation. Empirical 
evidence from Gao and Kling (2008) has also shown that institutional ownership, 
used as an endogenous variable, indirectly restricts tunnelling behaviour by 
improving the corporate governance of listed firms in China. Consistent with Gao 
and Kling (2008), Jiang et al. (2010) aggregate and split into deciles firms’ 
ORECTA in 2004 and examine related institutional ownership. Their results show 
that institutional ownership is highest when firms have low ORECTA, which 
indicates that institutional investors prefer to keep their funds away from high-
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ORECTA listed firms. Based on these arguments, we develop the third hypothesis 
as follows:
H3(a): Mutual fund ownership can effectively reduce tunnelling behaviour, as 
it can improve the corporate governance mechanism among Chinese listed 
firms. 
Consistent with the second hypothesis, mutual fund managers with higher 
ownership can also transfer firm resources for their own interest. Therefore, we 
have the following hypothesis:
H3(b): Mutual fund ownership has a non-linear effect on tunnelling behaviour 
with increased ownership concentration by mutual fund managers.
3.3 Methodology
In order to calculate the mutual fund ownership, this chapter defines INS_PER as 
the percentage of mutual funds deflated by total shares. Following Yuan et al. 
(2008), another way to calculate mutual fund ownership is to use the ratio of the 
market value of mutual funds to the firm’s market value at the end of the year. 
This has been used for testing the robustness of our results. 
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Another main variable is the proxy for tunnelling behaviour (TUL). Unlike the 
tunnelling of Johnson et al. (2000b), expropriation in China usually takes the form 
of corporate loans to controlling shareholders, payments made on behalf of 
controlling shareholders, and loan guarantees from controlling shareholders (Li, 
2010a). The most routine tunnelling behaviour is from other receivables extracted 
from listed firms. China’s Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
consider other receivables from transactions other than the sale and purchase of 
goods and services to be improper receivables, and since 1997 the CSRC has also 
required related-party transactions to be recorded in listed firms’ annual reports to 
limit tunnelling behaviour. However, the underdeveloped Chinese laws and 
related regulations cannot prevent tunnelling behaviour from using other 
receivables. From their empirical evidence, Jiang et al. (2010) conclude that inter-
corporate loans (represented by other receivables) are an appropriate proxy for 
tunnelling behaviour, as they are traceable to public sources and do not require a 
‘fair value’ test, which is needed to clarify asset transfers between related parties. 
The authors also demonstrate that other receivables from controlling shareholders 
can be approximately replaced by the value obtained from the annual report. Li 
(2010a) comes to the same conclusions using a randomly selected 50 firms, and 
finds that almost all other receivables are funds extracted by controlling 
shareholders. This chapter also uses other receivables from controlling 
shareholders and their affiliates (Wang and Xiao, 2011) to examine precisely 
whether mutual fund ownership can improve listed firms’ profitability, given the 
tunnelling of controlling shareholders.
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For testing the concave relationship, INS_PER and INS_PER_2 (the square value 
of INS_PER) are introduced to capture the predicted concave relation, while 
TUL_INS_PER and TUL_INS_PER_2 (the square value of INS_PER multiplied 
by TUL) are used to study such concave relation when controlling shareholders 
extract resources from listed firms. Furthermore, following prior studies such as 
those of Yuan et al. (2008), Elyasiani and Jia (2010), and Wang and Xiao (2011), 
this chapter uses firm characteristics and corporate governance variables to 
control for their effects on firm performance. To examine H1 and H2, we use the 
following regressions:
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9 10
11 12 13
_ _ _ 2 _
_ _ 2 _
_
Firm Performance INS PER INS PER TUL TUL INS PER
TUL INS PER TS REFORM RET ADJ STATE LEVERAGE
CHANGE SALES BM SIZE
    
     
  
      
     
  
      (1)
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9 10
11 12 13 14 15 16
17 18
_ _ _ 2 _
_ _ 2 _1 _
_ _ 5 _
_
Firm Performance INS PER INS PER TUL TUL INS PER
TUL INS PER PAY HERF TOP IND DSUP NUM
DSUP MEET BIG TS REFORM RET ADJ STATE
LEVERAGE CHANGE SALE
    
     
     
 
      
     
     
  19 20S BM SIZE  
       (2)
In models (1) and (2), this chapter uses ROA, ROE, ROS, Tobin_Q, and 
OPNIC_MV as dependent variables to fully examine listed firm performance. 
More specifically, firm performance proxies are represented by five financial 
variables adopted in the previous studies (Yuan et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2008, 
2009): earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets (ROA); total profits 
divided by the book value of equity (ROE); the market value of assets over the 
book value of assets (Tobin_Q); earnings before interest and tax divided by net 
sales (ROS), and operating income divided by the market value of assets 
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(OPINC_MV). In other words, ROA, ROE, and ROS measure the profitability of 
the listed firms, Tobin’s Q is market value performance, and OPINC controls the 
time-series properties of earnings (cash flows). Because the relation between firm 
performance and mutual fund ownership may vary from industry to industry 
(Yuan et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2008), this chapter uses median-adjusted 
performance measures by industry for a robustness test; the industry classification 
is based on published CSRC codes.
Corresponding to the H1 and H2, the concave relation expects a positive 
coefficient for INS_PER and TUL_INS_PER if the shareholding of mutual funds 
can improve the quality of listed firms in their portfolios for firms with and 
without tunnelling behaviour. A negative coefficient for INS_PER_2 and 
TUL_INS_PER_2 implies that highly concentrated mutual fund ownership may 
induce managerial entrenchment effect and that fund managers are more likely to 
be influenced by their ultimate controlling shareholders’ investment decision to 
expropriate minority shareholders’ interests.
With regard to control variables, including corporate governance and firm 
characteristics, agency theory predicts that executive compensation is positively 
correlated with firm performance. In China, since 2001 and 2006, respectively, in 
coordination with the split share structure reform, listed firms have been required 
by the CSRC to disclose executive and individual compensation in their annual 
reports. The literature on China’s stock market also reveals a positive relation 
between executive compensation and firm performance. Firth et al. (2006, 2007a) 
find that firm performance is affected by cash compensation and that ownership 
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structure affects the cash of pay. Conyon and He (2011) also confirm such a 
relation after controlling for management quality, ownership, and board structure. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) first point out that high ownership in board structure 
can help reduce the expropriation of controlling shareholders. The degree of such 
ownership may also improve firm performance. To control for the impact of 
ownership concentration on firm performance, this chapter follows Xu and Wang 
(1999) and Yuan et al. (2008), who find a positive relation between ownership 
concentration and firm performance in China. Therefore, this chapter considers 
the Herfindahl index, computed by the sum of the squared percentage of shares 
held by the top 10 shareholders, to determine the extent to which a high 
percentage of largest shareholders can adversely affect firm performance through 
raising firm capital costs or decreasing diversification opportunities (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Margaritis and Psillaki, 2010). 
In China it is usually the case that the largest shareholder is dominant and has 
more influence than in other countries. Then, this chapter expects a negative 
relation between the largest shareholder’s ownership and firm performance. 
Consistent with the development of China’s capital market, since 2002 the CSRC 
has required listed firms to gradually adopt the Anglo-American style of internal 
corporate governance to protect minority shareholder interests, as in the assigning 
of independent directors to the main board of directors, and standardizing the 
supervision committee. Therefore, a positive correlation would be expected 
between a corporate governance variable (independent director, number of 
supervisors and number of supervisors’ meetings) and firm performance. The 
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variable Big4 indicates that an international Big 4 auditor supervises the firm’s 
accounting, although few Chinese listed firms hire such auditors due to their high 
commission fees.
The other control variables consist of firm characteristics. Compared with tradable 
shareholders, non-tradable shareholders may have more incentive to transfer 
interests from listed firms to themselves (Firth et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011). 
However, Jiang et al. (2010) state that non-tradable shares, mostly owned by the 
government, are more likely to have better firm performance. To capture the 
effect on firm performance, this chapter includes the percentage of tradable 
shareholders. The split share structure reform is considered as a benchmark for 
gradually transforming non-tradable shares into tradable shares, and nearly 90% 
of non-tradable shares had become tradable by the end of 2010. Therefore, the 
objective of controlling shareholders changed from maximizing the value of net 
assets to maximizing market value, since stock price is directly related to firm 
performance. A positive correlation is expected between share reform and firm 
performance.
Following Cornett et al. (2007) and Yuan et al. (2008), market-adjusted stock 
returns can also control for firm performance expectations and lucky selections by 
mutual fund managers. The market index used to compute market-adjusted stock 
returns is obtained from the Shanghai and Shenzhen composite market index. 
According to Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), who suggest that higher state 
ownership can result in firm operational inefficiency, the same empirical results 
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are found for China’s stock market. Gul (1999), Xu and Wang (1999), and Yuan 
et al. (2008) claim the state has a negative effect on firm performance. 
Morck et al. (1988) conclude that firm performance is affected by leverage from 
various directions, such as the increase in interest burden and operating risk, as 
well as the provision of tax shields. However, in China, the effect of leverage on 
firm performance is ambiguous. On the one hand, high leverage may reveal the 
ability to receive funding from government financial institutions and may 
therefore contribute to firm value. On the other hand, high leverage can also 
indicate that a firm is in financial trouble. The empirical evidence of Qi et al. 
(2000) and Sun and Tong (2003) shows a positive relation between leverage and 
the market-to-book ratio and a negative relation between leverage and accounting 
returns. In addition, Yuan et al. (2008) reveal a positive correlation between 
leverage and firm performance. 
Sales growth serves as a proxy for growth prospects and investment opportunities. 
Claessens et al. (2002), Maury (2006), and King and Santor (2008) find a positive 
relation between sales growth and firm performance. To control for the effects of 
firm risk and growth opportunities, this chapter also includes the book-to-market 
ratio. 
Xu and Wang (1999) argue that large firms in China may be supervised by more 
bureaucracy and may therefore be less efficient than small firms. Sun and Tong 
(2003) also find that firm size may have a negative correlation with firm 
performance, since large firms can suffer from more agency problems. Yuan et al. 
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(2008) find similar results to support the previous findings. Therefore, this chapter 
expects to observe a negative relation between firm size and firm performance.
The last hypothesis tests whether mutual fund (with highly concentrated) 
ownership may directly decrease (increase) tunnelling behaviour. Based on 
previous studies (Gao and Kling, 2008; Berkman et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2010), 
this chapter provides a more comprehensive and persuasive logistic regression to 
examine this question. Consistent with regressions (1) and (2), the logistic 
regression used for testing the third hypothesis also controls for firm 
characteristics and the effect of corporate governance:
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( 1) _ _ _ 2P DTUL INS PER INS PER STATE
LEVERAGE BM SIZE
   
   
    
                         (3)
0 1 2 3 4
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PAY STATE LEVERAGE BM SIZE
    
     
     
                   (4)
The dependent variable is the likelihood of controlling shareholders expropriating 
minority shareholder interests (DTUL), defined as one if the listed firm’s TUL 
value is above the median value of the current year for all firms and zero 
otherwise. Following H3 and H4, this chapter predicts a non-linear association 
between tunnelling behaviour and mutual fund ownership with a quadratic 
function specification. The concave relation expects a negative coefficient for 
INS_PER and a positive coefficient for INS_PER_2. The negative coefficient of 
1 from regressions (3) and (4) indicates that mutual fund ownership could 
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properly limit expropriation by controlling shareholders (Pagano and Röell, 1998; 
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Berkman et al., 2008; Gao and Kling, 2008; 
Yuan et al., 2008; Jiang et al., 2010), while the positive coefficient of 2  implies 
that the incentive alignment between mutual fund managers and controlling 
shareholders will force the ineffectiveness of mutual fund ownership in protecting 
minority shareholders’ interests. 
Berkman et al. (2008) and Jiang et al. (2010) argue that tunnelling behaviour is 
related to several firm characteristics. According to La Porta et al. (2002), in 
China the largest shareholder has effective control of a firm due to the lack of 
cumulative voting procedures. Berkman et al. (2008) also conclude that 
controlling shareholders have less incentive to exploit minority shareholders when 
cash flow rights and control rights are better aligned. Empirical evidence from La 
Porta et al. (2002) and Claessens et al. (2002) indicates a positive effect of 
controlling shareholder cash flow rights on firm performance. However, evidence 
from Peng et al. (2011) indicates that the largest shareholders may tunnel interests 
from minority shareholders, depending on the listed firm’s financial condition. 
Therefore, the largest shareholder would have an ambiguous effect on tunnelling 
behaviour. Furthermore, since the variable BIG4 is also considered a proper 
corporate governance variable to supervise controlling shareholder behaviour and 
accounting standards, it is expected to have a negative effect on tunnelling 
behaviour. With regard to the compensation of board directors, Wang and Xiao 
(2011) conclude that executive compensation is negatively associated with 
tunnelling behaviour, not only because controlling shareholders prefer to hire 
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docile executives rather than capable managers in order to seek private benefits, 
but also because executives may receive compensation in non-pecuniary form, 
such as promotion. In addition, state listed firms are more likely to use tunnelling 
behaviour to maximize their benefits from minority shareholders (Jiang et al., 
2010; Wang and Xiao, 2011). Other control variables are leverage (LEVERAGE), 
the book-to-market (BM) ratio, and firm size (FIRMSIZE), which are also used to 
control for the effects of tunnelling behaviour (Berkman et al., 2008; Jiang et al., 
2010; Wang and Xiao, 2011).
Wang and Xiao (2011) point out that tunnelling and pay-performance sensitivity 
might be affected by some common factors such as ownership structure. For 
example, a higher level of ownership of controlling shareholders makes it easier 
for them to tunnel resources from firms. In addition, when government is the 
controlling shareholder, related party transactions are relatively common, because 
most of the listed firms are carved out from their state-owned groups (Aharony et 
al., 2010). These factors could lead to simultaneous variations in tunnelling and 
executive compensation rather than tunnelling per se. Therefore, they employ a 
two-stage regression sensitivity test to further examine whether pay-performance 
is affected by these common factors instead of the tunnelling proxy itself. 
Hence, this chapter also determines whether mutual fund ownership is still 
effective in improving firm performance for firms engaging in unexplained 
tunnelling behaviour after controlling for other factors, such as corporate 
governance variables or firm characteristics. The corresponding regressions are:
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Following Wang and Xiao (2011), when controlling for the influence of common 
factors on mutual fund, the unexplained tunnelling behaviour proxy can be 
redefined as a dummy variable (UNEXP_TUL) that equals one if the residual from 
regression (5) is greater than the mean, representing those firms that may have 
greater potential incentive to employ tunnelling behaviour compared with others, 
and zero otherwise. The predicted non-linear results will strongly support H1 and 
H2 if the corresponding coefficients (INS_PER, INS_PER_2, 
UNEXP_TUL*INS_PER and UNEXP_TUL*INS_PER_2) are significant and have 
the same signs as regressions (1) and (2).
3.4 Data and Sample
The sample used in the study consists of 9062 firm-years, representing 1806 A-
share listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2003 to 
2011. We collect the data from the China Securities Market and Accounting 
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Research (CSMAR) database. We use the sum of Open-end-Funds and Close-end-
Funds4 to define the mutual fund ownership for each listed company. The sample 
begins in 2003 mainly because the information about mutual fund ownership is 
available from this time point. With regard to tunnelling behaviour, we follow Liu 
and Lu (2007) and Jiang et al. (2010) and use other receivables deflated by total 
assets to measure inter-corporate lending to controlling shareholders and their 
affiliates. Following Wang and Xiao (2011), this chapter also obtains cash 
transferred from listed firms to controlling shareholders and their affiliates at the 
end of the year. 
[Insert Table 3.1 around here]
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics of all the variables used in this study. 
Although the sample period is different from those in previous studies, panel A 
shows that the mean and median values of ROA, ROE, ROS, and Tobin’s Q are 
quite similar to those reported by Chang and Wong (2004), Jiang et al. (2010), 
Peng et al. (2011), and Mirth et al. (2012). The values of the means of ROA, ROE, 
ROS, and Tobin’s Q are 0.038, 0.070, 0.111, and 1.603, respectively. This chapter 
also uses the OPNIC_MV variable of Aboody et al. (2010) as an alternative 
measure of firm performance. In contrast to other papers that use TUL (other 
receivables deflated by total assets) as a tunnelling proxy, its mean value in this 
4 This paper does not investigate the impact of the two types of mutual funds, the open and close-end funds, on firm 
performance separately for two reasons: First, the share ownership of mutual funds in China is much lower than in 
developed markets. Secondly, this separation would further induce lower share ownership for both types of mutual funds 
and thus their impact would be significantly weakened. This chapter has also implemented empirical investigation and 
found that consistent with the expectations above, the impact of either open or close-end funds becomes insignificant. 
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chapter is only 0.032 across the entire sample period (2003-2011). The main 
reason is that CSRC policies restricting tunnelling behaviour and requiring listed 
firms to repay loans from other firms came into force in 2005, when most current 
papers’ research periods end. Since not all controlling shareholders transfer their 
resources out of listed firms, the number of firm-year observations is reduced 
from 9,062 to 5,091 and the mean of the TUL value from controlling shareholders 
also decreases, to 0.017, very similar to the results of Wang and Xiao (2011).
On average, the mean value of mutual fund ownership is 0.053, with a standard 
deviation of 0.017, similar to Ding et al. (2013). The first quartile is 0.001 and the 
third quartile is 0.076, indicating that fund managers in China prefer large 
percentages of listed firms’ tradable shares in their portfolios. The other 
independent variables are roughly similar to those of Firth et al. (2007b), Ding et 
al. (2013), and Hou et al. (2012). In detail, the average of STATE is 0.617, which 
reveals that the majority of listed firms in China belong to the state or the 
government. The percentage of tradable shares is about 61% for the whole sample 
period, and this high percentage is mainly due to the split share structure reform of 
2005. Panel A of Table 3.1 also reveals that most Chinese listed firms seldom hire 
internationally known auditors to oversee their financial statements, since the 
mean of BIG4 is only about 8.3%. The variable Top_1 reveals that ownership of 
the largest shareholder among China’s listed firms is high, about 38%.  Panel B 
summarizes the statistics of annual other receivables from the financial statement. 
Consistent with Jiang et al. (2010) and Liu and Lu (2007), ORECTA decreases 
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dramatically from 0.053 to 0.023 after 2005, when the CSRC implemented several 
compulsory policies to eliminate controlling shareholder tunnelling behaviour.
Table 3.2 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between variables. The 
correlation between the two mutual fund ownership measures is up to 0.937. This 
confirms that results are robust when either one of these two measures is adopted. 
It also reveals that mutual fund ownership by share and by market value are 
significantly positively related with all firm performance proxies and related 
industry-adjusted variables. This is consistent with the assumption in H1 that 
mutual fund managers are more willing to monitor firms in order to boost 
shareholders’ wealth. On the other hand, Table 3.2 also observes a negative 
relation between ORECTA and firm performance, which is consistent with the 
findings of Gao and Kling (2008), Berkman et al. (2009), and Jiang et al. (2010) 
and shows that tunnelling by controlling shareholders decreases with firm quality. 
Furthermore, there is a negative association between mutual fund ownership and 
tunnelling proxy, which implies that mutual fund ownership may play a corporate 
governance role in restricting tunnelling, so acting against controlling 
shareholders’ interests. In general, most of the correlations reported in Table 3.2 
are below 0.2 and thus present no concerns about multicollinearity among the 
explanatory variables.
 [Insert Table 3.2 around here]
132
3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 Relation between Mutual Fund Ownership and Firm 
Performance under Tunnelling Behaviour
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 report the results of the regression estimation for testing H1 
and H2. These results are based on five measures of firm performance (ROA, ROE, 
ROS, Tobin’s Q and OPNIC_MV) and two alternative proxies of mutual fund 
ownership (INS_PER and INS_MV_PER), controlled by industry and year effects. 
In Table 3.3, mutual fund ownership is computed by the number of shares owned 
by mutual funds deflated by total shares. The results indicate a concave 
association between mutual fund ownership and firm performance and thus 
strongly support H1 and H2. In detail, mutual fund ownership has positive and 
significant effect on firm performance at the 1% level for all regressions. This is 
consistent with Yuan et al. (2008), and suggests that the mutual fund has the 
incentive and ability to improve firm performance through direct monitoring over 
management. However, when mutual fund ownership reaches a certain point, a 
negative association between mutual fund ownership and firm performance 
emerges, except for Tobin’s Q, which still maintains a positive relation with firm 
performance. At this level of ownership, mutual fund managers have more 
influential power and can focus on their own interests instead of protecting small 
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shareholders and firm performance (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Velury and 
Jenkins, 2006). 
[Insert Tables 3.3 and 3.4 around here]
The coefficient on the tunnelling proxy in the third row of Table 3.3 indicates a 
significantly negative correlation with firm performance, and this is in line with 
the findings of Jiang et al. (2010) and Wang and Xiao (2011). Consistent with the 
relation between mutual fund ownership and firm performance, the coefficients of 
TUL_INS_PER and TUL_INS_PER_2 also indicate a non-linear relationship with 
firm performance. In other words, the coefficients of the interaction term between 
TUL and INS_PER and between TUL and INS_PER_2 are significantly positive 
and negative respectively. This implies that among firms with tunnelling 
behaviour, firm performance can still be improved under the supervision of 
mutual fund ownership. To some extent, mutual fund managers prefer to obtain 
interests and higher compensation through improving firm performance rather 
than by aligning with controlling shareholders to expropriate minority 
shareholders’ benefits. However, the coefficient on the squared mutual ownership 
is negative for all firm performance proxies, and this shows that the relationship 
becomes negative when mutual fund ownership reaches the critical point. The 
results are consistent with H2 and reveal that mutual fund managers prefer to be 
aligned with controlling shareholders or government agencies, not only because 
high ownership of mutual fund may drive the same benefits between the two 
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groups, but also because most mutual fund managers are under pressure from 
appointment issues and powerless voting rights. Therefore, mutual fund managers 
must relinquish supervisory power in order to keep their position and basic 
interests.
The other control variables in Table 3.3 are also consistent with the findings of 
previous studies. CEO compensation packages are viewed as playing an important 
role in restricting conflict between managers and shareholders. Consistent with 
empirical evidence (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Firth et al., 2006, 2007a; Conyon 
and He, 2011; Ozkan, 2011), which has shown that CEO compensation packages 
have a positive effect on firm performance owing to the enhanced motivation of 
managerial officers, a significantly positive correlation is observed between CEO 
compensation and firm performance. The development of China’s corporate 
governance is another incentive for managers to pay more attention to improving 
firm performance than to exploiting firm resources. The results in Table 3.3 also 
show the effect of ownership concentration on firm performance, where a positive 
relation is found at the 5% level of significance for all regressions. The results 
yield negative coefficients at the 1% level of significance for the relation between 
the largest shareholders and firm performance. In addition, although firm 
performance is not influenced by the number of meetings held by supervisors, the 
scale of supervision is considered to play a proper role in protecting minority 
shareholder interests, due to a significantly positive coefficient. The effects of 
adjusted stock returns, leverage, and the book-to-market ratio are all consistent 
with the previous studies. In addition, the coefficients for tradable shares, the split 
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share structure reform, and the rates of change for sales and firm size also partly 
support the previous findings.
In Table 3.4, mutual fund ownership is computed as the market value of mutual 
fund shares owned deflated by the total market value of the listed firm. The results 
are highly consistent with those in Table 3.3 and support H1 and H2 on the effect 
of mutual fund ownership on promoting firm performance.
3.5.2 Logistic Regression Results from the Determinants of 
Tunnelling Behaviour
Table 3.5 provides the results of testing whether mutual fund ownership can 
effectively reduce tunnelling behaviour. It presents the results of logistic 
regressions where the dependent variable equals one if TUL is above the median 
value in the current year and zero otherwise. Consistent with the univariate 
analysis, mutual fund ownership has a strong negative effect on tunnelling 
behaviour after corporate governance variables are controlled. In addition, the 
results are robust to other measures of mutual fund ownership. These results 
support H3 and imply that the probability of tunnelling behaviour through 
controlling shareholders’ other receivables is effectively restricted by mutual fund 
ownership. Moreover, mutual fund ownership is found to have a non-linear 
relation with tunnelling behaviour; in other words, tunnelling is significantly 
positively correlated with high mutual fund ownership concentration. These 
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findings suggest that the effect of corporate governance by mutual funds declines 
as mutual fund ownership reaches the critical turning point. This result is also 
consistent with the finding of Berkman et al. (2009) and Firth et al. (2010) that 
tunnelling behaviour is unrestricted when the costs greatly outweigh the benefits if 
high mutual fund ownership aligns with controlling shareholders. 
The largest shareholder and executive compensation are negatively and positively 
associated with tunnelling at the 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively. 
The positive effect of executive compensation implies that controlling 
shareholders can prevent tunnelling of private interests from firms. Each of the 
firm characteristic variables is also statistically significant at the 1% level and has 
the expected sign. More precisely, controlling shareholders are significantly more 
likely to transfer funds out of listed firms when leverage is high. A significantly 
negative correlation is also found between tunnelling behaviour and growth 
opportunities. A plausible explanation is that the cost of tunnelling behaviour 
would be substantial if it decreased expected future cash flow from a potential 
investment. Based on the conclusion of Jiang et al. (2010) and Wang and Xiao 
(2011), tunnelling proxies are higher for smaller firms.
[Insert Table 3.5 around here]
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3.5.3 Controlling the Determinants of Controlling Shareholder 
Tunnelling
Wang and Xiao (2011) state that the correlation between listed firms’ pay-
performance sensitivity and tunnelling behaviour is affected by some other factors, 
as previous studies (Gao and Kling, 2008; Jiang et al., 2010) find that tunnelling 
behaviour is determined by corporate governance and firm characteristics. 
Therefore, following the two-stage least-squares (2SLS) method of Wang and 
Xiao (2011), this chapter first controls for the effects of those factors on 
tunnelling proxy and then re-examines the association between mutual fund 
ownership and firm performance.
Panel A of Table 3.6 reports the results of regression (5). The coefficients on the 
mutual fund ownership and the squared term are still significantly negative and 
positive respectively, and thus mutual fund ownership still shows a non-linear 
relationship with tunnelling behaviour. This is consistent with Table 3.5. In 
addition, the coefficient of TUL_LAG is significantly positive and indicates that 
tunnelling behaviour is pushed up by the tunnelling in the previous period. The 
effect of state ownership on tunnelling behaviour is significantly negative at the 1% 
level, as shown by Jiang et al. (2010), although Jian and Wong (2010) report the 
opposite result. 
After excluding the expected tunnelling, panel B of Table 3.6 re-estimates model 
(2) with an unexpected tunnelling proxy, UNEXL_TUL. The corresponding 
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coefficients between firm performance and UNEXP_INS_PER, as well as 
UNEXP_INS_PER_2, are consistent with those reported in Table 3.3, except for 
the insignificant results from Tobin’s Q. Therefore, the results imply that mutual 
fund ownership is still effective in restricting controlling shareholders’ tunnelling 
behaviour and in turn improves firm performance, even after controlling for the 
influence of corporate governance and firm characteristics variables. But higher 
mutual fund ownership can act in alignment with controlling shareholders and 
lower firms’ performance. To test the robustness of these results, this chapter also 
uses a different mutual fund ownership measure based on market value of shares 
and firm performance proxies and adjusted by industry effect. Consistent with 
panel B, the results in panels C and D also support H1 and H2.
[Insert Table 3.6 around here]
3.5.4 Robustness Test
Tables 3.7 to 3.9 provide several alternative measures for testing H1 and H2. The 
main purpose of these tests is to ensure the findings in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 are still 
supportive of H1 and H2.
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3.5.4.1 Alternative Measurements of the Tunnelling Proxy
Although Jiang et al. (2010) and Li (2010a) suggest that firms’ overall other 
receivables obtained from the financial statement can approximately represent 
firms’ tunnelling behaviour, some other studies adopt alternative measures to 
capture such activities. For example, Ye (2006) collected other receivables of 
controlling shareholders and their affiliates from the footnotes of financial 
statements. Wang and Xiao (2011) also manually collected the other receivables 
belonging to controlling shareholders and their affiliates with a larger sample size 
to conduct further empirical analysis. Instead of using other receivables from the 
entire firm and its controlling shareholder, this chapter uses other receivables from 
the China Listed Firms’ Related Party Transactions Research Database. 
Furthermore, compared with previous literature, this chapter use a longer sample 
period, from 2003 to 2011, to test the robustness of the results of Tables 3.3 and 
3.4. The correlation matrix in Table 3.2 shows a significant positive relation 
between the value of other receivables from the formal financial statement, and 
the value of that part of other receivables noted in the footnote as relating to 
controlling shareholders, which implies a reasonable substitution for these two 
variables. In Table 3.7, most coefficients of TUL_INS_PER and TUL_INS_PER_2 
are positive and negative at the 1% level of significance, respectively. These 
findings indicate that mutual fund ownership can still enhance the performance of 
listed firms if other receivables are collected directly from controlling 
shareholders when mutual fund managers hold a high percentage of a listed firm’s 
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shares. The improvement in firm performance is even higher for those firms with 
tunnelling behaviour.
[Insert Table 3.7 around here]
3.5.4.2 Alternative Measurements of Firm Performance and Fixed Effects
Because mutual fund ownership may vary across different industries, it is 
important to control for such variation. Following Allayannis and Weston (2001), 
Woidtke (2002), and Yuan et al. (2008), industry-adjusted firm performance 
proxies are defined as the difference between listed firm performance and the 
corresponding industry median in the same year. The main coefficients reported in 
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 suggest the same findings regarding H1 and H2 when the 
influence of industry is controlled. In addition, following Bond and Meghir (1994) 
and Harrison and McMillan (2003), this chapter also estimates the multivariate 
panel regressions with fixed effects. The corresponding findings also support the 
results of Tables 3.3 and 3.4 when the estimation with the control of fixed effects 
is used.
[Insert Tables 3.8 and 3.9 around here]
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3.5.4.3 More Restricted Variables as the Determinants of Controlling 
Shareholder Tunnelling Behaviour
Jiang et al. (2010) and Wang and Xiao (2011) both test the determinants of 
tunnelling behaviour with the same set of factors: ROA, STATE, SIZE, 
LEVERAGE, MARKETIZATION INDEX, and LARGEST SHAREHOLDER. 
Regression (5) includes all these variables to control for effects on tunnelling, 
except for the marketization index, which measures the development of the 
regional market, where higher values indicate greater regional market 
development (Fan and Wang, 2011). Since the marketization index is only 
available until 2009, this chapter includes it to fully control for tunnelling 
behaviour in a further empirical analysis over the period from 2003 to 2009. The 
results in Table 3.10 further confirm that the negative impact of unexplained 
tunnelling can be weakened by the increase in mutual fund ownership and thus 
firm performance can be improved even when MARKETIZATION INDEX has 
been considered as one of the determinants of tunnelling behaviour.
[Insert Table 3.10 around here]
3.6 Conclusion
Mutual fund ownership is considered in the previous studies to play an important 
corporate governance role in protecting minority shareholders. However, the 
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situation for the Chinese stock market is ambiguous, since mutual fund managers 
cannot properly address the contradiction in benefits between controlling 
shareholders and themselves (Firth et al., 2010; Ding et al., 2013). In order to 
resolve the puzzling role of mutual fund ownership, this chapter provides 
empirical evidence to show that there is a non-linear association between mutual 
fund ownership and firm performance in China. Furthermore, the positive 
association between mutual fund ownership and firm performance indicates that 
mutual fund ownership is effective in improving firm performance, and the 
improvement is even greater for those firms that have controlling shareholders 
exploiting tunnelling behaviour to maximize their own interests. 
This monitoring effect of mutual fund ownership can be induced by the following 
factors: First, compared with individual investors, mutual fund investors have 
more experience and expertise to monitor listed firms’ performance. More 
precisely, given the unique ownership structure of Chinese firms, agency 
problems can be effectively decreased as mutual fund ownership plays an external 
corporate governance role. Second, in the gradual reform by the Chinese 
government and the CSRC, more attention has been paid to the supervision of 
mutual fund managers regarding the protection of minority shareholders’ interests. 
Third, the performance of invested forms can also affect the income of mutual 
fund managers, because their compensation depends primarily on the size of the 
fund and the performance of the managed funds. Finally, since 2001 tunnelling 
behaviour has been gradually restricted by the CSRC, with several related policies 
for the protection of minority shareholders’ interests (Jiang et al., 2010). 
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Therefore, mutual fund managers are less likely to align with controlling 
shareholders in order to expropriate firms’ resources.
On the other hand, the negative relation between the squared mutual fund 
ownership and firm performance suggests that a high level of mutual fund 
ownership can increase the probability that the wealth of minority shareholders 
will be expropriated, rather than that firm performance will be improved. It is 
argued here that a high level of mutual fund ownership may create an agency 
problem that directly induces expropriation of minority shareholders. In addition, 
the effectiveness of monitoring by mutual fund ownership in China is more likely 
to be affected by government agencies or the CSRC, which has the right to 
appoint mutual managers and a strong incentive to protect controlling shareholder 
interests against the corporate governance mechanism. Moreover, most mutual 
fund managers in China have less power than those in developed countries. To 
protect against the potential hazards listed above, mutual fund managers may 
prefer to align with controlling shareholders or government agencies to extract 
resources out of firms when they have a high level of ownership.
The findings in this chapter also confirm that mutual fund ownership can act 
directly as proper corporate governance to limit the probability of tunnelling 
behaviour of controlling shareholders. In line with H2(b), however, mutual fund 
managers’ individual incentive, and the lack of voting rights, may explain why 
mutual fund managers act in the interests of controlling shareholders.
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The policy implication of this chapter is that although mutual fund ownership in 
China is effective in restricting controlling shareholders’ tunnelling and in 
improving firm performance, greater direct enforcement and more transparent 
appointments should be further imposed and strengthened by government 
agencies. Greater direct enforcement can further push mutual fund managers with 
a high level of ownership to provide more constructive suggestions on firm 
operation and monitoring, and more protection for minority shareholders, instead 
of aligning with controlling shareholders’ interests.
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics and Distribution of TUL
Panel A. Summary Statistics      
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. P25 P75
ROA 9062 0.038 0.037 0.057 0.014 0.065
ROA_ADJ 9062 0.003 0.002 0.056 -0.018 0.030
ROE 9006 0.070 0.077 0.124 0.032 0.129
ROE_ADJ 9006 0.000 0.006 0.122 -0.034 0.057
ROS 9062 0.111 0.094 0.174 0.046 0.170
ROS_ADJ 9062 0.008 0.001 0.166 -0.044 0.065
TOBIN_Q 9062 1.603 1.265 0.863 1.036 1.824
TOBIN_Q_ADJ 9062 0.206 -0.004 0.728 -0.162 0.310
OPNIC_MV 9062 0.029 0.029 0.042 0.011 0.050
OPNIC_MV_ADJ 9062 0.002 0.003 0.042 -0.014 0.023
INS_PER 9062 0.053 0.017 0.076 0.001 0.076
INS_MV_PER 9062 0.053 0.013 0.082 0.001 0.069
TUL 9062 0.032 0.013 0.056 0.004 0.034
DTUL 9062 0.481 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000
TUL_LAR 5091 0.017 0.001 0.048 0.000 0.010
DTUL_LAR 5091 0.466 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000
PAY 9062 13.428 13.481 0.951 12.819 14.064
HERF 9062 0.193 0.162 0.133 0.090 0.270
TOP_1 9062 0.386 0.370 0.157 0.258 0.505
IND 9062 0.357 0.333 0.053 0.333 0.375
DSUP_NUM 9062 0.922 1.000 0.268 1.000 1.000
DSUP_MEET 9062 0.659 1.000 0.474 0.000 1.000
BIG4 9062 0.083 0.000 0.276 0.000 0.000
TS 9062 0.607 0.550 0.256 0.395 0.841
REFORM 9062 0.634 1.000 0.482 0.000 1.000
RET_ADJ 9062 0.048 -0.032 0.489 -0.200 0.216
STATE 9062 0.617 1.000 0.486 0.000 1.000
LEVERAGE 9062 0.494 0.504 0.191 0.358 0.633
CHANGE_SALES 9062 0.099 0.148 0.387 0.031 0.261
BM 9062 0.424 0.371 0.268 0.226 0.573
FIRMSIZE 9062 21.797 21.658 1.144 20.982 22.446
MAK 6296 8.235 8.330 2.053 6.610 10.180
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix.
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Panel B. TUL Distribution by Year
Year Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. P25 P75
2003 382 0.033 0.013 0.052 0.003 0.039
2004 1008 0.052 0.020 0.079 0.005 0.062
2005 1139 0.053 0.020 0.084 0.005 0.058
2006 1083 0.035 0.015 0.059 0.004 0.041
2007 762 0.026 0.011 0.043 0.004 0.030
2008 794 0.023 0.011 0.038 0.004 0.027
2009 1128 0.022 0.010 0.034 0.004 0.026
2010 1215 0.022 0.010 0.037 0.003 0.025
2011 1551 0.023 0.011 0.039 0.005 0.025
Total 9062 0.032 0.013 0.056 0.004 0.034
147
Table 3.2 Correlation Matrix                               
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ROA 1.000
ROA_ADJ 0.988 1.000
ROE 0.917 0.911 1.000
ROE_ADJ 0.907 0.917 0.994 1.000
ROS 0.765 0.743 0.720 0.703 1.000
ROS_ADJ 0.758 0.763 0.725 0.727 0.964 1.000
TOBIN_Q 0.289 0.234 0.220 0.178 0.177 0.150 1.000
TOBIN_Q_ADJ 0.241 0.231 0.151 0.142 0.124 0.121 0.863 1.000
OPNIC_MV 0.896 0.895 0.845 0.844 0.699 0.692 0.040 0.032 1.000
OPNIC_MV_ADJ 0.895 0.906 0.852 0.859 0.676 0.695 0.076 0.042 0.984 1.000
INS_PER 0.373 0.344 0.350 0.326 0.207 0.196 0.386 0.296 0.258 0.271 1.000
INS_MV_PER 0.427 0.394 0.361 0.334 0.242 0.226 0.455 0.371 0.287 0.298 0.937 1.000
TUL -0.370 -0.355 -0.382 -0.372 -0.308 -0.312 -0.059 0.008 -0.357 -0.358 -0.182 -0.169 1.000
DTUL -0.182 -0.173 -0.156 -0.153 -0.148 -0.144 0.051 0.044 -0.214 -0.202 -0.086 -0.087 0.513 1.000
TUL_LAR -0.282 -0.278 -0.297 -0.294 -0.248 -0.259 -0.048 0.002 -0.269 -0.275 -0.123 -0.113 0.599 0.224 1.000
DTUL_LAR -0.211 -0.212 -0.202 -0.206 -0.140 -0.145 -0.011 -0.026 -0.225 -0.222 -0.127 -0.130 0.360 0.377 0.401 1.000
PAY 0.283 0.260 0.277 0.257 0.208 0.192 0.144 0.021 0.247 0.263 0.318 0.286 -0.160 -0.020 -0.119 -0.039 1.000
HERF 0.159 0.158 0.136 0.140 0.119 0.104 -0.163 -0.141 0.210 0.194 -0.045 0.010 -0.128 -0.252 -0.008 -0.117 -0.070 1.000
TOP_1 0.149 0.148 0.129 0.132 0.111 0.099 -0.150 -0.132 0.197 0.182 -0.023 0.024 -0.139 -0.245 -0.014 -0.109 -0.090 0.955 1.000
IND 0.026 0.018 0.029 0.022 0.020 0.018 0.080 0.016 -0.006 0.010 0.038 0.025 -0.023 0.010 -0.076 -0.006 0.050 0.003 -0.004 1.000
DSUP_NUM 0.065 0.048 0.066 0.053 0.049 0.044 0.121 0.030 0.024 0.043 0.133 0.120 -0.106 -0.021 -0.081 -0.002 0.078 -0.050 -0.040 0.052 1.000
DSUP_MEET 0.050 0.033 0.051 0.038 0.039 0.026 0.124 0.023 0.023 0.037 0.060 0.062 -0.031 0.025 -0.019 0.007 0.074 -0.004 0.000 0.048 0.033 1.000
BIG4 0.140 0.124 0.104 0.094 0.146 0.117 -0.070 -0.106 0.165 0.154 0.068 0.072 -0.135 -0.129 -0.072 -0.034 0.247 0.130 0.082 0.063 0.017 0.025 1.000
TS 0.021 -0.012 0.040 0.010 0.014 0.001 0.405 0.216 -0.088 -0.044 0.228 0.119 -0.046 0.131 -0.061 0.071 0.241 -0.506 -0.460 0.101 0.163 0.101 0.000 1.000
REFORM 0.168 0.123 0.176 0.135 0.144 0.120 0.318 0.114 0.080 0.109 0.276 0.239 -0.175 0.002 -0.167 -0.015 0.211 -0.187 -0.152 0.135 0.383 0.065 -0.015 0.430 1.000
RET_ADJ 0.236 0.222 0.244 0.234 0.150 0.142 0.311 0.270 0.179 0.191 0.274 0.287 -0.070 -0.016 -0.059 -0.050 0.092 0.042 0.040 -0.004 -0.003 0.060 -0.010 0.088 0.072 1.000
STATE 0.025 0.017 0.027 0.022 0.033 0.029 -0.086 -0.091 0.039 0.025 -0.001 -0.004 -0.104 -0.067 -0.023 0.035 -0.044 0.262 0.274 -0.043 0.036 -0.021 0.095 -0.068 -0.021 -0.011 1.000
LEVERAGE -0.363 -0.358 -0.226 -0.224 -0.271 -0.259 -0.212 -0.266 -0.315 -0.301 -0.003 -0.116 0.156 0.100 0.098 0.072 0.024 -0.083 -0.068 0.036 0.030 0.009 -0.069 0.063 0.045 0.024 0.007 1.000
CHANGE_SALES 0.330 0.329 0.331 0.331 0.275 0.292 -0.003 -0.014 0.332 0.325 0.134 0.136 -0.190 -0.087 -0.150 -0.110 0.072 0.081 0.083 -0.021 -0.013 0.009 0.034 -0.052 0.009 0.098 0.071 0.019 1.000
BM -0.222 -0.163 -0.175 -0.129 -0.133 -0.092 -0.587 -0.399 -0.097 -0.116 -0.340 -0.401 -0.029 -0.045 0.005 0.020 -0.178 0.039 0.053 -0.067 -0.037 -0.111 -0.025 -0.146 -0.240 -0.327 0.069 -0.080 -0.043 1.000
FIRMSIZE 0.170 0.136 0.198 0.174 0.190 0.144 -0.125 -0.290 0.199 0.203 0.265 0.180 -0.252 -0.198 -0.134 -0.070 0.378 0.243 0.212 0.098 0.123 0.092 0.412 0.136 0.162 0.086 0.206 0.271 0.113 0.055 1.000
MAK 0.128 0.108 0.120 0.099 0.115 0.098 0.164 0.044 0.072 0.090 0.114 0.104 -0.072 0.019 -0.072 0.008 0.366 -0.066 -0.064 0.107 0.155 0.078 0.139 0.209 0.274 0.000 -0.077 -0.019 -0.046 -0.161 0.182 1.000
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Table 3.3 Relation between Mutual Fund Ownership and Firm Performance
Dependent variable ROA ROA ROE ROE ROS ROS TOBIN_Q TOBIN_Q OPINC OPINC
INS_PER 0.310*** 0.303*** 0.567*** 0.546*** 0.438*** 0.424*** 0.899*** 1.046*** 0.215*** 0.207***
(11.859) (11.874) (9.019) (8.693) (5.155) (5.016) (2.702) (3.047) (11.325) (11.191)
INS_PER_2 -0.489*** -0.484*** -0.822*** -0.814*** -0.845** -0.827** 5.948*** 5.753*** -0.627*** -0.609***
(-4.902) (-5.037) (-3.672) (-3.642) (-2.494) (-2.485) (4.111) (3.928) (-9.483) (-9.472)
TUL -0.225*** -0.207*** -0.586*** -0.547*** -0.659*** -0.634*** -0.268** -0.237** -0.180*** -0.168***
(-11.858) (-10.748) (-11.506) (-10.606) (-9.248) (-8.722) (-2.444) (-2.118) (-13.756) (-12.710)
TUL×INS_PER 2.172*** 2.102*** 7.269*** 7.238*** 9.142*** 9.873*** 27.521*** 27.048*** 2.513*** 2.508***
(2.627) (2.753) (3.091) (3.117) (3.203) (3.752) (3.126) (3.007) (4.534) (4.972)
TUL×INS_PER_2 -9.718** -9.209*** -27.929*** -27.227*** -38.860*** -41.501*** -110.402** -109.850** -7.941*** -7.771***
(-2.550) (-2.595) (-3.084) (-3.048) (-2.872) (-3.238) (-2.552) (-2.523) (-3.771) (-4.013)
PAY 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.016*** -0.006 0.008***
(15.145) (13.890) (6.618) (-0.798) (15.527)
HERF 0.084*** 0.179*** 0.170*** 0.401** 0.065***
(6.367) (6.243) (3.828) (2.542) (6.181)
TOP_1 -0.030*** -0.067*** -0.129*** -0.156 -0.023***
(-2.830) (-2.829) (-3.584) (-1.213) (-2.772)
IND -0.005 -0.001 -0.017 0.226* -0.008
(-0.455) (-0.048) (-0.445) (1.789) (-0.973)
DSUP_NUM 0.006** 0.010* 0.015* 0.049*** 0.005**
(2.393) (1.759) (1.868) (2.729) (2.369)
DSUP_MEET 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.011 0.001
(0.451) (0.907) (0.454) (0.870) (1.197)
BIG4 0.004** 0.001 0.005 0.058*** 0.004**
(2.205) (0.256) (0.833) (2.583) (2.522)
TS -0.021*** -0.009*** -0.052*** -0.027*** -0.055*** -0.050*** 0.506*** 0.579*** -0.023*** -0.014***
(-8.205) (-3.292) (-8.585) (-4.100) (-6.372) (-5.158) (13.853) (13.560) (-11.308) (-6.192)
REFORM 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.036*** 0.038*** -0.036* -0.038* 0.009*** 0.010***
(3.133) (3.983) (4.860) (5.743) (7.268) (7.487) (-1.734) (-1.808) (7.359) (8.290)
RET_ADJ 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.153*** 0.154*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(9.265) (9.093) (8.642) (8.168) (4.718) (4.888) (9.992) (9.770) (6.816) (6.520)
STATE -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.011*** -0.007* -0.023* -0.031** -0.004*** -0.003***
(-3.877) (-3.418) (-3.299) (-2.708) (-3.035) (-1.908) (-1.756) (-2.261) (-4.382) (-4.015)
LEVERAGE -0.090*** -0.081*** -0.067*** -0.052*** -0.193*** -0.180*** -0.987*** -0.960*** -0.058*** -0.051***
(-25.734) (-23.178) (-8.476) (-6.539) (-15.506) (-13.766) (-23.284) (-21.021) (-23.520) (-20.718)
CHANGE_SALES 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.073*** -0.030* -0.023 0.023*** 0.023***
(11.910) (11.833) (10.903) (10.977) (5.839) (6.084) (-1.663) (-1.309) (13.405) (13.466)
BM -0.017*** -0.009** -0.030*** -0.014* -0.002 0.012 -0.983*** -0.962*** -0.006** 0.001
(-5.068) (-2.565) (-4.108) (-1.825) (-0.214) (1.018) (-31.260) (-28.941) (-2.225) (0.286)
FIRMSIZE 0.005*** -0.001 0.012*** 0.001 0.016*** 0.007*** -0.197*** -0.217*** 0.008*** 0.003***
(7.726) (-1.342) (8.663) (0.409) (7.775) (2.807) (-26.355) (-23.277) (15.619) (5.562)
Intercept -0.003 -0.055*** -0.106*** -0.246*** -0.118*** -0.184*** 6.046*** 7.055*** -0.077*** -0.133***
(-0.279) (-3.188) (-3.586) (-6.212) (-2.906) (-3.170) (39.814) (34.015) (-7.822) (-10.595)
Year dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-Squared 0.385 0.420 0.299 0.329 0.284 0.294 0.627 0.630 0.338 0.369
Observations 8,826 8,412 8,767 8,355 8,826 8,412 8,826 8,412 8,826 8,412
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is between 2003 and 2011. The dependent variables are the 
proxies of firm performance, represented by ROA, ROE, ROS, TOBIN_Q, and OPNIC. This chapter uses industry dummies to control for 
industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes, and a year dummy to control for the year. The coefficients and t-statistics are 
computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is between 2003 and 2011. The dependent 
variables are the proxies of firm performance, represented by ROA, ROE, ROS, TOBIN_Q, and OPNIC. This chapter uses 
industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes, and a year dummy to control for the 
year. The coefficients and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in 
parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 3.4 Relation between Mutual Fund Ownership and Firm Performance (Mutual 
Fund Market Value as a Substitutable Variable for Mutual Fund Ownership)
Dependent variable ROA ROE ROS TOBIN_Q OPINC
INS_MV_PER 0.312*** 0.597*** 0.356*** 0.805** 0.222***
(13.179) (10.209) (4.466) (2.414) (12.979)
INS_MV_PER_2 -0.417*** -0.969*** -0.318 5.661*** -0.583***
(-5.151) (-5.117) (-1.108) (4.528) (-10.656)
TUL -0.203*** -0.540*** -0.629*** -0.287*** -0.163***
(-10.748) (-10.605) (-8.785) (-2.626) (-12.527)
TUL×INS_MV_PER 1.663** 5.932*** 9.713*** 28.589*** 1.964***
(2.339) (2.671) (3.937) (3.344) (4.174)
TUL×INS_MV_PER_2 -6.869** -20.042** -39.158*** -96.958*** -5.334***
(-2.190) (-2.517) (-3.471) (-2.693) (-3.154)
PAY 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.015*** -0.006 0.008***
(14.919) (13.875) (6.372) (-0.712) (15.297)
HERF 0.077*** 0.159*** 0.161*** 0.292* 0.061***
(5.983) (5.661) (3.659) (1.860) (5.940)
TOP_1 -0.027** -0.056** -0.122*** -0.112 -0.021**
(-2.539) (-2.416) (-3.413) (-0.875) (-2.507)
IND -0.003 0.001 -0.012 0.240* -0.007
(-0.307) (0.048) (-0.322) (1.896) (-0.861)
DSUP_NUM 0.005** 0.010* 0.015* 0.050*** 0.005**
(2.389) (1.738) (1.872) (2.758) (2.342)
DSUP_MEET 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.010 0.001
(0.283) (0.795) (0.362) (0.792) (1.097)
BIG4 0.004* -0.001 0.005 0.038* 0.004**
(1.815) (-0.274) (0.785) (1.721) (2.435)
TS -0.006** -0.020*** -0.046*** 0.645*** -0.013***
(-2.056) (-3.115) (-4.797) (14.990) (-5.936)
REFORM 0.007*** 0.021*** 0.039*** -0.031 0.011***
(4.321) (6.028) (7.630) (-1.464) (8.466)
RET_ADJ 0.009*** 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.143*** 0.005***
(8.475) (7.829) (4.546) (9.167) (6.354)
STATE -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.007* -0.028** -0.003***
(-3.294) (-2.603) (-1.878) (-2.064) (-3.998)
LEVERAGE -0.072*** -0.038*** -0.167*** -0.875*** -0.047***
(-20.407) (-4.765) (-12.562) (-18.982) (-18.824)
CHANGE_SALES 0.030*** 0.067*** 0.072*** -0.025 0.023***
(11.783) (10.970) (6.038) (-1.419) (13.411)
BM -0.002 -0.006 0.022* -0.931*** 0.004
(-0.720) (-0.736) (1.803) (-28.013) (1.480)
FIRMSIZE -0.000 0.002 0.008*** -0.204*** 0.003***
(-0.632) (1.395) (3.063) (-22.367) (6.023)
Intercept -0.077*** -0.299*** -0.208*** 6.630*** -0.140***
(-4.618) (-7.713) (-3.678) (32.866) (-11.549)
Year dummy Y Y Y Y Y
Industry dummy Y Y Y Y Y
R-Squared 0.431 0.330 0.296 0.633 0.372
Observations 8,412 8,355 8,412 8,412 8,412
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Table 3.5 Logistic Regression Results for Tunnelling Behaviour in Mutual Fund Ownership
Dependent variable DTUL DTUL DTUL DTUL
INS_PER -5.675*** -5.732***
(-5.738) (-5.740)
INS_PER_2 18.144*** 15.508***
(4.767) (4.055)
INS_MV_PER -3.844*** -4.180***
(-4.090) (-4.389)
INS_MV_PER_2 8.986*** 8.784***
(2.814) (2.725)
TOP_1 -1.980*** -1.953***
(-12.520) (-12.449)
BIG4 0.022 0.034
(0.239) (0.370)
PAY 0.069** 0.068**
(2.362) (2.342)
STATE -0.045 0.084 -0.045 0.082
(-0.905) (1.621) (-0.899) (1.596)
LEVERAGE 1.986*** 1.849*** 1.915*** 1.778***
(14.334) (12.989) (13.380) (12.127)
BM -0.316*** -0.465*** -0.361*** -0.491***
(-2.646) (-3.778) (-2.917) (-3.870)
FIRMSIZE -0.324*** -0.266*** -0.331*** -0.281***
(-11.152) (-7.992) (-11.499) (-8.548)
Year dummy Y Y Y Y
Industry dummy Y Y Y Y
Observations 9,061 9,061 9,061 9,061
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is between 2003 and 2011. The dependent variable 
is the likelihood of the expropriation of minority shareholder interests by controlling shareholders. It is set to 1 if the 
OREC is over mean value, otherwise 0. This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to 
CSRC industrial codes, and a year dummy to control for the year. The numbers are followed by ***, **, * if they are 
significantly different from zero with 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level respectively.
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Table 3.6 2SLS Sensitivity Tests
Panel A. Determinants of Tunnelling Behaviour
Dependent variable TUL
INS_PER -0.071***
(-5.483)
INS_PER_2 0.229***
(5.289)
TUL_LAG 0.766***
(37.946)
TOP_1 -0.002
(-0.710)
STATE -0.003***
(-3.934)
ROA_LAG -0.032**
(-2.150)
LEVERAGE 0.025***
(6.002)
BM -0.002
(-1.251)
FIRMSIZE -0.004***
(-7.538)
Intercept 0.086***
(9.096)
R-Squared 0.623
Observations 9,376
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is between 2003 and 2011. The dependent variable 
is the proxy for tunnelling behaviour, calculated as other receivables deflated by total assets. This chapter uses industry 
dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes, and a year dummy to control for the year. 
The coefficients and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in 
parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Panel B. Relation between Mutual Fund Ownership and Firm Performance (Evidence from 
Unexplained Tunnelling)
Dependent variable ROA ROE ROS TOBIN_Q OPINC
INS_PER 0.305*** 0.686*** 0.607*** 1.696*** 0.224***
(11.861) (11.110) (7.570) (4.521) (11.696)
INS_PER_2 -0.578*** -1.337*** -1.754*** 2.555* -0.648***
(-6.375) (-6.338) (-6.361) (1.682) (-9.867)
UNEXP_TUL -0.010*** -0.028*** -0.035*** 0.009 -0.007***
(-5.120) (-6.069) (-5.345) (0.560) (-4.932)
UNEXP_TUL×INS_PER 0.195*** 0.345*** 0.448*** -0.012 0.164***
(4.731) (3.703) (3.246) (-0.020) (5.403)
UNEXP_TUL×INS_PER_2 -0.473*** -0.992*** -0.900* 1.742 -0.512***
(-3.049) (-2.986) (-1.719) (0.730) (-4.729)
PAY 0.011*** 0.025*** 0.018*** -0.005 0.008***
(14.888) (13.972) (6.886) (-0.659) (15.374)
HERF 0.079*** 0.173*** 0.165*** 0.470*** 0.062***
(5.575) (5.583) (3.562) (2.765) (5.536)
TOP_1 -0.021* -0.050** -0.109*** -0.190 -0.018**
(-1.862) (-1.970) (-2.910) (-1.388) (-2.023)
IND -0.008 -0.006 -0.017 0.255* -0.010
(-0.630) (-0.225) (-0.422) (1.918) (-1.107)
DSUP_NUM 0.008*** 0.017** 0.023** 0.062*** 0.006***
(2.817) (2.387) (2.414) (2.868) (2.614)
DSUP_MEET 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.010 0.001
(0.566) (0.794) (0.337) (0.828) (1.206)
BIG4 0.006*** 0.004 0.009 0.066*** 0.005***
(2.715) (0.950) (1.396) (2.772) (2.874)
TS -0.011*** -0.031*** -0.053*** 0.580*** -0.015***
(-3.886) (-4.591) (-5.390) (13.415) (-6.544)
REFORM 0.008*** 0.023*** 0.042*** -0.033 0.012***
(4.782) (6.465) (8.120) (-1.571) (9.062)
RET_ADJ 0.011*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.156*** 0.006***
(9.603) (8.573) (5.435) (9.897) (7.273)
STATE -0.004*** -0.006** -0.007* -0.033** -0.003***
(-3.262) (-2.175) (-1.713) (-2.289) (-3.699)
LEVERAGE -0.091*** -0.081*** -0.208*** -0.947*** -0.057***
(-24.272) (-9.339) (-14.921) (-19.332) (-22.203)
CHANGE_SALES 0.034*** 0.073*** 0.084*** -0.019 0.026***
(12.982) (11.987) (6.972) (-0.996) (15.139)
BM 0.000 0.001 0.040*** -0.942*** 0.008***
(0.023) (0.151) (3.090) (-27.683) (2.775)
FIRMSIZE -0.000 0.004** 0.010*** -0.227*** 0.004***
(-0.088) (2.284) (3.555) (-22.777) (6.292)
Intercept -0.090*** -0.355*** -0.177*** 6.465*** -0.133***
(-4.976) (-8.530) (-2.930) (31.009) (-10.385)
Year dummy Y Y Y Y Y
Industry dummy Y Y Y Y Y
R-Squared 0.394 0.296 0.269 0.629 0.334
Observations 8,056 7,999 8,056 8,056 8,056
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is between 2003 and 2011. The dependent 
variables are the proxies of firm performance, represented by ROA, ROE, ROS, TOBIN_Q, and OPNIC. This chapter uses 
industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes, and a year dummy to control for the 
year. The coefficients and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in 
parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Panel C. Relation between Mutual Fund Ownership and Firm Performance (Evidence from 
Unexplained Tunnelling, with Mutual Fund Market Value as a Replaceable Variable for 
Mutual Fund Ownership)
Dependent variable ROA ROE ROS TOBIN_Q OPINC
INS_MV_PER 0.314*** 0.743*** 0.564*** 1.400*** 0.240***
(12.741) (12.986) (7.253) (3.725) (13.343)
INS_MV_PER_2 -0.495*** -1.439*** -1.344*** 3.854*** -0.638***
(-6.210) (-8.157) (-5.388) (2.761) (-11.228)
UNEXP_TUL -0.009*** -0.026*** -0.034*** 0.016 -0.007***
(-5.141) (-5.839) (-5.483) (1.035) (-4.820)
UNEXP_TUL×INS_MV_PER 0.165*** 0.231*** 0.351*** 0.264 0.125***
(4.424) (2.762) (2.783) (0.481) (4.511)
UNEXP_TUL×INS_MV_PER_2 -0.356*** -0.558** -0.390 -1.117 -0.300***
(-2.807) (-2.071) (-0.889) (-0.539) (-3.316)
PAY 0.011*** 0.025*** 0.017*** -0.005 0.008***
(14.699) (13.973) (6.687) (-0.603) (15.205)
HERF 0.071*** 0.151*** 0.153*** 0.359** 0.057***
(5.132) (4.939) (3.328) (2.130) (5.206)
TOP_1 -0.017 -0.037 -0.099*** -0.147 -0.015*
(-1.516) (-1.471) (-2.678) (-1.083) (-1.650)
IND -0.006 -0.005 -0.013 0.268** -0.009
(-0.501) (-0.176) (-0.325) (2.004) (-1.050)
DSUP_NUM 0.008*** 0.016** 0.023** 0.061*** 0.006**
(2.766) (2.314) (2.413) (2.823) (2.556)
DSUP_MEET 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.009 0.001
(0.403) (0.669) (0.294) (0.722) (1.093)
BIG4 0.005** 0.002 0.009 0.044* 0.005***
(2.282) (0.405) (1.282) (1.883) (2.760)
TS -0.008*** -0.025*** -0.049*** 0.645*** -0.014***
(-2.644) (-3.642) (-4.966) (14.800) (-6.317)
REFORM 0.009*** 0.025*** 0.043*** -0.025 0.012***
(5.151) (6.785) (8.319) (-1.173) (9.255)
RET_ADJ 0.010*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.146*** 0.006***
(8.971) (8.251) (5.158) (9.284) (7.115)
STATE -0.004*** -0.006** -0.007* -0.029** -0.003***
(-3.099) (-2.045) (-1.701) (-2.033) (-3.679)
LEVERAGE -0.082*** -0.066*** -0.192*** -0.866*** -0.053***
(-21.671) (-7.673) (-13.638) (-17.482) (-20.404)
CHANGE_SALES 0.034*** 0.073*** 0.084*** -0.020 0.026***
(12.919) (11.975) (6.922) (-1.063) (15.078)
BM 0.006* 0.010 0.051*** -0.910*** 0.011***
(1.720) (1.237) (3.901) (-26.677) (3.891)
FIRMSIZE 0.001 0.006*** 0.011*** -0.212*** 0.004***
(0.907) (3.554) (4.011) (-21.818) (7.041)
Intercept -0.112*** -0.421*** -0.208*** 6.083*** -0.142***
(-6.429) (-10.365) (-3.531) (30.009) (-11.483)
Year dummy Y Y Y Y Y
Industry dummy Y Y Y Y Y
R-Squared 0.405 0.297 0.272 0.631 0.337
Observations 8,056 7,999 8,056 8,056 8,056
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is between 2003 and 2011. The dependent variables are the 
proxies of firm performance, represented by ROA, ROE, ROS, TOBIN_Q, and OPNIC. This chapter uses industry dummies to control for 
industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes, and a year dummy to control for the year. The coefficients and t-statistics are 
computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Panel D. Relation between Mutual Fund Ownership and Firm Performance (Evidence from 
Unexplained Tunnelling, with Industry-Adjusted Dependent Variables)
Dependent variable ROA_ADJ ROE_ADJ ROS_ADJ TOBIN_Q_ADJ OPINC_ADJ
INS_PER 0.302*** 0.677*** 0.595*** 1.598*** 0.220***
(11.637) (10.976) (7.350) (4.152) (11.476)
INS_PER_2 -0.570*** -1.321*** -1.712*** 2.650* -0.635***
(-6.215) (-6.250) (-6.153) (1.703) (-9.625)
UNEXP_TUL -0.010*** -0.028*** -0.035*** 0.011 -0.007***
(-5.051) (-5.983) (-5.277) (0.641) (-4.727)
UNEXP_TUL×INS_PER 0.193*** 0.333*** 0.451*** -0.098 0.159***
(4.629) (3.579) (3.263) (-0.172) (5.198)
UNEXP_TUL×INS_PER_2 -0.460*** -0.949*** -0.966* 1.966 -0.496***
(-2.911) (-2.844) (-1.853) (0.810) (-4.543)
PAY 0.011*** 0.025*** 0.018*** -0.003 0.008***
(14.700) (13.928) (6.729) (-0.319) (15.222)
HERF 0.078*** 0.167*** 0.155*** 0.495*** 0.062***
(5.573) (5.437) (3.353) (2.919) (5.518)
TOP_1 -0.020* -0.046* -0.102*** -0.192 -0.018**
(-1.772) (-1.854) (-2.743) (-1.392) (-2.008)
IND -0.008 -0.008 -0.012 0.255* -0.011
(-0.633) (-0.282) (-0.306) (1.903) (-1.244)
DSUP_NUM 0.008*** 0.016** 0.022** 0.061*** 0.006**
(2.673) (2.266) (2.263) (2.836) (2.328)
DSUP_MEET 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.008 0.001
(0.466) (0.898) (0.314) (0.640) (1.271)
BIG4 0.006*** 0.004 0.010 0.063*** 0.005***
(2.634) (0.913) (1.497) (2.684) (2.905)
TS -0.012*** -0.032*** -0.055*** 0.563*** -0.015***
(-3.958) (-4.753) (-5.561) (12.858) (-6.616)
REFORM 0.008*** 0.023*** 0.042*** -0.031 0.012***
(4.821) (6.380) (7.995) (-1.429) (8.903)
RET_ADJ 0.011*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.156*** 0.006***
(9.433) (8.715) (5.369) (9.648) (7.206)
STATE -0.004*** -0.006** -0.006* -0.034** -0.003***
(-3.365) (-2.268) (-1.657) (-2.348) (-3.639)
LEVERAGE -0.091*** -0.079*** -0.205*** -0.927*** -0.057***
(-24.072) (-9.129) (-14.802) (-18.799) (-22.031)
CHANGE_SALES 0.034*** 0.073*** 0.084*** -0.016 0.025***
(12.985) (12.015) (6.926) (-0.858) (15.111)
BM 0.001 0.001 0.045*** -0.913*** 0.007***
(0.371) (0.114) (3.392) (-27.361) (2.674)
FIRMSIZE -0.000 0.004** 0.009*** -0.222*** 0.004***
(-0.216) (2.268) (3.375) (-22.009) (6.355)
Intercept -0.111*** -0.447*** -0.341*** 5.406*** -0.164***
(-6.169) (-10.764) (-5.606) (25.658) (-12.865)
Year dummy Y Y Y Y Y
Industry dummy Y Y Y Y Y
R-Squared 0.361 0.269 0.187 0.470 0.317
Observations 8,056 7,999 8,056 8,056 8,056
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is between 2003 and 2011. The dependent 
variables are the proxies of firm performance, represented by ROA_ADJ, ROE_ADJ, ROS_ADJ, TOBIN_Q_ADJ, and 
OPNIC_ADJ. This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes, and 
a year dummy to control for the year. The coefficients and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.7 Relation between Mutual Fund Ownership and Firm Performance (Robustness 
Test with Controlling Shareholders’ Other Receivables as a Tunnelling Proxy)
Dependent variable ROA ROE ROS TOBIN_Q OPINC
INS_PER 0.339*** 0.759*** 0.536*** 1.422*** 0.285***
(11.459) (10.874) (5.742) (3.490) (12.426)
INS_PER_2 -0.681*** -1.565*** -1.365*** 2.586 -0.816***
(-6.095) (-6.318) (-3.850) (1.495) (-10.244)
TUL -0.255*** -0.630*** -0.828*** -0.481*** -0.194***
(-8.516) (-7.456) (-7.195) (-3.339) (-9.194)
TUL×INS_PER 4.680*** 10.940*** 19.600*** 27.163** 3.843***
(4.116) (3.038) (5.432) (2.169) (5.201)
TUL×INS_PER_2 -15.837*** -39.958** -77.068*** -42.414 -15.728***
(-3.087) (-2.552) (-5.106) (-0.669) (-4.897)
PAY 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.021*** -0.008 0.008***
(10.389) (9.517) (6.077) (-0.815) (10.812)
HERF 0.071*** 0.180*** 0.079 0.029 0.058***
(4.080) (4.632) (1.407) (0.161) (4.193)
TOP_1 -0.014 -0.045 -0.013 0.017 -0.011
(-0.963) (-1.393) (-0.277) (0.113) (-0.989)
IND -0.008 -0.002 -0.022 0.274* -0.012
(-0.468) (-0.051) (-0.401) (1.883) (-0.922)
DSUP_NUM 0.006** 0.015** 0.018* 0.035* 0.005**
(2.219) (2.025) (1.772) (1.828) (2.104)
DSUP_MEET 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.587) (0.417) (-0.494) (0.091) (1.280)
BIG4 0.006** 0.008 0.016* -0.012 0.008***
(2.333) (1.525) (1.894) (-0.486) (3.449)
TS -0.009** -0.028*** -0.047*** 0.455*** -0.011***
(-2.314) (-2.861) (-3.459) (7.943) (-3.524)
REFORM 0.014*** 0.036*** 0.050*** -0.021 0.014***
(5.862) (6.656) (6.986) (-0.838) (7.168)
RET_ADJ 0.010*** 0.024*** 0.016*** 0.151*** 0.006***
(6.341) (6.127) (3.241) (7.246) (4.580)
STATE -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002**
(-1.157) (-0.866) (-0.184) (-0.246) (-2.090)
LEVERAGE -0.080*** -0.063*** -0.165*** -0.789*** -0.054***
(-17.251) (-5.615) (-9.481) (-13.221) (-15.998)
CHANGE_SALES 0.036*** 0.077*** 0.100*** -0.052** 0.025***
(11.907) (9.799) (6.990) (-2.254) (12.186)
BM -0.006 0.006 0.028* -0.805*** 0.001
(-1.370) (0.557) (1.928) (-22.249) (0.410)
FIRMSIZE -0.000 0.000 0.005 -0.191*** 0.003***
(-0.084) (0.149) (1.290) (-16.096) (4.065)
Intercept -0.096*** -0.262*** -0.263*** 6.448*** -0.144***
(-3.970) (-4.982) (-3.285) (24.375) (-8.361)
Year dummy Y Y Y Y Y
Industry dummy Y Y Y Y Y
R-Squared 0.423 0.324 0.319 0.611 0.381
Observations 4,860 4,814 4,860 4,860 4,860
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is between 2003 and 2011. The dependent 
variables are the proxies of firm performance, represented by ROA, ROE, ROS, TOBIN_Q, and OPNIC. This chapter uses 
industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes, and a year dummy to control for the 
year. The coefficients and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in 
parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.8 Relation between Mutual Fund Ownership and Firm Performance (Robustness 
Test, with Industry-Adjusted Dependent Variables)
Dependent variable ROA_ADJ ROE_ADJ ROS_ADJ TOBIN_Q_ADJ OPINC_ADJ
INS_PER 0.296*** 0.535*** 0.407*** 0.911*** 0.205***
(11.498) (8.561) (4.815) (2.618) (11.049)
INS_PER_2 -0.459*** -0.785*** -0.793** 5.991*** -0.604***
(-4.719) (-3.521) (-2.401) (4.046) (-9.307)
TUL -0.206*** -0.544*** -0.639*** -0.226** -0.165***
(-10.606) (-10.503) (-8.723) (-2.054) (-12.617)
TUL×INS_PER 2.213*** 7.153*** 9.880*** 27.169*** 2.343***
(2.883) (3.121) (3.854) (3.081) (4.598)
TUL×INS_PER_2 -9.864*** -27.129*** -41.615*** -113.140*** -7.281***
(-2.794) (-3.062) (-3.293) (-2.644) (-3.702)
PAY 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.016*** -0.004 0.008***
(14.954) (13.851) (6.506) (-0.447) (15.397)
HERF 0.083*** 0.172*** 0.161*** 0.422*** 0.065***
(6.316) (6.053) (3.619) (2.676) (6.149)
TOP_1 -0.029*** -0.063*** -0.123*** -0.156 -0.023***
(-2.699) (-2.683) (-3.425) (-1.201) (-2.746)
IND -0.005 -0.003 -0.013 0.229* -0.009
(-0.447) (-0.101) (-0.350) (1.797) (-1.073)
DSUP_NUM 0.005** 0.009 0.013* 0.048*** 0.004**
(2.177) (1.590) (1.655) (2.658) (2.012)
DSUP_MEET 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.008 0.001
(0.337) (1.005) (0.424) (0.659) (1.257)
BIG4 0.004** 0.001 0.006 0.055** 0.004**
(2.126) (0.207) (0.905) (2.504) (2.566)
TS -0.010*** -0.028*** -0.052*** 0.561*** -0.014***
(-3.385) (-4.267) (-5.323) (12.987) (-6.253)
REFORM 0.007*** 0.020*** 0.038*** -0.036* 0.010***
(4.013) (5.640) (7.349) (-1.658) (8.126)
RET_ADJ 0.010*** 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.154*** 0.005***
(8.936) (8.340) (4.847) (9.527) (6.503)
STATE -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.007* -0.033** -0.003***
(-3.504) (-2.794) (-1.835) (-2.316) (-3.913)
LEVERAGE -0.081*** -0.050*** -0.177*** -0.938*** -0.051***
(-22.880) (-6.303) (-13.610) (-20.445) (-20.565)
CHANGE_SALES 0.030*** 0.067*** 0.072*** -0.021 0.023***
(11.820) (10.984) (6.043) (-1.155) (13.452)
BM -0.007** -0.014* 0.017 -0.931*** 0.001
(-2.138) (-1.831) (1.382) (-28.581) (0.238)
FIRMSIZE -0.001 0.001 0.007*** -0.212*** 0.003***
(-1.441) (0.383) (2.592) (-22.432) (5.610)
Intercept -0.096*** -0.337*** -0.249*** 4.996*** -0.159***
(-5.522) (-8.523) (-4.251) (23.726) (-12.639)
Year dummy Y Y Y Y Y
Industry dummy Y Y Y Y Y
R-Squared 0.389 0.304 0.214 0.470 0.352
Observations 8,412 8,355 8,412 8,412 8,412
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is between 2003 and 2011. The dependent 
variables are the proxies of firm performance, represented by ROA_ADJ, ROE_ADJ, ROS_ADJ, TOBIN_Q_ADJ, and 
OPNIC_ADJ. This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes, and 
a year dummy to control for the year. The coefficients and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.9 Relation between Mutual Fund Ownership and Firm Performance (Robustness 
Test, with Fixed Effects)
Dependent variable ROA ROE ROS TOBIN_Q OPINC
INS_PER 0.188*** 0.351*** 0.373*** 1.001** 0.115***
(5.814) (4.309) (4.238) (2.431) (5.111)
INS_PER_2 -0.178 -0.283 -0.533* 6.457*** -0.363***
(-1.568) (-1.041) (-1.728) (3.763) (-4.817)
TUL -0.204*** -0.575*** -0.676*** -0.580** -0.176***
(-7.217) (-7.396) (-6.822) (-2.429) (-9.161)
TUL×INS_PER 1.651* 7.010*** 7.510*** 17.495* 2.346***
(1.738) (3.040) (2.761) (1.659) (4.583)
TUL×INS_PER_2 -7.442* -25.824*** -33.418*** -62.017 -7.398***
(-1.887) (-3.013) (-2.754) (-1.205) (-4.122)
PAY 0.011*** 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.019 0.009***
(7.348) (7.248) (5.075) (1.272) (8.867)
HERF 0.040 0.066 0.143* -0.228 0.043*
(1.417) (0.996) (1.803) (-0.722) (1.799)
TOP_1 0.017 0.096 0.001 0.093 0.010
(0.707) (1.627) (0.014) (0.332) (0.515)
IND 0.011 0.012 0.038 0.175 0.009
(0.627) (0.299) (0.777) (0.935) (0.681)
DSUP_NUM -0.001 0.001 -0.006 0.019 0.000
(-0.287) (0.086) (-0.706) (0.744) (0.167)
DSUP_MEET 0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.017 0.001
(0.407) (0.668) (-0.111) (1.297) (1.534)
BIG4 -0.001 -0.012 0.002 0.004 -0.001
(-0.307) (-1.064) (0.179) (0.093) (-0.311)
TS -0.013*** -0.033*** -0.042*** 0.349*** -0.016***
(-3.169) (-3.251) (-3.298) (6.115) (-4.820)
REFORM 0.017*** 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.053* 0.017***
(5.396) (6.950) (4.144) (1.876) (7.433)
RET_ADJ 0.009*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.123*** 0.005***
(8.764) (7.232) (6.549) (9.471) (6.675)
STATE 0.001 0.005 0.003 -0.006 0.001
(0.485) (0.760) (0.436) (-0.210) (0.284)
LEVERAGE -0.031*** -0.007 -0.044 -0.498*** -0.023***
(-3.725) (-0.387) (-1.457) (-6.221) (-4.013)
CHANGE_SALES 0.025*** 0.056*** 0.047*** 0.002 0.019***
(9.487) (8.995) (3.946) (0.120) (10.800)
BM 0.008 0.017 0.050*** -0.421*** 0.000
(1.498) (1.363) (3.036) (-9.333) (0.047)
FIRMSIZE -0.009*** -0.003 -0.001 -0.433*** -0.004***
(-3.849) (-0.518) (-0.142) (-17.598) (-2.687)
Intercept 0.073 -0.299** -0.195 10.936*** -0.012
(1.324) (-2.508) (-0.990) (19.740) (-0.323)
Year dummy Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y
R-Squared 0.213 0.189 0.146 0.593 0.214
Observations 8,412 8,355 8,412 8,412 8,412
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is between 2003 and 2011. The dependent 
variables are the proxies of firm performance, represented by ROA, ROE, ROS, TOBIN_Q, and OPNIC. This chapter uses 
industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes, and a year dummy to control for the 
year. The coefficients and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in 
parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.10 2SLS Sensitivity Tests
Panel A. Determinants of Tunnelling (Robustness Test with MAK, 2003-2009)
Dependent variable TUL
INS_PER -0.117***
(-6.696)
INS_PER_2 0.362***
(6.272)
TUL_LAG 0.776***
(34.787)
TOP_1 -0.000
(-0.029)
STATE -0.005***
(-3.762)
ROA_LAG -0.018
(-0.941)
LEVERAGE 0.028***
(4.649)
BM -0.005**
(-2.356)
FIRMSIZE -0.004***
(-5.069)
MAK -0.001***
(-3.840)
Intercept 0.090***
(7.314)
R-Squared 0.627
Observations 6,249
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is between 2003 and 2009. The dependent variable 
is the proxy of tunnelling behaviour, calculated as other receivables deflated by total assets. This chapter uses industry 
dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes, and a year dummy to control for the year. 
The coefficients and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in 
parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Panel B. Relation between Mutual Fund Ownership and Firm Performance (Evidence from 
Unexplained Tunnelling, Robustness Test with MAK, 2003–2009)
Dependent variable ROA ROE ROS TOBIN_Q OPINC
INS_PER 0.356*** 0.820*** 0.730*** 0.857* 0.275***
(10.662) (10.194) (7.235) (1.942) (10.784)
INS_PER_2 -0.744*** -1.769*** -2.352*** 4.347** -0.805***
(-6.383) (-6.469) (-6.654) (2.405) (-9.246)
UNEXP_TUL -0.015*** -0.041*** -0.051*** 0.000 -0.012***
(-6.807) (-7.306) (-6.520) (0.008) (-6.644)
UNEXP_TUL×INS_PER 0.199*** 0.338*** 0.422*** -0.661 0.190***
(4.028) (2.973) (2.593) (-1.061) (5.026)
UNEXP_TUL×INS_PER_2 -0.479*** -0.945** -0.479 4.432 -0.604***
(-2.603) (-2.346) (-0.781) (1.603) (-4.445)
PAY 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.020*** -0.002 0.008***
(11.101) (10.485) (6.329) (-0.261) (11.891)
HERF 0.080*** 0.169*** 0.149** 0.344* 0.058***
(4.368) (4.228) (2.506) (1.892) (3.954)
TOP_1 -0.029** -0.059* -0.107** -0.192 -0.016
(-1.989) (-1.862) (-2.273) (-1.303) (-1.379)
IND 0.002 0.004 -0.013 0.022 -0.005
(0.106) (0.112) (-0.222) (0.145) (-0.385)
DSUP_NUM 0.007** 0.016** 0.020* 0.018 0.006**
(2.403) (2.184) (1.955) (0.892) (2.529)
DSUP_MEET 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001
(0.175) (0.158) (0.254) (0.339) (0.844)
BIG4 0.006** 0.008 0.016* 0.006 0.004**
(2.370) (1.421) (1.852) (0.237) (1.985)
TS -0.020*** -0.045*** -0.076*** 0.540*** -0.018***
(-3.859) (-3.723) (-4.315) (8.374) (-4.169)
REFORM 0.015*** 0.038*** 0.050*** 0.015 0.017***
(5.895) (7.305) (6.685) (0.640) (8.536)
RET_ADJ 0.012*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.176*** 0.006***
(7.496) (6.253) (4.977) (10.040) (4.899)
STATE -0.005*** -0.008** -0.004 -0.039** -0.004***
(-2.922) (-2.139) (-0.873) (-2.389) (-3.739)
LEVERAGE -0.089*** -0.088*** -0.213*** -0.868*** -0.064***
(-18.523) (-7.979) (-11.821) (-16.661) (-19.103)
CHANGE_SALES 0.035*** 0.077*** 0.100*** -0.011 0.029***
(11.681) (10.810) (7.306) (-0.588) (14.924)
BM 0.006 0.011 0.054*** -0.722*** 0.006*
(1.269) (1.149) (3.524) (-22.841) (1.757)
FIRMSIZE -0.000 0.003 0.011*** -0.171*** 0.004***
(-0.294) (1.109) (3.038) (-16.068) (4.855)
Intercept -0.072*** -0.309*** -0.315*** 6.085*** -0.152***
(-3.043) (-5.847) (-3.992) (26.166) (-8.895)
R-Squared 0.396 0.304 0.300 0.629 0.352
Observations 5,541 5,500 5,541 5,541 5,541
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is between 2003 and 2009. The dependent 
variables are the proxies of firm performance, represented by ROA, ROE, ROS, TOBIN_Q, and OPNIC. This chapter uses 
industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes, and a year dummy to control for the 
year. The coefficients and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in 
parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Chapter 4
Earnings Management and M&As in China
4.1 Introduction
The quality of accounting disclosure plays a critical role in maintaining the 
efficiency of a capital market. A market with pervasive accounting fraud and 
misrepresentation can significantly increase the cost of capital. Earnings 
management activities on the part of companies can damage the quality of 
corporate financial information and lead to information asymmetry. Prior studies 
have examined various incentives and approaches of earnings management 
activities and have shown that the pervasiveness of earnings management has 
reached a level that significantly compromises the integrity of financial reporting 
(Healy and Wahlen, 1999).
The main objective of this chapter is to investigate the environment of investor 
protection in the Chinese stock market by looking at the relation between earnings 
management and M&A.  There are two reasons for this. First of all, investor 
protection in China is much weaker compared with that in developed countries. 
Allen et al. (2005) and Firth et al. (2007) both provide empirical evidence and 
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conclude that the system of investor protection in China is far behind that of most 
countries in the sample used by the substantial studies by La Porta et al. (1997, 
1998). Although the Chinese government is taking measures to improve the 
market environment and regulate business practice, the overall market 
transparency remains low and disclosure quality continues to be substandard. The 
need to improve accounting quality has become a key concern for Chinese 
regulators.
Secondly, due to the speedy development of the Chinese capital market, there are 
more alternative channels available for the listed firms to obtain external financing 
when expanding their investment. As a result of the more restrictive requirements 
imposed by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) on suspended 
initial public offerings (IPOs) in recent years, Chinese firms have gradually 
moved to other methods of financing which can get approval from regulators 
more easily and quickly, for example Merger and Acquisition (M&A). The 
number of M&A deals in China has dramatically increased, from 171 in 2006 to 
991 in 2012.5 In addition, compared with IPO or SEO in China, while M&As 
involving the acquisition of less than 30% of the total assets of target firms need 
to be kept on record and undergo simple auditing by the CSRC, only those deals 
acquiring more than 30% of the total assets of target firms need to report to and 
gain approval from the CSRC. Therefore, Chinese listed acquirers may have more 
opportunities and incentives to overstate their earnings and manipulate accounting 
information prior to M&A to meet or beat the regulatory benchmark requirements 
and reduce the deal costs. More importantly, to the best of our knowledge, this is 
5 Data Source: Thomson One Banker M&A dataset. 
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the first study to explore the earnings management activities surrounding M&A 
events in the Chinese market. This chapter aims to fill this gap by examining 
earnings management activities and earnings quality during M&A, as well as the 
corresponding market reactions in the post-M&A period.
Furthermore, this chapter expands the examination of earnings management 
activities around M&A by looking at both accrual- and real-based earnings 
strategies. Many empirical studies have considered accrual-based earnings 
management as the only channel for acquirers to manipulate earnings before 
M&A. Erickson and Wang (1999) explain that accounting earnings manipulation 
before M&A is beneficial to decrease deal costs through employing fewer shares 
with higher price to purchase the target firm. The authors also note that earnings 
management is less costly than other ways to increase stock price, since the 
earnings activities can be completed in the absence of disruptive economic events. 
Louis (2004) supports the conclusion of Erickson and Wang (1999) and further 
suggests that underperformance after M&A may be caused by manipulated 
accounting information through earnings management. Their results indicate that 
reversals in discretionary accruals before M&A are the main determinant of both 
short-term and long-term performance for stock-for-stock acquisitions. Gong et al. 
(2008) extend the study and investigate the association between earnings 
manipulation prior to M&A and lawsuits after M&A. The results show a 
significantly negative relation between the probability of lawsuit announcements 
and market reactions to M&A announcements, as well as long-term post-M&A 
underperformance. Their findings also imply that investors should pay attention 
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not only to adjusted earnings management before M&A, but also to contingent 
losses from earnings management through lawsuits. Botsari and Meeks (2008) 
provide empirical evidence for the UK M&A market which is similar to that of 
Erickson and Wang (1999). More specifically, the authors suggest that managers 
may adjust earnings in the year of the M&A. 
Although previous studies suggest that firms have incentives to manipulate 
accounting earnings before M&A in order to raise the market price of its own 
stocks and then reduce the costs of deals, none reach their conclusions by 
considering the effect of real-based earnings management. Managers prefer to use 
real earnings management rather than accrual-based earnings management, since 
it is less detectable and departs from normal operational practice, occurring when 
managers alter the timing or structuring of transactions, investment and allocation 
of resources to boost accounting earnings in the current period (Dechow and 
Skinner, 2000; Roychowdhury, 2006). As a consequence, it has a direct effect on 
operating activities and cash flow. Cohen et al. (2008), Cohen and Zarowin (2010), 
and Ipino and Parbonetti (2011) also suggest that managers prefer real earnings 
management activities when the implementation of accrual-based earnings 
strategies is constrained by accounting regulations, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) or International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Ball and 
Shivakumar (2008) also conclude that acquirers face heightened litigation and 
regulatory risk (from inflating earnings), and more scrutiny by regulators and 
market monitors such as analysts, underwriters, auditors, the press, and other 
parties of the transaction during the M&A.
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In addition, the environment of M&A activities in China provides favourable 
conditions for testing whether acquirers may prefer real earnings management. On 
the one hand, firms need to process M&A deals on the basis of local regulations 
set by the CSRC. For example, M&A activities must be submitted to the CSRC 
(or even to a review subcommittee) when the deals involve the transfer of over 50% 
(or 70%) of the target company’s assets. In addition, acquirers in China are 
supervised by audit committee in the pre- and post-M&A periods. On the other 
hand, the majority of M&A payments in China are made by cash rather than by 
stock, to lower the cost of processing deals.6 Therefore, in order to complete the 
deal, the main aim for acquirers is to collect sufficient funds, which provides the 
incentive for firms to adopt real earnings management that can manipulate 
earnings upwards to firm’s cash flow in a short time without violating accounting 
standards.  
In addition to studying real earnings management around M&A, this chapter 
makes several contributions to the literature. This is the first study to investigate 
the earnings management activities around M&A in the Chinese stock market 
with a weak investor protection environment. Secondly, in line with the findings 
of Cohen et al. (2008), Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012) that firms use 
multiple earnings management strategies, this chapter finds that acquirers employ 
both real and accrual-based earnings management strategies around M&A. 
Thirdly, this chapter examines the relation between accrual-based and real 
6 According to the ‘Measure for the Administration of the Takeover of Listed Companies’ 
published by the CSRC, acquirers have to submit their deals to the CSRC to obtain administrative 
permission if they use more than 30% of shares to merge target firms. In other words, employing 
cash as the only payment method will indirectly reduce the time costs during the application of 
M&A. 
166
earnings management during M&A and investigates whether acquirers engage in 
more real earnings management instead of more easily detectable accrual-based 
earnings activities. Finally, we test whether earnings informativeness is reduced if 
managers manipulate earnings before M&A, and the corresponding market 
reactions to the earnings management activities.
This chapter obtains Chinese domestic M&A deals from the Thomson One 
Banker database and collects financial and corporate governance variables from 
the China Securities Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. As the 
corporate governance variables are not available for all firms before 2002, we 
consider the M&A deals over the period 2002-2011, with 964 deals and a total of 
6,572 firm-year observations. Similar to Chapter 2, the accrual-based and real 
earnings proxies are calculated by the cross-sectional Jones model (1991) and the 
model developed by Roychowdhury (2006), respectively. Regarding earnings 
informativeness and market reactions after M&A, this chapter follows the method 
of Firth et al. (2007b) and Louis (2004) to test acquirer’s earnings quality and 
stock performance around the M&A.
Consistent with previous studies (Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Ipino and Parbonetti, 2011), the results in this chapter show that M&As in China 
have a positive effect on promoting real earnings management and a negative 
effect on limiting accrual-based earnings management during the year of M&A. 
This finding indicates that acquirers in China prefer to engage in more real 
earnings management mainly because of strict regulatory supervision by the 
CSRC and the high percentage of deals paid by cash, which requires acquirers to 
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collect cash in a short time before the M&A. However, accrual-based earnings 
management yields a significantly positive correlation with both real earnings 
proxies and their interaction with M&A, rather than a substitution effect between 
accrual-based and real earnings management around M&A. This further reflects 
the weak investor protection and absence of effective corporate governance for the 
Chinese stock market. In other words, the supervision over M&A cannot 
fundamentally improve the quality of financial information of Chinese listed firms. 
Otherwise, we would expect to observe a reduction in the level of both accrual-
based and real earnings management simultaneously. The findings imply that 
policy makers and regulators in China should pay more attention to the earnings 
management activities around M&A and strengthen corporate governance to 
protect minority shareholders’ interests. In addition, the results show a decrease in 
earnings informativeness in the year of the M&A, and this further supports the 
conclusion that the adjustment of earnings upwards around M&A can lower the 
firm’s informational quality. Finally, due to the increase in real earnings 
management activities around M&A, the market is more likely to react negatively 
to such earnings strategies, especially in the year of the M&A.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the related studies and 
develops the main hypotheses. Section 4.3 outlines the methodology and data 
statistics. Section 4.4 discusses the empirical results for the regressions in Section 
4.3. Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.
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4.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
4.2.1 Accrual-Based and Real Earnings Management
The motivations for altering financial information range from meeting regulatory 
thresholds and analysts’ forecasts, to smoothing managerial compensation and 
obtaining desirable stock valuations in capital markets (Dechow and Skinner, 
2000; Healy et al., 1999; Lo, 2008). Firms manipulate accruals by exploiting the 
flexibility of accounting rules to temporarily ‘mask’ true firm performance 
(Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Boonlert-U-Thai et al., 2006). Accruals manipulation 
is not achieved by altering underlying operating activities with direct effect on 
cash flow, but via the exercise of managers’ discretion and judgment regarding 
accounting choices (Gunny, 2010). Empirical evidence on accrual-based earnings 
management mainly relies on financial activities, which may provide benchmarks 
of earnings for managers to beat or meet, for example seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs), IPOs, and share repurchases (Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998; Brav et al., 
2000; Shivakumar, 2000). 
Firms may engage in not only accrual-based but also real-based earnings 
management activities.  Unlike accruals manipulation, real activities manipulation 
departs from normal operational practice and occurs when managers alter the 
timing or structuring of transactions, investment and allocation of resources to 
boost accounting earnings in the current period (Dechow & Skinner, 2000; 
Roychowdhury, 2006). Roychowdhury (2006) directly measures real earnings 
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management activities and their capital market consequences. Following 
Roychowdhury (2006), Gunny (2010) provides further empirical evidence that 
real activities are associated with meeting earnings benchmarks and will allow 
firms engaging in real earnings management to have relatively higher subsequent 
performance. Cohen et al. (2008) document that after the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in 2002 following highly publicized accounting scandals, firms tended 
to use less accrual-based and more real-based earnings management methods to 
avoid detection of accrual-based management. Ipino et al. (2011) find the same 
tendency in the context of mandatory IFRS adoption in countries with strict 
enforcement regimes. A similar trend is reported by Cohen and Zarowin (2010), 
whereby firms make seasoned equity offerings (SEO) in order to achieve critical 
earnings benchmarks. 
4.2.2 Earnings Management and M&As
Previous studies state that acquiring managers have strong incentives to 
manipulate earnings upwards before stock-for-stock M&As (Erickson and Wang, 
1999; Louis, 2004; Jensen, 2005; Gong et al., 2008). Erickson and Wang (1999) 
argue that M&As consider stock to be contingent on the market value of acquirer 
firms, which means that a higher stock price for the acquirer is helpful to decrease 
the number of shares used in the stock exchange. To increase accounting earnings, 
pushing up stock price is considered the main and inevitable way for acquirers to 
adjust firm market value. Consistent with previous findings, Erickson and Wang 
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(1999) indicate that acquiring firms prefer to manage earnings prior to M&A to 
boost the stock price, and that income-increasing accounting manipulations are 
significantly positively related to the relative deal size. Louis (2004) concludes 
that the reversal of adjusted abnormal accruals after M&A is a crucial factor in 
stock-for-stock acquirers’ long-term underperformance. In addition, his results 
confirm that acquirers can exploit overestimated earnings in the quarter of the 
stock swap announcement to decrease the cost of the deal. Jensen (2005) argues 
that overvaluation can encourage managers to manipulate earnings to sustain a 
firm’s overvalued stock price. Gong et al. (2008) consider the effects of lawsuits 
in the post-merger performance and find that accrual inflation before M&A is 
significantly positively related with post-merger announcement lawsuits. In 
addition, their paper proves a negative association between market reactions to 
M&A announcements and post-merger announcement lawsuits, and that relation 
still holds when short-term reactions are replaced by long-term performance.
4.2.3 Earnings Management and Chinese M&As
There is as yet no empirical evidence to examine the effects of M&A in Chinese 
firm earnings manipulation, other than for financial activities, such as IPOs, SEOs, 
special treatment (ST), and tunnelling behaviour. Liu and Lu (2007) list two main 
situations, rights issues and special treatment, which create incentives for Chinese 
managers to exploit earnings management. Their results show that agency 
conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders are the primary driver of 
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managerial earnings manipulation. Aharony et al. (2010) use IPOs as a study 
event and arrive at the same conclusion as Liu and Lu (2007), that tunnelling 
behaviour is the main incentive for controlling shareholders, as well as managers, 
to adjust earnings upward prior to an IPO period. Shen et al. (2012) select Chinese 
IPOs between 1998 and 2003 and empirically determine a positive relation 
between initial returns and discretionary accruals, as well as a negative relation 
between long-term stock performance and initial returns. Chen et al. (2013) 
examine the relations between adjusted accruals prior to IPOs and issuer’s 
underwriter reputation under the various ownership structures for Chinese listed 
firms. Their findings reveal that adjusted accruals are only significantly negatively 
related to underwriter reputation for privately controlled firms.
To date there are few studies that research firm performance and ownership 
structure during domestic M&As in China. Chi et al. (2011) collect data on 1148 
M&A deals to determine market reactions after M&A using the capital asset 
pricing model and buy-and-hold abnormal returns. The authors find a significant 
positive abnormal return six months prior to M&A, with insignificant long-term 
abnormal returns within a six-month period after M&A. In addition, politically 
connected acquirers have a positive effect on deal performance while firms can 
create more value after M&A if the deals are cross-provincial or with better 
corporate governance. Zhou et al. (2012) test the effects of state ownership on the 
short- and long-term performance of Chinese M&As. Their findings indicate that 
state-owned acquirers outperform privately owned acquirers in long-run stock and 
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operating performance, because acquirers with political connections may obtain 
more benefits from government intervention.
We conjecture that Chinese listed acquirers also have incentives to manipulate 
earnings (both accrual-based and real earnings management) upwards around 
M&A to reduce the costs of deals and pursue individual benefits. First, the 
corporate governance and investor protection environment in China are much 
weaker than in developed markets (La Porta et al., 1997; La Porta et al., 1998; 
Allen et al., 2005; Firth et al., 2007). As earnings management is the commonly 
used indicator representing the quality of financial information, this chapter 
measures both accrual-based and real earnings management strategies to examine 
whether Chinese acquirers exploit the imperfect market mechanism to adjust 
earnings to inflate stock prices around M&A. Secondly, acquirers may manage 
their earnings to inflate their share prices and thus pay fewer shares to the target 
firms. In addition, the high cost of detection of earnings management within the 
bounds of generally accepted accounting procedures, and the target’s expectation 
that the acquiring firm will manage earnings also suggest that acquirers will 
manage earnings before M&A. 
So far, there have been few studies addressing earnings management (either 
accrual-based or real earnings management) around Chinese domestic M&A deals 
with weak investor protection. There is strong evidence of real earnings 
management activities, achieved via multiple means and probably linked to 
meeting certain earnings benchmarks (Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin et 
al., 2010; Ipino et al., 2011). Therefore, in order to provide a more comprehensive 
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investigation of the earnings management activities around M&As in China, we 
first test whether acquirers in China implement both accrual-based and real 
earnings management. 
H1: Chinese acquirers engage in both real and accrual-based earnings 
management to manipulate earnings around M&A.
Ball and Shivakumar (2008) argue that the measure of earnings management 
(discretionary accruals) is likely to be unreliable around large corporate events. 
Further, they point out that acquirers do not have an unequivocal incentive to 
manage earnings close to acquisitions, owing to heightened scrutiny and litigation 
risks. Acquirers in China may face stricter scrutiny from both regulators and audit 
committees around M&A, and compared with real earnings management, accrual 
earnings management is more detectable.  Hence, Chinese acquirers are more 
likely to adopt real earnings management rather than an accrual-based earnings 
strategy in order to avoid possible scrutiny, even though real earnings 
management is more costly to the firm (Graham et al., 2005). At the same time, 
previous empirical evidence suggests that in the majority of Chinese M&As, cash 
is the preferred payment method, rather than stocks. Chi et al. (2011) report that 
nearly 88% of M&A deals from 1998 to 2003 used cash as the only payment. 
Emma et al. (2013) also note that about 57% of domestic deals and 70% of 
foreign deals acquired by Chinese firms used only cash as the transaction method. 
As a consequence, acquirers are more likely to adopt real earnings management, 
since such earnings manipulation has a direct effect on current cash flow in a 
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situation where firms prefer to structure the investment or gather deal funds in a 
short period (Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Roychowdhury, 2006). 
Furthermore, previous empirical studies examining the relation between accrual-
based and real earnings management also find that a decline in one type of 
earnings management may lead to a substitution of the other earnings 
management method. Cohen et al. (2008) and Zang (2012) find a negative 
correlation between these two earnings management approaches, given regulatory 
scrutiny and the need to adjust earnings within a short period. Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010) extend the research of Cohen et al. (2008) and confirm that strict scrutiny, 
as under SOX, can result in more managers engaging in real earnings management 
instead of accrual-based earnings management. Fan et al. (2010) and Badertscher 
(2011) both indicate that more scrutiny and further constraints on accrual-based 
earnings management would not be effective in preventing managers from using 
other earnings management strategies. 
In the light of the above discussion, this chapter postulates that the level of 
accrual-based earnings management (real earnings management) may decrease 
(increase) in the year of M&A owing to the strict scrutiny of regulators and audit 
committee as well as the high percentage of cash payment, which results in higher 
costs of accrual-based earnings management. In addition, in order to continue 
earnings manipulation to beat or meet the benchmark, the acquirer may switch to 
implement real earnings management, which is less subject to scrutiny and less 
detectable. Then the second hypothesis is as follows: 
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H2: During the year of M&A, Chinese acquirers prefer to use less accrual-
based earnings management but favour more real earnings management.
4.2.4 Earnings Informativeness and M&As
The development of the capital markets depends on investor confidence, and in 
turn, investors rely on credible corporate financial information to make investment 
decisions. Therefore, effective monitoring of the credibility of financial reporting 
is fundamental to a vibrant capital market. However, oversight of the financial-
reporting process before M&A is not emphasized by the market (Erickson and 
Wang, 1999; Louis 2004; Botsari and Meeks, 2008; Gong et al., 2008), despite 
evidence that acquirers seek to lower the costs of deals or increase individual 
benefits by exaggerating earnings before the M&A. Although a wave of earnings 
management among financial reports before M&A have attracted the attention of 
regulators and researchers, acquirers may find substitute earnings manipulation 
methods, such as real earnings management, to meet or beat benchmarks required 
by regulators.
In China, the structure of M&A payment is quite different from that in most 
developed economies, but all acquirers have the same goal of improving firm 
earnings to reduce deal transaction costs. In addition, with the stagnant 
development of IPOs in China, M&A has become an alternative way for Chinese 
firms to finance or to acquire listed status in a short time. Moreover, in order to 
adjust the industrial structure and solve the problem of excess capacity, in 2013 
the Chinese regulator widened the review procedure on M&A to encourage more 
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firms to rely on this method. However, the improved regulation mainly 
concentrates on the payment method; the related complex review procedure to 
strengthen financial disclosure, especially with regard to real earnings 
management, has been largely ignored. Therefore, the quality of accounting 
information and corporate transparency is still a challenge for current regulators 
and investors. The earnings may also bias to original levels due to over adjustment 
before M&As. 
Previous studies relate earnings informativeness to the issue of information 
disclosure or corporate governance. For example, Fan and Wong (2002) examine 
the relation between ownership structure and earnings quality, represented by 
earnings informativeness, and indicate that controlling shareholders prefer to 
adjust earnings for individual interests, leading to low credibility among minority 
shareholders. In addition, highly concentrated ownership can cause low earnings 
informativeness, since such ownership may keep rent-seeking information from 
the public and provide camouflage in financial statements. Chang and Sun (2009) 
consider the passage of SOX as their research context and find that, after SOX, 
cross-listed firms’ earnings informativeness is associated with audit committee 
independence and board independence. Armstrong et al. (2012) consider the 
passage of anti-takeover laws as a benchmark to measure whether earnings 
informativeness can be improved after the implementation of such laws. Their 
results are in accordance with previous conclusions that lower information 
asymmetry and reduced amounts of private information are helpful in increasing 
financial statement informativeness following the passage of anti-takeover laws. 
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Firth et al. (2007b) focus on the Chinese stock market and suggest that special 
ownership structure, a two-tier board structure, and auditor, all affect earnings 
informativeness. Specifically, ownership concentration, foreign ownership, the 
percentage of tradable shares, and several corporate governance variables are 
related to the implementation of discretionary accruals. Hence, compared with 
previous conclusions and assumptions, during the period of M&A in China, lack 
of investor protection and effective corporate governance means that the quality of 
accounting disclosure cannot be properly supervised.  Therefore, the third 
hypothesis is as follows.
H3: Earnings informativeness of Chinese listed acquirers would be significantly 
decreased by their involvement in earnings management before M&A.
4.2.5 Earnings Management and Stock Returns
Previous studies find significant long-run stock-for-stock M&A 
underperformance, which can be partly explained by the reversal effects of 
accrual-based earnings management after the M&A (Louis, 2004; Gong et al., 
2008). Similar evidence can be found in the Chinese market. Although Chi et al. 
(2011) suggest non-negative market performance after M&A, their sample period 
extends only six months before and after M&As. Emma et al. (2013) extend the 
period to 24 months and observe significant long-run underperformance for 
domestic M&As in China. When taking payment method into consideration, 
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Louis (2004) observes that stock-for-stock acquirers fare worse than cash 
acquirers over the three years subsequent to merger announcement. He also 
confirms that a significant negative correlation can be found between the 
abnormal accruals and the long-term stock performance for stock-for-stock 
acquirers. 
However, the market reaction during M&A in China can differ from that in other 
countries, as most deals in China are completed via cash payment. Furthermore, 
real-based earnings management has a direct effect on increasing firms’ cash flow, 
which is the main fund source for acquirers. Consequently, the implementation of 
accrual-based earnings management during M&A is more likely to be replaced by 
a real earnings strategy. The final hypothesis for this chapter is as follows.
H4: Market reactions during M&A are more likely to be affected by real 
earnings management than by accrual-based earnings management.
4.3 Empirical Methodology
4.3.1 Earnings Management
The earnings management proxies are discretionary accruals, calculated according 
to Hribar and Collins (2002), and abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal 
production costs, abnormal discretionary expenses, and three aggregate real 
179
proxies, calculated according to Roychowdhury (2006). More specifically, 
discretionary accruals are computed as: 
 it it itTA NDA DA                                                                                                   (1)
where itTA  is total accruals for firm i  in year t , itNDA  is non-discretionary 
accruals for firm i  in year t , and itDA  is discretionary accruals for firm i  in year 
t . Therefore: 
1 2 3
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
1it it it
it
i t i t i t i t
TA SALES PPEk k k
Assets Assets Assets Assets

   
                                      (2)
where , 1i tAssets   is total assets for firm i  in year t , itREV  is change in revenue 
for firm i  in year t , itREC  is change in receivables for firm i  in year t , and 
itPPE  is gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i  in year t .
The coefficients estimated by equation (2) are used to calculate the firm-specific 
normal accruals ( itNA ) for the sample firms:
1 2 3
, 1 , 1 , 1
1ˆ ˆ ˆit it
it
i t i t i t
SALES PPENA k k k
Assets Assets Assets  
                                                     (3)
The measure of discretionary accruals ( itDA ) is the difference between total 
accruals and fitted normal accruals ( itNA ), defined as:
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Assets 
                                                                                           (4)
Regarding the calculation of real earnings proxies, this chapter first obtains 
individual real proxies and combines them in three ways to represent a total effect:
1 1 2 3
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
1it it it
it
i t i t i t i t
CFO Sales Salesk k k
Assets Assets Assets Assets
 
   
                                (5)
where CFOit is cash flow from operations taken from the statement of cash flows 
for firm i  in year t, Asseti,t-1  represents total assets at the end of year t - 1, Salesit 
is net sales for firm i in year t, ΔSalesit is firm i’s change in net sales between 
years t - 1 and t, and εit is the error term. The abnormal cash flow from operations 
is the actual CFO value minus the normal CFO level calculated using the 
coefficient estimated by equation (5) for each industry and year.
The second individual proxy is abnormally high production costs, expressed in the 
following regression:
, 1
1 1 2 3 4
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
1 i tit it it
it
i t i t i t i t i t
SalesPROD Sales Salesk k k k
Assets Assets Assets Assets Assets
 
    
         (6)
where PRODit is firm i’s production costs in year t, equal to the sum of the costs 
of goods sold plus changes in inventory.
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The third proxy is abnormal discretionary expenses (ADISX), which is estimated 
using the following equation:
, 1
1 1 2
, 1 , 1 , 1
1 i tit
it
i t i t i t
SalesDISX k k
Assets Assets Assets
 
  
                                                       (7)
where itDISX  is discretionary expenditures, including sales, general and 
administrative expenses, research and development, and advertising, for firm i in 
year t.
Consistent with Cohen et al. (2008), Cohen and Zarowin (2010), and Zang (2012), 
three aggregate proxies are obtained by combining the above individual proxies to 
capture the total effects of real earnings management7:
_1RM abnormal cash flow from operations abnormal production costs            (8)
_ 2RM abnormal cash flow from operations abnormal discretionary expenses          (9)
_ 3RM abnormal cash flow from operations abnormal production costs
abnormal discretionary expenses
  
             (10)
7 Please refer to Chapter 2 for more details.
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4.3.2 Research Design
This chapter examines both accrual- and real-based earnings management 
activities around M&A, and their dynamic relation, using the following 
regressions:
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
13 14 15
_ _ _ _ 4
_ _
DA MA Dummy RM PROXY MA Dummy RM PROXY BIG PAY
TS STATE LEVERAGE DUALITY IPO DUM ROE ST DUM
TOBINQ FIRMSIZE BIND
     
      
  
      
      
  
     (11)
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13 14 15
_ _ _ 4
_ _
RM PROXY MA Dummy DA MA Dummy DA BIG PAY
TS STATE LEVERAGE DUALITY IPO DUM ROE ST DUM
TOBINQ FIRMSIZE BIND
     
      
  
      
      
  
   (12)
where MA_Dummy is a dummy variable equal to one when the Chinese listed 
firms are involved in an M&A in year t and zero otherwise. This dummy variable 
captures the effect of M&A on earnings manipulation. To be consistent with H1, 
this chapter expects to find a significant association between accrual-based (DA) 
and real earnings managements (RM_PROXY) across the whole sample period, 
indicating that managers in China may have flexibility when choosing earnings 
management approaches for beating or meeting benchmarks. The independent 
variables of RM_PROXY (DA) and RM_PROXY*MA_Dummy (DA*MA_Dummy) 
measure the long-term relation between the two earnings management approaches 
over the whole sample period and their substitution or complementary effect 
during the M&A. The above regressions also control for the effect of corporate 
governance and firm characteristics. Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2 discusses the 
details of how corporate governance variables and firm characteristics affect firm 
earnings management.
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To determine the earnings informativeness around M&A, this chapter follows the 
method adopted by Firth et al. (2007b) and Armstrong et al. (2012) and uses the 
following regression:
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
_15 (12) _ _
_
RETURN MA Dummy EARN EARN MA Dummy
EARN MARLET VALUR EARN LEVERAGE EARN MB EARN ROE
   
   
    
       
       (13)
where RETURN_15 is the 15-month cumulative raw return during the interval that 
begins three months following the end of fiscal year t - 1 and ends six months 
after the end of fiscal year t, with year t being the year of the M&A. To test 
support for H3, we also use RETURN_12 as an alternative measure of cumulative 
raw return through the 12-month period during the interval that begins three 
months following the end of fiscal year t - 1 and ends three months after the end 
of fiscal year t. The variable MA_Dummy is a dummy variable, which is set to one 
if the listed firm acquires other firms in the year t; EARN represents firm earnings, 
calculated as the operating income of year t divided by total assets for year t - 1; 
MARKET_VALUE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market value in year t; 
LEVERAGE is total liability divided by total assets in year t; MB is the market-to-
book ratio in year t; and ROE is computed as total profit divided by the book 
value of equity in year t. Atiase (1985) and Freeman (1987) indicate that public 
disclosure and the private development of non-earnings information are positively 
related to firm size. Leverage has also been shown to have an impact on the 
relation between earnings and returns.  Results from Fan and Wong (2002) and 
Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) reveal that leverage can be considered as an 
investment opportunity to negatively affect earnings informativeness. In addition, 
the market-to-book ratio MB represents the firm’s growth opportunities, which are 
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more likely to be positively related to earnings persistence (Collins and Kothari, 
1989). The variable ROE is the proxy for profitability. For H3, we expect a 
negative correlation between RETURN and EARN*MA_Dummy if there is a 
reduction in earnings quality during M&A.
We use the following regression to test the relation between market reactions and 
the two earnings strategies, accrual-based and real earnings management:
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12
_ _ _ _
_ _
_
RETURN MA Dummy RM PROXY MA Dummy RM PROXY
BM NOA ASSETS LEVERAGE FIRMSIZE ROE BOARD SHARE
BIND DUALITY SUPER MEETINGS
   
     
  
    
     
  
     (14)
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where RETURN is the cumulative raw return for year t + 1 after the acquirer 
completes the deal; NOA_ASSETS is calculated as net operating assets divided by 
total assets for year t; and SUPER_MEETINGS is the number of meetings held by 
supervisors. According to previous studies (Louis, 2004, 2005; Gong et al., 2008; 
Li, 2012), we may expect to observe a negative relation between RETURN 
following the M&A and the interaction terms RM_PROXY*MA_Dummy and 
DA*MA_Dummy respectively, as the market may react negatively to M&As due 
to the engagement in earnings management activities. 
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4.3.3 Data Selection and Summary Statistics
This chapter uses a sample of 964 successful Chinese domestic M&A deals from 
2002 to 2011 obtained from the Thomson One Banker (SDC) database. Following 
Chi et al. (2011), Zhou et al. (2012), and Emma et al. (2013), this chapter restricts 
acquirers to those listed on either the Shenzhen or Shanghai stock exchange and 
deal values must be over US$1 million to control for size effects. Consistent with 
Chapters 2 and 3, the financial accounting information of Chinese listed firms is 
obtained from the CSMAR database. To merge SDC deals with the CSMAR 
database, Datastream codes are first downloaded from the SDC and the related 
Chinese stock codes are obtained from the Datastream database, then these are 
combined with the SDC and CSMAR databases by Chinese stock code. Hence, 
the final sample consists of 964 M&A deals, for a total of 6,572 firm-year 
observations. The main reason the data begin in 2002 is that most data for 
corporate governance variables from the CSMAR are not available before that 
year.
Table 4.1 shows the general characteristics of M&A transactions and acquirers in 
China from 2002 to 2011. Panel A reports the number of M&As in each year 
during the sample period. More specifically, M&As in China are observed in two 
increasing waves from 2002 to 2011, consistent with the previous studies (Chi et 
al., 2011; Zhou et al., 2012; Emma et al., 2013). The most important finding of 
Panel A is that the main payment method used in China is cash, and the other 
payment methods account for only 23.24% of M&A deals. The percentage of cash 
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payment employed during M&A in China is similar to the 87.28% reported by 
Chi et al. (2011) and the 57% found by Emma et al. (2013). Panel B shows the 
distribution of M&As across industries in China, with nearly 62% of deals coming 
from industrials and the second largest percentage, 16.08%, from conglomerates.
[Insert Table 4.1 around here]
Table 4.2 describes the variable statistics and reveals similar results to Chapters 2 
and 3, as well as previous studies looking at the Chinese stock market (Firth et al., 
2007b; Gul et al., 2010; Hou et al., 2012). BSCb represents accounting flexibility, 
which is different from the measurement of BSCa in Chapter 2, calculated as the 
firm ratio 1 1/t tNOA Sales   minus its corresponding industrial median value. 
Regarding earnings informativeness, the mean and median values of EARN, 
RETURN_15, and RETURN_12 are relatively higher than the values described by 
Firth et al. (2007b), indicating an improvement in firm performance. The main 
reason for this difference may be the different sample periods.
[Insert Table 4.2 around here]
Table 4.3 shows the Pearson correlation matrix for all the variables considered in 
the chapter, from 2002 to 2011. The relation between accrual-based and real 
proxies is consistent with Chapter 2 and previous studies, such as Cohen et al. 
(2008) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010). For example, a positive significant 
association between discretionary accruals and real earnings proxies indicates that 
listed firms in China prefer to use both earnings strategies simultaneously, and 
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this relation holds even after real earnings proxies are replaced by their individual 
proxies (ACFO, APROD, and ADISX). Furthermore, the correlations between 
other accounting and corporate governance variables are consistent with previous 
findings (Firth et al., 2006, 2007b).
[Insert Table 4.3 around here]
4.4 Empirical Results
4.4.1 Impact of M&As on Accrual-Based Earnings Management
Table 4.4 shows the association between the M&As in China and the behaviour of 
discretionary accruals. In regressions (11) and (12), this chapter controls for 
similar corporate governance, firm characteristics, and industry effects as in 
Chapter 2. In order to test the hypotheses of this chapter, six real earnings proxies 
– ACFO, APROD, ADISX, RM_1, RM_2, and RM_3 – are used to examine the 
relation between real and accrual-based earnings management. The results show 
that there is a long-term positive association between accrual-based and real 
earnings management at the 1% level of significance. This implies that listed 
firms with more accrual-based earnings management tend also to engage in real 
earnings activities. 
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In addition, the results show a significantly negative coefficient on the M&A 
dummy for all regressions in Table 4.4. This finding indicates that during the year 
of M&A the listed firms in China are likely to engage in less accrual-based 
earnings management than suggested in the literature. Therefore, accrual-based 
earnings management around M&As in China can be limited by the scrutiny 
under the supervision of the CSRC and audit committee. Compared with previous 
studies (Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Chapter 2), however, the 
correlation between accrual-based and real earnings management is still 
significantly positive rather than negative during the year of the M&A. 
Consequently, the results show that although M&As result in less implementation 
of accrual-based earnings management, rather than a substitution effect between 
the two earnings management approaches, those firms involved in more real-
based earnings management would also use more accrual-based earnings 
management. In other words, accrual-based earnings management cannot be 
effectively restricted by the scrutiny and regulations related to M&A, although it 
is more detectable. This supports our H1 that Chinese acquirers engage in both 
real and accrual-based earnings management to manipulate earnings around M&A. 
However, this is different from the previous finding of a substitution correlation 
between the two earnings strategies caused by changes in accounting reporting 
practice such as SOX and IFRS (Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Ipino and Parbonetti, 2011), or the incentive alignment effect between controlling 
and minority shareholders caused by the split share structure reform. The 
difference may be caused by the weak investor protection environment and 
corporate governance mechanism.  
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[Insert Table 4.4 around here]
4.4.2 Impact of M&As on Real Earnings Management
Table 4.5 reports the effects of M&As on real earnings management in China 
using regression (12). Similar to the results of accrual-based earnings management, 
the coefficient on DA is significantly positive for all real earnings management 
proxies, and this implies that acquirers in China can use both earnings strategies at 
the same time to beat or meet benchmarks. In addition, the results empirically 
show a positive coefficient for the M&A dummy for all regressions in Table 4.5, 
which reconfirms that Chinese listed firms prefer to exploit more real earnings 
management to boost current earnings in the year of M&A. This is consistent with 
our expectation expressed in H2. The relation between accrual-based and real 
earnings management is still significant positive during the year of M&A, which 
is consistent with the results in Table 4.4 and supports our H1. The unchanged 
relation between the two earnings management strategies also indicates that 
greater real earnings management during M&A cannot prevent acquirers from 
engaging in accrual-based earnings management. 
[Insert Table 4.5 around here]
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4.4.3 Sensitivity Test for the Impact of M&As on Earnings 
Management Strategies
Both Barton and Simko (2002) and Wang and D’Souza (2006) point out that 
listed firms are more likely to engage in real earnings management when 
accounting flexibility is low. Consistent with Chapter 2, this chapter also 
considers BSCb a proxy for accounting flexibility and uses its interaction term 
with MA_Dummy to examine whether H1 and H2 still hold after controlling for 
the effect of accounting flexibility. The empirical results in Table 4.6 show a 
significant negative correlation between accounting flexibility and discretionary 
accruals. These results lead to similar arguments as in Chapter 2, and suggest that 
listed firms tend to have lower discretionary accruals when there is accounting 
flexibility. However, the coefficients on RM and the interaction term 
RM*MA_dummy remain positive and the coefficient on MA_dummy is negative, 
which still support our H1 and H2.
The results in Table 4.7 show a significantly positive coefficient on BSCb but 
insignificant coefficient on the interaction term of BSCb*MA_Dummy. These 
imply that Chinese listed firms prefer real earnings management when there are 
few opportunities for managers to adopt accrual-based earnings management and 
changes in accounting flexibility have no incremental effects on real earnings 
management in the year of M&A. More importantly, the coefficients of 
MA_Dummy, DA, and DA*M&A_Dummy remain significant and keep the same 
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signs as in Tables 4.4 and 4.5, and thus the results still support our hypotheses H1 
and H2.
[Insert Tables 4.6 and 4.7 around here]
4.4.4 Impact of M&As on Earnings Informativeness
We report the results of testing H3 in Table 4.8. The table shows that EARN is 
significantly positive with RETURN (RETURN_15), while a significantly negative 
correlation is found between RETURN and EARN*MA_Dummy for both 
RETURN_15 and RETURN_12 in the year of M&A. In contrast, except for the 
year of M&A, the quality of earnings is positively correlated with market 
reactions, which indicates that manipulation by acquirers to exaggerate financial 
information during the M&A has been detected by market investors. In other 
words, the decreased quality of financial disclosure during the year of M&A may 
be caused by the incentive to lower the cost of deals. In addition, in China, the 
lower detectability of real earnings management and the high percentage of cash 
payment provide incentives for acquirers to engage in more earnings manipulation 
during the M&A. In other words, acquirers prefer to boost the current year’s 
earnings to inflate their stock prices via earnings management.
[Insert Table 4.8 around here]
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4.4.5 Sensitivity Test for the Impact of M&As on Earnings 
Informativeness
Studies to date offer empirical evidence that ownership structure and a two-tier 
board structure affect earnings informativeness for listed firms. Specifically, two 
strands of research discuss the effect of ownership structure on earnings 
informativeness. On the one hand, Fan and Wong (2002) and Donnelly and Lynch 
(2002) indicate that high ownership concentration influences the level of 
information asymmetry between managers and investors, which can result in 
various levels of earnings informativeness and accounting choices. On the other 
hand, different types of ownership may have positive or negative effects on 
earnings informativeness. Warfield et al. (1995) observe a positive association 
between management ownership and earnings informativeness, while Gabrielsen 
et al. (2002) find the opposite effect due to entrenchment or expropriation effects. 
Firth et al. (2007b) and Chang and Sun (2009) directly explain earnings 
informativeness by including ownership structure in the earnings return regression. 
Therefore, to fully test whether M&As in China can reduce earnings 
informativeness, this chapter controls for ownership structure as well as for other 
corporate governance variables in regression (13).
The main results in Table 4.9 lead to a similar conclusion as suggested by the 
results in Table 4.8. More precisely, there is a significant negative correlation 
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between EARN and EARN*MA_Dummy when listed firms launch their M&A in 
year 0, while this interaction term is insignificant during other periods. These 
results indicate that earnings informativeness is reduced when managers adjust 
firm accounting information in the year of M&A. In addition, the overestimated 
earnings during M&A would be beneficial for lowering deal costs, and the 
positive relation with EARN and EARN*MA_Dummy in other periods also 
suggests that earnings quality would recover, owing to the reduced incentives for 
acquirers to manipulate earnings. Furthermore, the signals of control variables in 
Table 4.9 are also consistent with those of previous studies. More specifically, the 
significant negative association between RETURN and EARN*TOP_1 reveals that 
investors become less interested in the accounting information provided by listed 
firms when the largest shareholders hold more shares. The positive correlation 
between RETURN and EARN*STATE at 1% significance level is consistent with 
the results of Ding et al. (2007) and Armstrong et al. (2010), who find that state-
owned firms have less incentive to adjust earnings due to subsidies provided by 
the government, while the significant positive coefficient on EARN*IND_NUM 
indicates that independent directors improve the quality of accounting information 
available to investors.
[Insert Table 4.9 around here]
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4.4.6 Earnings Management and Stock Returns
Table 4.10 shows the relation between real earnings management and stock 
performance during the sample period, which is from two years before to two 
years after the M&A. More precisely, a significant negative correlation is 
observed between RETURN and MA_Dummy in the year of M&A, while a 
positive coefficient for MA_Dummy for the years -2, +1, and +2 confirms the 
results in Table 4.9. These results suggest that the implementation of M&A has a 
negative effect on market reactions. In addition, although there is a negative 
association between RM_PROXY and RETURN at 1% significance level across all 
regressions, the interaction term RM*MA_Dummy has a significantly positive 
coefficient in year 0. To compare the different effects of earnings management on 
market reactions, Table 4.11 replaces the dependent variable with discretionary 
accruals. The results reveal a similar relation between RETURN and MA_Dummy, 
but insignificant correlations for both DA and DA*MA_Dummy with stock returns. 
The findings indicate that, compared with real earnings management, the 
acquirer’s underperformance may not be explained by accrual-based earnings 
management. 
Louis (2004) and Gong et al. (2008) suggest that poor market reaction after M&A 
is mainly due to overestimated earnings before the completion of the deal. 
Similarly, we find significant and insignificant correlation of RM and DA, 
respectively, with stock returns, and this suggests that poor stock returns of 
Chinese listed firms can be caused by the use of real earnings management. 
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However, the significant positive coefficient on the interaction term of 
RM*MA_dummy for the year of M&A shows that the involvement of real earnings 
management can indeed provide better earnings reports and thus reduce the 
decrease in share prices. This effect is not found for the accrual-based earnings 
management activities.
[Insert Table 4.10 and 4.11 around here]
Table 4.12 re-examines regression (14) when including DA and DA_Dummy to 
observe whether the outcomes are robust. Consistent with the results in Tables 
4.10 and 4.11, results in Table 12 show a significant positive coefficient for 
RM*MA_Dummy and an insignificant correlation with DA*MA_Dummy.
[Insert Table 4.12 around here]
4.5 Conclusion
The adjustment of financial reports to beat or meet benchmarks has been 
considered the main incentive for managers to implement earnings management. 
In China, there are two main reasons for managers of listed firms to employ 
earnings manipulation to achieve individual benefits. First, the investor protection 
mechanism in China is much weaker than in developed economics, which implies 
that the Chinese regulator could not effectively restrict expropriation of minority 
shareholders’ interests by controlling shareholders or managers. Secondly, the fast 
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development of M&A in the Chinese stock market attracts more managers to 
adjust earnings in order to achieve the benchmark required by regulators. 
Therefore, this chapter analyses the effect of Chinese domestic M&As on earnings 
management in order to provide policy implications for improving the investor 
protection mechanism. Compared with previous studies, which focus solely on the 
influence of stock-for-stock M&As on earnings management, this chapter not only 
considers all payment methods, but also takes real earnings management into 
consideration to fully examine earnings activities around M&As. The results show 
a significantly positive relation between accrual-based and real earnings proxies 
across the whole research period as well as in the year of M&A, which indicates 
that acquirers in China prefer to use both earnings strategies to lower the costs of 
M&A deals. More importantly, although we find that M&A has significant 
negative and positive effect on accrual-based and real earnings management 
respectively in the year of the M&A, the relation between these two earnings 
strategies is still significant positive, as in the period without M&A. The findings 
indicate that Chinese acquirers prefer to engage in more real earnings 
management and less detectable accrual-based earnings management in the year 
of the M&A, but those firms with more accrual-based (or real based) earnings 
management tend to make greater use of the other earnings management approach. 
This is very different from the effects of changes in accounting reporting practice 
or incentive alignment on earnings management brought about by SOX and IFRS 
or by the split share structure reform. Therefore, acquirers in China may still 
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implement both earnings strategies simultaneously, even during the year of the 
M&A, due to the weak investor protection environment.
The results of this chapter also support the conclusions in previous studies by 
finding lower earnings informativeness in the year of M&A, and this implies that 
market reactions can be negatively affected by lower quality of accounting 
information provided by acquirers during the M&A. In addition, the chapter finds 
a significant negative association between stock returns and real earnings 
management, but an insignificant coefficient for DA. The results suggest that 
market reactions are more likely to detect a real earnings management strategy.
Consequently, the implication of this chapter is that regulators and the CSRC 
should pay more attention to the supervision of earnings management behaviour 
during M&As. At least, they should formalize the publication of accounting 
information to limit accrual-based earnings management when acquirers can 
engage in both accrual-based and real earnings management to lower the costs of 
M&A. Furthermore, investors should be concerned about the accounting 
information published by acquirers, who may exploit less detectable methods to 
manipulate earnings to maximize their own interest.
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Table 4.1 Time and Industry Distribution of Deals
This table illustrates the time series and industry distribution of the whole sample. Only successful deals are 
included and those pending are excluded. All samples are selected from the Thomson One Banker database 
for Chinese domestic M&As from 2002 to 2011, with 964 events. Transaction value is calculated in millions 
of US dollars. The industry code is obtained from the Datastream database, using the first two digits of the 
Standard Industrial Classification code.
Panel A: Number of M&As       
Year M&A Transaction value (mil) Cash only Cash and stock only Stock only Other unknown Total
2002 23 115.1537 19 1 3 23
2003 90 100.4903 76 4 10 90
2004 116 93.65893 90 2 9 1 14 116
2005 55 69.0295 47 2 6 55
2006 45 399.2289 32 4 9 45
2007 91 400.009 60 2 5 8 16 91
2008 120 577.9128 76 1 3 17 23 120
2009 86 844.9831 51 10 13 12 86
2010 136 759.8671 95 1 11 15 14 136
2011 202 492.7309 174 5 3 11 9 202
Total 964 506.1328 720 11 52 65 116 964
Panel B: Industry Distribution
No. of M&As Percentage Industry sector
80 8.30 Utilities
49 5.08 Properties
155 16.08 Conglomerates
597 61.93 Industrials
83 8.61 Commerce
Total 964  
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Table 4.2 Summary Statistics     
 Observations Mean Standard deviation p25 p50 p75
DA 6520 0.002 0.088 -0.043 0.003 0.049
RM_1 6121 -0.002 0.171 -0.080 0.014 0.096
RM_2 6453 0.007 0.121 -0.056 0.013 0.077
RM_3 6121 0.003 0.224 -0.108 0.017 0.129
ACFO 6570 -0.001 0.084 -0.046 0.000 0.047
APROD 6230 0.005 0.136 -0.052 0.006 0.059
ADISX 6455 -0.001 0.061 -0.037 -0.010 0.022
BIG4 6572 0.046 0.209 0.000 0.000 0.000
PAY 6572 14.271 0.893 13.669 14.296 14.880
TS 6572 19.005 0.964 18.312 18.928 19.606
STATE 6572 0.522 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000
LEVERAGE 6572 0.503 0.193 0.369 0.516 0.644
DUALITY 6572 0.141 0.348 0.000 0.000 0.000
IPO_DUM 6572 0.110 0.313 0.000 0.000 0.000
ROE 6572 0.051 0.179 0.023 0.068 0.122
ST_DUM 6572 0.061 0.239 0.000 0.000 0.000
TOBINQ 6572 2.106 1.422 1.233 1.649 2.442
FIRMSIZE 6572 21.490 1.075 20.757 21.378 22.101
BIND 6572 0.345 0.063 0.333 0.333 0.364
BSCb 6572 0.402 1.411 -0.416 0.006 0.711
RETURN_15 6572 0.210 0.873 -0.316 -0.100 0.358
RETURN_12 6572 0.212 0.711 -0.261 -0.033 0.432
MARKET_VALUE 6572 22.086 0.988 21.392 21.978 22.653
BM 6572 0.403 0.252 0.215 0.350 0.540
EARN 6572 0.038 0.067 0.011 0.035 0.068
BOARD_NUM 6572 9.479 2.046 9.000 9.000 11.000
SUPER_NUM 6572 4.375 1.820 3.000 4.000 5.000
NOA_ASSETS 6572 0.669 0.632 0.490 0.647 0.787
BOARD_MEETINGS 6572 8.602 3.378 6.000 8.000 10.000
RELATIVE_SIZE 990 0.531 0.338 0.230 0.500 0.900
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix.
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Table 4.3 Correlation Matrix                               
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DA 1.000
RM_1 0.166 1.000
RM_2 0.608 0.651 1.000
RM_3 0.406 0.915 0.862 1.000
ACFO -0.757 -0.369 -0.809 -0.648 1.000
APROD 0.159 0.709 0.500 0.701 -0.381 1.000
ADISX -0.079 -0.682 -0.532 -0.566 0.128 -0.423 1.000
BIG4 0.049 -0.021 -0.001 -0.015 -0.006 -0.019 -0.002 1.000
PAY 0.164 -0.124 0.019 -0.043 -0.072 -0.047 0.165 0.089 1.000
TS 0.010 0.074 0.113 0.114 -0.037 0.056 -0.022 0.126 0.410 1.000
STATE 0.009 0.051 0.000 0.022 0.005 0.052 -0.036 0.123 -0.128 -0.109 1.000
LEVERAGE -0.075 0.289 0.220 0.295 -0.191 0.296 -0.140 -0.038 0.038 0.175 0.017 1.000
DUALITY 0.052 -0.051 -0.033 -0.040 -0.023 -0.029 0.044 -0.025 0.005 -0.099 -0.162 -0.113 1.000
IPO_DUM 0.067 -0.110 -0.043 -0.090 -0.001 -0.049 0.079 -0.003 0.088 -0.320 -0.049 -0.226 0.138 1.000
ROE 0.271 -0.158 -0.082 -0.140 0.084 -0.125 0.055 0.053 0.253 0.081 0.003 -0.178 0.048 0.053 1.000
ST_DUM -0.087 0.033 -0.002 0.020 0.017 0.074 -0.054 -0.019 -0.261 -0.143 0.000 0.034 0.039 -0.075 -0.008 1.000
TOBINQ -0.028 -0.241 -0.245 -0.270 0.170 -0.219 0.147 -0.044 -0.080 -0.157 -0.103 -0.323 0.028 0.030 0.112 0.148 1.000
FIRMSIZE 0.087 0.123 0.151 0.173 -0.112 0.149 0.011 0.189 0.474 0.728 0.088 0.399 -0.112 -0.107 0.163 -0.257 -0.427 1.000
BIND -0.007 0.053 0.062 0.066 -0.049 0.093 -0.048 -0.051 0.056 0.099 -0.107 0.032 0.111 0.042 0.040 0.058 0.064 0.011 1.000
BSCb -0.152 0.083 -0.032 0.026 0.086 0.046 -0.100 -0.043 -0.187 -0.023 -0.017 -0.061 -0.003 -0.049 -0.157 0.068 0.016 -0.091 -0.070 1.000
RETURN_15 -0.045 -0.017 -0.049 -0.036 0.050 0.004 0.025 -0.019 -0.139 -0.106 0.029 0.025 -0.056 -0.084 0.015 0.058 0.157 -0.144 0.021 -0.029 1.000
RETURN_12 -0.031 -0.028 -0.056 -0.046 0.036 0.012 0.032 -0.033 -0.140 -0.087 0.007 0.009 -0.047 -0.106 0.050 0.077 0.322 -0.160 0.029 -0.022 0.869 1.000
MARKET_VALUE 0.083 -0.027 0.018 0.018 -0.025 0.031 0.119 0.192 0.508 0.733 0.029 0.239 -0.099 -0.085 0.266 -0.214 0.049 0.863 0.043 -0.105 -0.084 0.005 1.000
BM 0.036 0.187 0.166 0.192 -0.077 0.094 -0.172 0.032 -0.025 0.065 0.131 -0.000 -0.015 -0.005 -0.101 -0.148 -0.595 0.280 -0.051 0.050 -0.081 -0.272 -0.120 1.000
EARN 0.277 -0.302 -0.198 -0.274 0.163 -0.212 0.192 0.089 0.258 0.039 0.005 -0.324 0.049 0.153 0.824 -0.015 0.245 0.101 0.017 -0.239 0.005 0.041 0.281 -0.209 1.000
BOARD_NUM 0.011 0.002 0.017 0.005 0.008 -0.053 0.005 0.074 0.140 0.150 0.168 0.097 -0.097 -0.070 -0.059 -0.088 -0.111 0.226 -0.252 0.006 -0.063 -0.049 0.183 0.091 -0.073 1.000
SUPER_NUM 0.088 -0.006 0.075 0.040 -0.066 0.012 0.008 -0.049 0.133 0.077 -0.152 -0.066 0.056 0.103 0.091 -0.043 0.099 0.031 0.093 -0.019 -0.004 0.014 0.095 -0.092 0.115 -0.100 1.000
NOA_ASSETS -0.019 -0.053 -0.093 -0.069 0.079 0.102 0.050 -0.013 -0.089 -0.094 0.092 -0.081 -0.001 0.009 0.072 0.084 -0.028 -0.032 -0.065 0.093 -0.005 0.006 -0.048 -0.007 0.198 -0.016 0.014 1.000
BOARD_MEETINGS 0.046 0.051 0.064 0.081 -0.095 0.105 -0.006 -0.059 0.138 0.073 -0.112 0.100 0.035 -0.002 0.044 0.001 -0.048 0.097 0.072 0.019 -0.032 -0.037 0.084 0.009 -0.018 -0.105 0.316 -0.012 1.000                
RELATIVE_SIZE -0.108 0.032 -0.023 0.021 0.023 0.050 0.033 -0.016 -0.125 -0.006 0.002 0.019 0.003 -0.033 -0.081 0.079 0.086 -0.050 0.079 0.042 0.031 0.055 -0.008 -0.059* -0.064 -0.075 0.037 0.011 -0.009  1.000       
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is between 2002 and 2011. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Table 4.4 Impact of M&As on Accrual-Based Earnings Management
RM_PROXY RM_1 RM_2 RM_3 ACFO APROD ADISX
MA_Dummy -0.006* -0.008*** -0.007** -0.007*** -0.007** -0.007**
(-1.757) (-3.326) (-2.278) (-3.336) (-2.080) (-2.194)
RM_PROXY×MA_Dummy 0.057*** 0.048* 0.044*** -0.021 0.086*** -0.033
(2.650) (1.881) (2.979) (-0.730) (3.151) (-0.569)
RM_PROXY 0.100*** 0.419*** 0.159*** -0.708*** 0.093*** -0.234***
(10.956) (39.480) (24.382) (-55.897) (6.254) (-9.934)
BIG4 0.006 0.012*** 0.009* 0.012*** 0.005 0.007
(1.291) (3.098) (1.947) (3.574) (1.149) (1.534)
PAY 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.012***
(7.865) (11.368) (10.063) (8.078) (6.249) (7.373)
TS -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.007*** -0.013*** -0.012***
(-7.106) (-8.421) (-8.321) (-5.366) (-6.493) (-6.232)
STATE -0.001 0.004** -0.000 0.004** -0.001 -0.000
(-0.493) (1.976) (-0.060) (2.296) (-0.268) (-0.187)
LEVERAGE -0.062*** -0.077*** -0.075*** -0.083*** -0.062*** -0.051***
(-8.383) (-12.657) (-10.887) (-15.473) (-8.466) (-7.081)
DUALITY 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.904) (0.565) (0.962) (-0.836) (0.565) (0.802)
IPO_DUM 0.006 -0.002 0.005 0.001 0.006 0.006
(1.264) (-0.712) (1.121) (0.433) (1.301) (1.335)
ROE 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.079*** 0.093*** 0.078*** 0.072***
(8.642) (9.937) (9.566) (12.778) (8.965) (8.293)
ST_DUM 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.009** 0.004 0.004
(0.861) (1.197) (1.085) (1.996) (0.656) (0.760)
TOBINQ 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.003***
(4.940) (8.134) (7.825) (6.274) (4.111) (3.476)
FIRMSIZE 0.004* 0.001 0.004* 0.002 0.004** 0.002
(1.853) (0.748) (1.865) (1.595) (2.083) (1.002)
IND 0.003 -0.017 -0.002 -0.009 0.001 -0.004
(0.166) (-1.228) (-0.147) (-0.738) (0.068) (-0.242)
Intercept 0.020 0.017 0.021 -0.021 0.023 0.017
(0.683) (0.730) (0.770) (-0.963) (0.793) (0.592)
Industry yes yes yes yes Yes yes
R-Squared 0.110 0.393 0.234 0.513 0.097 0.099
Observations 6,024 6,314 6,024 6,425 6,130 6,314
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is between 2002 and 2011. The dependent variable 
is DA. The regressions use RM_1, RM_2, RM_3, ACFO, APROD, and ADISX as proxies for real earnings management. 
This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes. The coefficients 
and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4.5 Impact of M&As on Real Earnings Management
Dependent variable RM_1 RM_2 RM_3 ACFO APROD ADISX
MA_Dummy 0.013** 0.010*** 0.017** -0.006*** 0.013** -0.005**
(2.088) (2.792) (2.326) (-2.684) (2.575) (-2.143)
DA×MA_Dummy 0.128 0.119*** 0.239** -0.085*** 0.216** -0.002
(1.586) (2.734) (2.523) (-2.817) (2.189) (-0.060)
DA 0.378*** 0.788*** 1.020*** -0.654*** 0.226*** -0.115***
(10.900) (40.357) (24.188) (-48.380) (6.345) (-9.485)
BIG4 -0.016 -0.020*** -0.031** 0.013*** -0.013* 0.004
(-1.607) (-3.352) (-2.486) (4.041) (-1.663) (1.044)
PAY -0.040*** -0.023*** -0.046*** 0.008*** -0.017*** 0.016***
(-12.976) (-12.901) (-12.474) (6.829) (-7.012) (15.119)
TS 0.024*** 0.016*** 0.032*** -0.003** 0.013*** -0.008***
(6.150) (6.882) (6.716) (-2.274) (4.161) (-6.294)
STATE 0.011** -0.009*** 0.001 0.006*** 0.009** -0.000
(2.474) (-3.577) (0.146) (3.361) (2.255) (-0.228)
LEVERAGE 0.120*** 0.110*** 0.198*** -0.082*** 0.106*** -0.030***
(8.732) (13.768) (11.706) (-16.066) (9.104) (-6.196)
DUALITY -0.003 -0.000 -0.004 -0.004* 0.007 0.001
(-0.506) (-0.010) (-0.556) (-1.927) (1.184) (0.633)
IPO_DUM -0.004 0.017*** 0.000 -0.004 0.003 -0.008***
(-0.404) (3.611) (0.017) (-1.501) (0.395) (-2.905)
ROE -0.042*** -0.056*** -0.108*** 0.073*** -0.049*** -0.020***
(-2.712) (-5.845) (-5.720) (11.132) (-3.303) (-3.425)
ST_DUM -0.017 -0.009 -0.019 0.010** -0.001 0.005
(-1.608) (-1.324) (-1.463) (2.263) (-0.120) (1.254)
TOBINQ -0.022*** -0.014*** -0.032*** 0.006*** -0.014*** 0.006***
(-10.252) (-10.996) (-12.556) (6.932) (-7.322) (8.004)
FIRMSIZE 0.003 0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.000
(0.667) (0.002) (-0.105) (1.401) (-0.561) (0.143)
IND 0.023 0.042** 0.044 -0.013 0.033 -0.023**
(0.727) (2.365) (1.129) (-1.126) (1.242) (-1.965)
Intercept -0.014 0.015 -0.020 -0.064*** -0.018 -0.070***
(-0.245) (0.458) (-0.291) (-3.165) (-0.432) (-3.580)
Industry yes yes yes yes Yes yes
R-Squared 0.141 0.383 0.255 0.493 0.094 0.093
Observations 6,024 6,314 6,024 6,425 6,130 6,314
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is between 2002 and 2011. The dependent 
variables are aggregate RM proxies, represented by RM_1, RM_2, RM_3, ACFO, APROD, and ADISX. This chapter uses 
industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes. The coefficients and t-statistics are 
computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p 
< 0.01. 
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Table 4.6 Impact of M&As on Accrual-Based Earnings Management, Controlling for Accounting 
Flexibility
RM_PROXY RM_1 RM_2 RM_3 ACFO APROD ADISX
MA_Dummy -0.004 -0.008*** -0.005* -0.007*** -0.005 -0.005*
(-1.111) (-2.971) (-1.748) (-3.204) (-1.419) (-1.663)
RM_PROXY×MA_Dummy 0.056*** 0.043* 0.042*** -0.023 0.083*** -0.035
(2.616) (1.660) (2.780) (-0.805) (3.079) (-0.604)
RM_PROXY 0.101*** 0.425*** 0.162*** -0.709*** 0.094*** -0.242***
(10.888) (39.238) (24.200) (-54.850) (6.107) (-9.932)
BSCb×MA_Dummy -0.006** -0.003 -0.004* -0.002 -0.005** -0.006**
(-2.065) (-1.375) (-1.691) (-1.129) (-2.057) (-2.027)
BSCb -0.001 -0.002*** -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.292) (-2.757) (-2.255) (-0.830) (-0.643) (-0.697)
BIG4 0.012** 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.010** 0.013***
(2.300) (4.536) (3.018) (4.336) (2.099) (2.582)
PAY 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.011***
(7.298) (10.681) (9.326) (7.764) (5.886) (6.945)
TS -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.007*** -0.013*** -0.012***
(-6.807) (-8.106) (-7.932) (-5.049) (-6.254) (-5.986)
STATE -0.001 0.004* -0.000 0.005*** -0.000 -0.000
(-0.417) (1.906) (-0.010) (2.655) (-0.117) (-0.087)
LEVERAGE -0.062*** -0.078*** -0.076*** -0.081*** -0.061*** -0.052***
(-8.406) (-12.798) (-10.891) (-14.933) (-8.348) (-7.063)
DUALITY 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.003
(1.030) (0.745) (1.112) (-0.940) (0.614) (0.901)
IPO_DUM 0.007 -0.002 0.006 0.002 0.007 0.006
(1.403) (-0.535) (1.302) (0.827) (1.446) (1.362)
ROE 0.074*** 0.072*** 0.076*** 0.092*** 0.076*** 0.070***
(8.245) (9.222) (9.024) (12.348) (8.624) (7.914)
ST_DUM 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.008* 0.004 0.005
(0.963) (1.218) (1.127) (1.836) (0.711) (0.887)
TOBINQ 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(4.922) (8.038) (7.825) (6.051) (3.947) (3.458)
FIRMSIZE 0.004* 0.001 0.003* 0.002 0.004* 0.002
(1.715) (0.713) (1.692) (1.266) (1.875) (0.937)
BIND 0.008 -0.012 0.002 -0.003 0.007 0.000
(0.430) (-0.901) (0.150) (-0.212) (0.385) (0.023)
Intercept 0.016 0.045* 0.014 -0.013 0.025 0.035
(0.534) (1.814) (0.494) (-0.588) (0.831) (1.183)
Industry yes Yes yes yes yes yes
R-Squared 0.113 0.399 0.238 0.516 0.099 0.102
Observations 5,820 6,099 5,820 6,200 5,916 6,099
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is between 2002 and 2011. The dependent variable 
is DA. The regressions use RM_1, RM_2, RM_3, ACFO, APROD, and ADISX as RM proxies, respectively. This chapter 
uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes. The coefficients and t-statistics 
are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01.
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Table 4.7 Impact of M&As on Real Earnings Management, Controlling for Accounting Flexibility
Dependent variable RM_1 RM_2 RM_3 ACFO APROD ADISX
MA_Dummy 0.013* 0.010*** 0.018** -0.006*** 0.014** -0.004
(1.885) (2.706) (2.261) (-2.835) (2.509) (-1.465)
DA×MA_Dummy 0.142* 0.123*** 0.251*** -0.086*** 0.225** -0.007
(1.713) (2.805) (2.625) (-2.842) (2.190) (-0.235)
DA 0.380*** 0.791*** 1.023*** -0.655*** 0.226*** -0.117***
(10.870) (40.231) (24.075) (-47.559) (6.208) (-9.501)
BSCb×MA_Dummy -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.001
(-0.615) (-0.313) (-0.574) (0.222) (-0.780) (-0.570)
BSCb 0.012*** 0.006*** 0.013*** -0.001 0.007*** -0.003***
(7.035) (5.588) (5.840) (-1.528) (5.480) (-5.891)
BIG4 -0.020* -0.027*** -0.039*** 0.014*** -0.011 0.005
(-1.700) (-4.137) (-2.721) (3.894) (-1.172) (1.295)
PAY -0.036*** -0.021*** -0.043*** 0.008*** -0.014*** 0.015***
(-11.445) (-11.971) (-11.191) (6.537) (-5.988) (13.963)
TS 0.024*** 0.015*** 0.031*** -0.003** 0.014*** -0.009***
(5.875) (6.731) (6.410) (-2.115) (4.284) (-6.279)
STATE 0.013*** -0.008*** 0.002 0.006*** 0.009** -0.002
(2.910) (-3.109) (0.418) (3.646) (2.431) (-0.926)
LEVERAGE 0.127*** 0.114*** 0.203*** -0.080*** 0.110*** -0.034***
(9.085) (14.154) (11.813) (-15.506) (9.126) (-6.831)
DUALITY -0.006 -0.001 -0.006 -0.005** 0.006 0.002
(-0.967) (-0.260) (-0.838) (-2.105) (1.061) (0.991)
IPO_DUM -0.002 0.017*** 0.000 -0.003 0.004 -0.010***
(-0.178) (3.472) (0.012) (-1.106) (0.595) (-3.213)
ROE -0.028* -0.049*** -0.093*** 0.071*** -0.039** -0.025***
(-1.796) (-4.943) (-4.867) (10.734) (-2.532) (-4.260)
ST_DUM -0.018* -0.008 -0.018 0.008** -0.000 0.006
(-1.714) (-1.273) (-1.397) (1.978) (-0.045) (1.564)
TOBINQ -0.023*** -0.014*** -0.033*** 0.006*** -0.015*** 0.006***
(-10.389) (-10.782) (-12.658) (6.858) (-7.288) (8.136)
FIRMSIZE 0.003 -0.000 -0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.001
(0.659) (-0.122) (-0.038) (1.110) (-0.546) (0.517)
BIND 0.021 0.039** 0.038 -0.008 0.026 -0.021*
(0.633) (2.163) (0.975) (-0.681) (0.963) (-1.815)
Intercept -0.005 -0.026 0.008 -0.057*** -0.041 -0.051**
(-0.094) (-0.780) (0.117) (-2.738) (-0.963) (-2.522)
Industry yes yes yes Yes yes yes
R-Squared 0.150 0.391 0.262 0.494 0.099 0.100
Observations 5,820 6,099 5,820 6,200 5,916 6,099
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is between 2002 and 2011. The dependent 
variables are aggregate RM proxies, represented by RM_1, RM_2, RM_3, ACFO, APROD, and ADISX. This chapter uses 
industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes. The coefficients and t-statistics are 
computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p 
< 0.0101. 
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Table 4.8 Impact of M&As on Earnings Informativeness
Dependent variable RETURN_15 RETURN_12 RETURN_15 RETURN_12 RETURN_15 RETURN_12 RETURN_15 RETURN_12 RETURN_15 RETURN_12
Year -2 -2 -1 -1 0 0 1 1 2 2
MA_Dummy 0.222*** 0.158*** 0.031 0.098*** -0.154*** -0.095*** -0.020 -0.070** 0.335*** 0.260***
(4.901) (4.364) (0.844) (3.189) (-4.540) (-3.098) (-0.574) (-2.452) (6.685) (6.268)
EARN 6.086* 0.427 6.023 0.364 6.492* 0.816 6.223* 0.559 7.549** 1.410
(1.661) (0.151) (1.632) (0.129) (1.768) (0.289) (1.684) (0.197) (2.056) (0.496)
EARN×MA_Dummy -0.153 -0.047 0.708 0.813** -0.804* -0.926** -0.014 -0.047 -0.062 -0.483
(-0.226) (-0.092) (1.518) (1.980) (-1.802) (-2.466) (-0.032) (-0.140) (-0.097) (-0.936)
EARN×MARKET_VALUE -0.314* 0.001 -0.320* -0.007 -0.321* -0.005 -0.321* -0.005 -0.381** -0.042
(-1.903) (0.010) (-1.936) (-0.057) (-1.946) (-0.039) (-1.932) (-0.039) (-2.304) (-0.327)
EARN×LEVERAGE 4.414*** 4.013*** 4.545*** 4.183*** 4.252*** 3.868*** 4.435*** 4.027*** 4.347*** 3.979***
(5.701) (6.438) (5.814) (6.694) (5.524) (6.217) (5.700) (6.451) (5.630) (6.357)
EARN×MB -0.115 -3.635*** -0.105 -3.541*** -0.269 -3.754*** -0.199 -3.684*** -0.044 -3.591***
(-0.174) (-6.378) (-0.158) (-6.220) (-0.410) (-6.611) (-0.302) (-6.461) (-0.067) (-6.197)
EARN×ROE 3.770*** 2.876*** 3.785*** 2.910*** 3.748*** 2.876*** 3.755*** 2.884*** 3.720*** 2.841***
(5.667) (5.484) (5.644) (5.558) (5.622) (5.484) (5.600) (5.482) (5.556) (5.385)
Intercept 0.054 0.059 0.078 0.069 0.093 0.085* 0.081 0.085* 0.042 0.049
(0.948) (1.350) (1.367) (1.580) (1.636) (1.932) (1.425) (1.931) (0.738) (1.118)
Industry Yes yes yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes
R-Squared 0.020 0.037 0.015 0.037 0.021 0.038 0.015 0.034 0.027 0.043
Observations 6,558 6,558 6,558 6,558 6,558 6,558 6,558 6,558 6,558 6,558
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is between 2002 and 2011. The dependent variables are the cumulative returns starting three months after the fiscal year-end t - 1 and 
ending six (three) months after the fiscal year-end t, where year 0 represents the year of the M&A. This chapter uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes. The 
coefficients and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
206
Table 4.9 Impact of M&As on Earnings Informativeness, Controlling for Corporate Governance     
Dependent variable RETURN_15 RETURN_12 RETURN_15 RETURN_12 RETURN_15 RETURN_12 RETURN_15 RETURN_12 RETURN_15 RETURN_12
Year -2 -2 -1 -1 0 0 1 1 2 2
MA_Dummy 0.221*** 0.158*** 0.031 0.099*** -0.154*** -0.096*** -0.020 -0.069** 0.335*** 0.261***
(4.881) (4.359) (0.870) (3.227) (-4.503) (-3.140) (-0.565) (-2.421) (6.714) (6.330)
EARN 6.030 0.294 5.907 0.149 6.432* 0.681 6.128 0.412 7.462** 1.278
(1.613) (0.102) (1.566) (0.052) (1.719) (0.236) (1.624) (0.142) (1.991) (0.440)
EARN×MA_Dummy -0.236 -0.106 0.727 0.836** -0.795* -0.949** 0.020 -0.026 0.088 -0.377
(-0.346) (-0.208) (1.575) (2.064) (-1.768) (-2.544) (0.046) (-0.075) (0.136) (-0.732)
EARN×TOP_1 -0.027*** -0.024*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.027*** -0.024*** -0.027*** -0.024***
(-2.765) (-3.161) (-2.824) (-3.268) (-2.743) (-3.149) (-2.779) (-3.144) (-2.845) (-3.250)
EARN×DUALITY 0.288 0.373 0.316 0.415 0.310 0.397 0.312 0.395 0.358 0.412
(0.789) (1.280) (0.855) (1.411) (0.843) (1.356) (0.843) (1.344) (0.986) (1.414)
EARN×STATE 0.960*** 1.008*** 0.993*** 1.032*** 0.941*** 0.992*** 0.987*** 1.017*** 1.067*** 1.073***
(3.065) (4.030) (3.148) (4.114) (2.986) (3.953) (3.138) (4.052) (3.419) (4.294)
EARN×SUPER_NUM 0.096 -0.068 0.097 -0.065 0.100 -0.065 0.098 -0.063 0.098 -0.065
(0.896) (-0.802) (0.904) (-0.768) (0.926) (-0.766) (0.907) (-0.744) (0.918) (-0.767)
EARN×BOARD_NUM -0.065 -0.091 -0.064 -0.091 -0.077 -0.100 -0.065 -0.094 -0.053 -0.086
(-0.719) (-1.266) (-0.718) (-1.274) (-0.868) (-1.407) (-0.731) (-1.328) (-0.605) (-1.207)
EARN×IND_NUM 0.384* 0.451** 0.392* 0.458*** 0.430** 0.489*** 0.394* 0.472*** 0.389* 0.457***
(1.846) (2.570) (1.927) (2.676) (2.091) (2.817) (1.930) (2.735) (1.942) (2.688)
EARN×BOARD_MEETS -0.033 0.009 -0.032 0.011 -0.015 0.024 -0.033 0.011 -0.027 0.014
(-0.725) (0.281) (-0.717) (0.328) (-0.335) (0.752) (-0.724) (0.329) (-0.605) (0.446)
EARN×MARKET_VALUE -0.342** -0.022 -0.350** -0.032 -0.360** -0.038 -0.352** -0.033 -0.423** -0.075
(-2.018) (-0.164) (-2.063) (-0.241) (-2.132) (-0.284) (-2.064) (-0.245) (-2.489) (-0.557)
EARN×LEVERAGE 4.489*** 4.070*** 4.623*** 4.242*** 4.304*** 3.901*** 4.507*** 4.075*** 4.384*** 4.010***
(5.682) (6.392) (5.805) (6.657) (5.474) (6.142) (5.676) (6.393) (5.579) (6.287)
EARN×MB -0.233 -3.727*** -0.234 -3.638*** -0.387 -3.847*** -0.336 -3.792*** -0.220 -3.715***
(-0.345) (-6.450) (-0.345) (-6.290) (-0.573) (-6.675) (-0.496) (-6.554) (-0.326) (-6.333)
EARN×ROE 4.030*** 3.122*** 4.056*** 3.166*** 4.003*** 3.119*** 4.019*** 3.128*** 3.989*** 3.093***
(5.906) (5.804) (5.896) (5.897) (5.855) (5.804) (5.841) (5.799) (5.820) (5.731)
Intercept 0.050 0.062 0.074 0.072 0.090 0.089** 0.077 0.088** 0.037 0.051
(0.871) (1.409) (1.282) (1.633) (1.573) (2.009) (1.338) (1.980) (0.646) (1.164)
Industry yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-Squared 0.024 0.042 0.019 0.042 0.024 0.043 0.018 0.038 0.031 0.048
Observations 6,556 6,556 6,556 6,556 6,556 6,556 6,556 6,556 6,556 6,556
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is between 2002 and 2011. The dependent variables are the cumulative returns starting three months after the fiscal year-end t - 1 to six (three) months after the fiscal year-end t, with year 0 representing the year of the M&A. This chapter uses 
industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes. The coefficients and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 4.10 Real Earnings Management and Stock Returns             
RM_PROXY RM_1 RM_2 RM_3 RM_1 RM_2 RM_3 RM_1 RM_2 RM_3 RM_1 RM_2 RM_3 RM_1 RM_2 RM_3
Dependent variable RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN
Year -2 -2 -2 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 +1 +1 +1 +2 +2 +2
MA_Dummy 0.216*** 0.218*** 0.216*** 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.121*** -0.119*** -0.123*** 0.081** 0.096*** 0.080** 0.232*** 0.247*** 0.235***
(6.245) (6.564) (6.244) (0.007) (-0.046) (0.029) (-3.809) (-3.922) (-3.845) (2.209) (2.702) (2.190) (5.594) (5.946) (5.652)
RM_PROXY×MA_Dummy 0.428* 0.331 0.264 0.078 -0.417 -0.122 0.210 0.586** 0.269* -0.294 -0.460* -0.231 -0.521** -0.659* -0.377**
(1.942) (1.092) (1.535) (0.384) (-1.597) (-0.764) (1.147) (2.431) (1.900) (-1.547) (-1.681) (-1.625) (-2.460) (-1.946) (-2.273)
RM_PROXY -0.532*** -0.775*** -0.411*** -0.505*** -0.681*** -0.372*** -0.522*** -0.833*** -0.427*** -0.448*** -0.675*** -0.352*** -0.430*** -0.678*** -0.343***
(-7.287) (-8.070) (-7.384) (-6.796) (-6.880) (-6.543) (-6.914) (-8.341) (-7.383) (-5.998) (-6.901) (-6.099) (-5.865) (-7.129) (-6.089)
BM 1.625*** 1.600*** 1.618*** 1.633*** 1.606*** 1.626*** 1.632*** 1.607*** 1.625*** 1.632*** 1.606*** 1.624*** 1.642*** 1.617*** 1.635***
(31.933) (32.634) (31.952) (32.036) (32.654) (32.038) (31.992) (32.710) (32.022) (31.976) (32.577) (31.960) (32.330) (33.021) (32.347)
NOA_ASSETS -0.100*** -0.091*** -0.097*** -0.102*** -0.094*** -0.100*** -0.102*** -0.093*** -0.098*** -0.103*** -0.097*** -0.101*** -0.110*** -0.100*** -0.106***
(-3.696) (-3.317) (-3.581) (-3.754) (-3.426) (-3.668) (-3.774) (-3.378) (-3.652) (-3.804) (-3.503) (-3.722) (-4.050) (-3.594) (-3.904)
LEVERAGE 0.826*** 0.813*** 0.831*** 0.826*** 0.813*** 0.832*** 0.826*** 0.811*** 0.832*** 0.824*** 0.811*** 0.830*** 0.823*** 0.809*** 0.830***
(12.335) (12.855) (12.408) (12.283) (12.787) (12.361) (12.285) (12.751) (12.342) (12.283) (12.785) (12.352) (12.324) (12.800) (12.397)
FIRMSIZE -0.151*** -0.152*** -0.153*** -0.152*** -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.152*** -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.153*** -0.154*** -0.155*** -0.156*** -0.158*** -0.158***
(-12.258) (-12.806) (-12.405) (-12.250) (-12.829) (-12.429) (-12.236) (-12.870) (-12.434) (-12.304) (-12.886) (-12.473) (-12.589) (-13.247) (-12.777)
ROE 0.144** 0.140** 0.121* 0.141* 0.138* 0.118 0.143** 0.141** 0.119* 0.143** 0.143** 0.121* 0.144** 0.145** 0.122*
(2.000) (1.973) (1.680) (1.944) (1.928) (1.637) (1.977) (1.965) (1.649) (1.982) (2.013) (1.685) (1.980) (2.009) (1.681)
BOARD_SHARE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.617) (1.106) (0.809) (0.797) (1.356) (1.002) (0.841) (1.507) (1.052) (0.755) (1.313) (0.949) (0.522) (1.216) (0.755)
BIND 1.242*** 1.199*** 1.249*** 1.197*** 1.161*** 1.203*** 1.231*** 1.199*** 1.239*** 1.168*** 1.132*** 1.176*** 1.133*** 1.098*** 1.140***
(16.390) (17.113) (16.470) (15.862) (16.616) (15.918) (16.091) (16.924) (16.189) (15.326) (16.065) (15.420) (14.903) (15.618) (14.981)
DUALITY 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.002
(0.074) (-0.026) (0.073) (0.049) (-0.017) (0.051) (0.027) (0.024) (0.067) (0.047) (0.025) (0.084) (0.012) (0.037) (0.056)
SUPER_MEETS 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.031***
(4.926) (4.913) (4.957) (4.876) (4.838) (4.903) (5.066) (5.081) (5.093) (4.886) (4.866) (4.905) (4.819) (4.858) (4.869)
Intercept 2.055*** 2.124*** 2.093*** 2.110*** 2.186*** 2.158*** 2.102*** 2.193*** 2.155*** 2.124*** 2.201*** 2.170*** 2.193*** 2.281*** 2.240***
(8.026) (8.586) (8.167) (8.194) (8.794) (8.375) (8.172) (8.825) (8.372) (8.255) (8.850) (8.424) (8.533) (9.186) (8.709)
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-Squared 0.206 0.209 0.206 0.200 0.203 0.200 0.202 0.205 0.203 0.201 0.204 0.201 0.206 0.209 0.206
Observations 5,860 6,217 5,860 5,860 6,217 5,860 5,860 6,217 5,860 5,860 6,217 5,860 5,860 6,217 5,860
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is between 2002 and 2011. The dependent variables are the cumulative returns for the fiscal year t and year 0 represents the year of the M&A. This chapter uses industry dummies to control for 
industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes. The coefficients and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4.11 Discretionary Accrual and Stock Returns  
Dependent variable RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN
Year -2 -1 0 1 2
MA_Dummy 0.214*** -0.011 -0.110*** 0.108*** 0.241***
(6.438) (-0.353) (-3.585) (3.016) (5.825)
DA×MA_Dummy 0.160 -0.414 0.207 -0.044 0.940**
(0.402) (-1.159) (0.623) (-0.111) (2.129)
DA -0.070 0.010 -0.092 -0.043 -0.133
(-0.560) (0.076) (-0.704) (-0.334) (-1.070)
BM 1.538*** 1.543*** 1.544*** 1.542*** 1.552***
(31.923) (31.950) (31.966) (31.905) (32.294)
NOA_ASSETS -0.096*** -0.099*** -0.099*** -0.101*** -0.104***
(-3.462) (-3.573) (-3.566) (-3.635) (-3.824)
LEVERAGE 0.740*** 0.737*** 0.737*** 0.735*** 0.733***
(11.944) (11.841) (11.854) (11.826) (11.838)
FIRMSIZE -0.145*** -0.146*** -0.146*** -0.147*** -0.151***
(-12.224) (-12.220) (-12.258) (-12.332) (-12.696)
ROE 0.202*** 0.198*** 0.207*** 0.204*** 0.202***
(2.760) (2.698) (2.813) (2.800) (2.752)
BOARD_SHARE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.850) (1.127) (1.169) (1.007) (0.849)
BIND 1.212*** 1.177*** 1.211*** 1.142*** 1.112***
(17.636) (17.174) (17.419) (16.526) (16.113)
DUALITY 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.057) (0.122) (0.081) (0.103) (0.071)
SUPER_MEETS 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.028***
(4.732) (4.658) (4.856) (4.697) (4.584)
Intercept 2.062*** 2.115*** 2.117*** 2.141*** 2.230***
(8.323) (8.495) (8.512) (8.608) (8.980)
Industry yes yes Yes yes yes
R-Squared 0.199 0.193 0.194 0.194 0.199
Observations 6,308 6,308 6,308 6,308 6,308
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is between 2002 and 2011. The dependent 
variables are the cumulative returns for the fiscal year t, where the year 0 represents the year of the M&A. This chapter 
uses industry dummies to control for industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes. The coefficients and t-statistics 
are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01.
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Table 4.12 Real Earnings Management and Stock Returns, Controlling for Discretionary Accruals        
RM_PROXY RM_1 RM_2 RM_3 RM_1 RM_2 RM_3 RM_1 RM_2 RM_3 RM_1 RM_2 RM_3 RM_1 RM_2 RM_3
Dependent variable RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN
Year -2 -2 -2 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2
MA_Dummy 0.209*** 0.212*** 0.208*** -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.117*** -0.116*** -0.118*** 0.075** 0.089** 0.074** 0.231*** 0.244*** 0.232***
(6.010) (6.348) (5.995) (-0.020) (-0.051) (0.009) (-3.654) (-3.799) (-3.671) (2.044) (2.507) (1.999) (5.542) (5.950) (5.595)
RM_PROXY×MA_Dummy 0.387* 0.335 0.244 0.105 -0.394 -0.093 0.194 0.740** 0.266* -0.304 -0.435 -0.241* -0.501** -0.481 -0.322*
(1.743) (1.085) (1.395) (0.512) (-1.494) (-0.584) (1.037) (2.511) (1.694) (-1.583) (-1.590) (-1.680) (-2.362) (-1.423) (-1.932)
RM_PROXY -0.552*** -1.315*** -0.522*** -0.534*** -1.228*** -0.490*** -0.544*** -1.394*** -0.536*** -0.473*** -1.211*** -0.464*** -0.455*** -1.225*** -0.457***
(-7.330) (-9.987) (-7.994) (-6.955) (-9.076) (-7.342) (-6.976) (-9.990) (-7.863) (-6.178) (-9.088) (-6.956) (-5.997) (-9.133) (-6.817)
DA×MA_Dummy 0.339 0.266 0.345 0.338 0.180 0.308 0.228 -0.320 0.018 0.300 0.187 0.277 0.314 0.207 0.293
(0.941) (0.792) (0.955) (0.940) (0.538) (0.856) (0.619) (-0.790) (0.045) (0.833) (0.557) (0.768) (0.873) (0.620) (0.815)
DA 0.139 1.055*** 0.520*** 0.141 1.076*** 0.531*** 0.143 1.137*** 0.554*** 0.152 1.054*** 0.531*** 0.132 1.046*** 0.506***
(0.996) (6.025) (3.291) (1.004) (6.109) (3.345) (1.015) (6.270) (3.443) (1.080) (5.988) (3.347) (0.943) (5.919) (3.180)
BM 1.626*** 1.631*** 1.632*** 1.635*** 1.637*** 1.639*** 1.633*** 1.637*** 1.638*** 1.633*** 1.636*** 1.638*** 1.642*** 1.647*** 1.647***
(31.863) (33.252) (32.110) (31.962) (33.259) (32.187) (31.913) (33.319) (32.164) (31.914) (33.202) (32.124) (32.252) (33.619) (32.476)
NOA_ASSETS -0.105*** -0.128*** -0.113*** -0.107*** -0.131*** -0.116*** -0.107*** -0.130*** -0.114*** -0.108*** -0.133*** -0.117*** -0.115*** -0.135*** -0.120***
(-3.825) (-4.349) (-4.041) (-3.889) (-4.470) (-4.139) (-3.898) (-4.423) (-4.122) (-3.945) (-4.508) (-4.180) (-4.171) (-4.573) (-4.327)
LEVERAGE 0.838*** 0.911*** 0.881*** 0.838*** 0.911*** 0.882*** 0.837*** 0.908*** 0.880*** 0.837*** 0.908*** 0.880*** 0.836*** 0.906*** 0.878***
(12.312) (13.665) (12.667) (12.255) (13.594) (12.617) (12.253) (13.558) (12.599) (12.265) (13.583) (12.615) (12.305) (13.603) (12.640)
FIRMSIZE -0.152*** -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.153*** -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.152*** -0.156*** -0.155*** -0.153*** -0.156*** -0.155*** -0.157*** -0.160*** -0.159***
(-12.196) (-12.865) (-12.342) (-12.183) (-12.876) (-12.354) (-12.162) (-12.903) (-12.346) (-12.234) (-12.935) (-12.398) (-12.531) (-13.301) (-12.711)
ROE 0.144* -0.002 0.058 0.141* -0.005 0.055 0.145* -0.003 0.058 0.142* 0.003 0.058 0.146* 0.006 0.063
(1.939) (-0.020) (0.763) (1.892) (-0.070) (0.723) (1.938) (-0.036) (0.757) (1.908) (0.039) (0.765) (1.952) (0.075) (0.825)
BOARD_SHARE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.496) (0.614) (0.566) (0.679) (0.855) (0.761) (0.727) (1.025) (0.821) (0.638) (0.823) (0.712) (0.415) (0.731) (0.528)
BIND 1.239*** 1.178*** 1.238*** 1.194*** 1.140*** 1.193*** 1.227*** 1.176*** 1.227*** 1.166*** 1.113*** 1.167*** 1.129*** 1.076*** 1.129***
(16.277) (16.714) (16.236) (15.761) (16.227) (15.702) (15.955) (16.514) (15.928) (15.232) (15.703) (15.219) (14.786) (15.216) (14.758)
DUALITY 0.002 -0.006 0.001 0.002 -0.005 0.001 0.002 -0.004 0.002 0.002 -0.004 0.002 0.001 -0.004 0.001
(0.074) (-0.191) (0.044) (0.068) (-0.169) (0.038) (0.051) (-0.119) (0.059) (0.063) (-0.125) (0.068) (0.034) (-0.120) (0.045)
SUPER_MEETS 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.032***
(4.965) (5.163) (5.092) (4.923) (5.103) (5.049) (5.102) (5.369) (5.237) (4.935) (5.122) (5.050) (4.868) (5.118) (5.016)
Intercept 2.075*** 2.181*** 2.115*** 2.127*** 2.239*** 2.175*** 2.117*** 2.242*** 2.168*** 2.140*** 2.254*** 2.187*** 2.212*** 2.337*** 2.260***
(8.033) (8.737) (8.174) (8.188) (8.926) (8.361) (8.158) (8.946) (8.344) (8.245) (8.983) (8.409) (8.533) (9.324) (8.701)
Industry yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-Squared 0.206 0.214 0.208 0.200 0.208 0.202 0.202 0.211 0.205 0.201 0.209 0.203 0.207 0.214 0.208
Observations 5,809 6,165 5,809 5,809 6,165 5,809 5,809 6,165 5,809 5,809 6,165 5,809 5,809 6,165 5,809
Note: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is between 2002 and 2011. The dependent variables are the cumulative returns for the fiscal year t, where year 0 represents the year of the M&A. This chapter uses industry dummies to control for 
industry effects according to CSRC industrial codes. The coefficients and t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. t-Statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Summary and Conclusion
With the rapid development of the Chinese stock market over the past decade, 
researchers have focused on studying market mechanisms under the special 
control of state ownership, and their studies yield several implications for 
improving and formalizing investor behaviour. Following previous studies, this 
thesis provides the empirical results of examining minority shareholder protection 
in China under three conditions: the split share structure reform (SSSREF), 
mutual fund ownership, and M&As. In this research, earnings management and 
tunnelling behaviour are considered the two main aspects to be examined with 
regard to the effectiveness of minority shareholder protection in China. 
Chapter 2 provides a dynamic process on accrual-based and real earnings 
management for the Chinese stock market, while previous studies have focused 
only on accrual-based earnings management. The evidence reveals a long-term 
significant positive association between accrual-based and real earnings 
management from 2002 to 2011, for a total of 13,840 firm–year observations. 
This finding suggests a relatively low degree of investor protection by regulators 
and policy makers in China. At the same time, the SSSREF, supported by the 
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China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), exogenously improves 
incentive alignments between controlling and minority shareholders, rather than 
directly affecting comprehensive accounting practice regulations, such as SOX or 
IFRS. Therefore, a significant negative effect and a significant positive effect have 
been detected for accrual-based and real earnings management respectively since 
the SSSREF, and the relation between the two earnings strategies has changed 
from positive to negative. A reasonable explanation for this result is that since the 
SSSREF managers of Chinese listed firms have shifted their earnings strategies 
from accrual-based to real earnings management in order to avoid detection and 
strict regulatory scrutiny. Furthermore, although previous studies show that the 
incentive alignment effect created by the reform has improved the quality of 
financial information, the positive relation between accrual-based and real 
earnings management is still observed in the post-reform period, which implies 
that SSSREF may not have fundamentally improved firms’ quality.
Chapter 3 questions the original corporate governance status of mutual fund 
investors in Chinese listed firms as determined in previous literature (Yuan et al., 
2008; Firth et al., 2010), and the assertion that mutual fund managers cannot 
properly address the contradiction in benefits between controlling shareholders 
and themselves (Firth et al., 2010; Ding et al., 2013). In order to resolve the 
puzzling role of mutual fund ownership, Chapter 3 provides empirical results from 
2002 to 2011, with 9,062 firm-year observations, and shows that there is a non-
linear association between mutual fund ownership and firm performance in China. 
The positive association between mutual fund ownership and firm performance 
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indicates that mutual fund ownership is effective in improving firm performance, 
and the improvement is even greater for those firms in which controlling 
shareholders exploit tunnelling behaviour to maximize their own interests. The 
results indicate that compared with individual investors, mutual fund investors 
have more experience and expertise to monitor listed firms’ performance. In 
addition, in the gradual reform by the Chinese government and the CSRC, more 
attention has been paid to the supervision of mutual fund managers regarding the 
protection of minority shareholders’ interests. 
On the other hand, the negative relation between the squared mutual fund 
ownership and firm performance suggests that a high level of mutual fund 
ownership can increase the probability that the wealth of minority shareholders 
will be expropriated, rather than that firm performance will be improved. The 
findings in Chapter 3 also confirm that mutual fund ownership can act directly as 
proper corporate governance to limit the probability of tunnelling behaviour by 
controlling shareholders.
Chapter 4 analyses the effect of Chinese domestic M&As on earnings 
management, to provide policy implications for improving the investor protection 
mechanism. Compared with previous studies, which focus solely on the influence 
of stock-for-stock M&As on earnings management, this chapter not only 
considers all payment methods, but also takes real earnings management into 
consideration to fully examine earnings activities around M&As. The results for 
this chapter reveal a significantly positive relation between accrual-based and real 
earnings proxies across the whole research period as well as in the year of M&A, 
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which indicates that acquirers in China prefer to use both earnings strategies to 
lower the cost of M&A deals. In addition, although we find that M&A has 
significant negative and positive effect on accrual-based and real earnings 
management respectively in the year of the M&A, the relation between these two 
earnings strategies is still significant positive, as in the period without M&A. The 
results indicate that Chinese acquirers prefer to engage in more real earnings 
management and less detectable accrual-based earnings management in the year 
of the M&A, but those firms with more accrual-based (or real-based) earnings 
management tend to make greater use of the other earnings management approach. 
The results of this chapter support the conclusions in previous literature by finding 
lower earnings informativeness in the year of M&A and a significant negative 
association between stock returns and real earnings management, but an 
insignificant coefficient for DA.
5.2 Policy Implications
This thesis has several implications for policy makers. First, this research focuses 
on the protection of minority shareholder interests in the China stock market, and 
points out that firm earnings strategies as a result of incentive alignment 
adjustments brought about by the SSSREF could fundamentally force managers to 
follow revised accounting rules, and employ less accrual-based earnings 
management. In addition, since the SSSREF has led to an incentive alignment that 
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prevents controlling shareholders from paying more attention to improving stock 
performance, more earnings management can be manipulated in order to meet the 
benchmark promised to minority shareholders to safeguard their interests. 
Consequently, managerial preferences in China have changed from accrual-based 
to real earnings management; although this is more costly, there are fewer 
opportunities for detection by regulators. In other words, stricter supervision 
cannot prevent earnings management behaviour and only encourages controlling 
shareholders to hide how they expropriate resources from firms. Minority 
shareholder benefit protection may require regulators to pay more attention to 
both accrual-based and real earnings management and to implement policies to 
curb controlling shareholder expropriation.
Second, although mutual fund ownership in China is effective in restricting 
controlling shareholders’ tunnelling and in improving firm performance, greater 
direct enforcement and more transparent appointments should be imposed by 
government agencies. Greater direct enforcement can further push mutual fund 
managers with a high level of ownership to provide more constructive suggestions 
on firm operation and monitoring, and more protection for minority shareholders, 
instead of aligning with controlling shareholders’ interests.
Finally, regulators and the CSRC should pay more attention to the supervision of 
earnings management behaviour during M&A. At least, they should formalize the 
publication of accounting information to limit accrual-based earnings 
management when acquirers can engage in both accrual-based and real earnings 
management to lower the cost of M&As. Furthermore, investors should be 
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concerned about the accounting information published by acquirers, who may 
exploit less detectable methods to manipulate earnings to maximize their own 
interest.
5.3 Limitations and Future Research
Although this thesis makes various contributions to the research on the 
effectiveness of minority shareholder interests in the context of the SSSREF, 
mutual fund ownership, and M&As, it has several limitations.
With reference to Chapter 2, the SSSREF can be divided into several progressive 
phases, such as the initial decision making in shareholder meetings, negotiations 
between tradable and non-tradable shareholders, and so on. Each step during the 
SSSREF may provide sufficient incentives for the original non-tradable 
shareholders to manipulate earnings management to maximize their profits before 
dilution by tradable shareholders and to try to meet or beat tradable shareholder 
requirements after the SSSREF. Otherwise, the original non-tradable shareholders 
may have to be punished according to the corresponding agreement. Therefore, 
expanding the research on the SSSREF into different steps would be beneficial to 
observe original non-tradable shareholder behaviour through earnings 
management as it corresponds to policies regulated by the CSRC. In addition, the 
results from the comparison between firms with and without non-tradable shares 
are puzzling, since there are 10 times as many observations in the group of firms 
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with non-tradable shares as in the other group. Therefore, use of the bootstrap 
method to keep the number of firm-years for the group with non-tradable shares 
the same as that for the group without non-tradable shares would provide more 
reliable support for the hypotheses in Chapter 2.
Firth et al. (2010) and Ding et al. (2013) both conclude that mutual fund 
ownership may lose its original role in supervising performance of firms owned 
by the state, while Chapter 3 only considers the situation of controlling 
shareholders when mutual fund ownership is sufficiently high. Hence, it would be 
interesting to examine whether coordination between mutual fund investors and 
controlling shareholders is important for firms controlled by the state. In addition, 
several other tunnelling proxies are calculated in the literature (Cheung et al., 
2006; Aharony et al., 2010; Jian and Wong, 2010; Peng et al., 2011; Du et al., 
2012). Hence, the selection of an additional tunnelling proxy would provide more 
support for the conclusions in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 4, the M&A dummy is set for the year of the M&A deal rather than for 
the following two or three years. The results then have apparent limitations 
compared with those of other studies. Consideration of the situation two years 
before and after M&A is important and necessary for future work.
In general, a number of areas remain to be explored, based on the current 
literature. Given the rapid development of China’s imperfect stock market, 
researchers should devote more attention to testing the effectiveness of minority 
shareholder protection in China.
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Appendix: Variable definitions
DA Discretionary accruals estimated by the cross-sectional Jones 
model.
RM_1 Aggregate real earnings management proxy 1, the sum of 
abnormal production costs and the additive inverse of abnormal 
cash flows from operations.
RM_2 Aggregate real earnings management proxy 2, the sum of the 
additive inverse of abnormal cash flows from operations and the 
additive inverse of abnormal discretionary expenses.
RM_3 Aggregate real earnings management proxy 3, the sum of RM_2 
and abnormal production costs.
ACFO Level of abnormal cash flows from operations.
APROD Level of abnormal production costs, where production costs 
equal the sum of costs of goods sold and changes in inventories.
ADISX Level of abnormal discretionary expenses, where discretionary 
expenses are the sum of R&D, advertising, and sales, general, 
and administrative expenses.
BSCa Accounting flexibility calculated as net operating assets over 
sales in year t - 1 deflated by its corresponding industry median 
value.
BSCb Accounting flexibility calculated as net operating assets over 
sales in the year t - 1, minus its corresponding industry median 
value.
SSSREF Dummy variable equal to 1 for the period commencing a year 
after a listed firm was chosen to complete the SSSREF and 0 
otherwise.
TOP1 Percentage of shareholdings held by the largest shareholder.
PAY Natural logarithm of total compensation received by the top 
three executives. 
BIND The ratio of independent directors on the board to the total 
number of directors on the board.
DUALITY A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the board 
chairperson and 0 otherwise.
BIG4 A dummy variable that is 1 if a listed firm is audited by one of 
the international Big 4 audit firms or their joint ventures in 
China and zero otherwise.
STATE A dummy variable equal to 1 if the state shareholder is the 
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largest shareholder and 0 otherwise.
TS Natural logarithm of the total number of tradable shares.
LEVERAGE Leverage calculated as total debt divided by total assets.
BM Book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value of common 
equity over market capitalization.
FIRMSIZE Firm size computed as the natural logarithm of total assets.
IPO_DUM A dummy variable set to 1 for the year of the IPO and the next 
two years and 0 otherwise.
ST_DUM A dummy variable equal to 1 in the year a firm has its special 
treatment status removed and the preceding year and 0 
otherwise.
ROA Return on assets, that is, earnings before interest and tax divided 
by total assets.
ROA_ADJ Adjusted industry median ROA, which is the difference between 
a firm’s ROA and the industry median.
ROE Total profits divided by the book value of equity.
ROE_ADJ Adjusted industry median ROE, which is the difference between 
a firm’s ROE value and the industry median.
TOBIN_Q Market value of assets over the book value of assets.
TOBIN_Q_ADJ Adjusted industry median TOBIN_Q, which is the difference 
between a firm’s TOBIN_Q value and the industry median .
ROS Earnings before interest and tax divided by net sales.
ROS_ADJ Adjusted industry median ROS, which is the difference between 
a firm’s ROS value and the industry median.
OPINC_MV Operating income divided by the market value of assets.
OPINC_MV_AD
J
Adjusted industry median OPINC_MV, which is the difference 
between a firm’s OPINC_MV value and the industry median.
INS_PER Institutional investor ownership, calculated as the ratio of the 
number of shares held by mutual funds to the total number of 
shares in the issue.
INS_MV_PER Another measure of institutional investor ownership, calculated 
as the ratio of the market value of shares held by mutual funds 
to the firm’s total market value.
TUL Other receivables deflated by total assets.
DTUL A dummy variable assigned to 1 if the firm’s TUL value is 
above the current year’s median value and 0 otherwise.
TUL_LAR Other receivables obtained from the firm’s controlling 
shareholders and its affiliates, deflated by total assets.
DTUL_LAR A dummy variable assigned to 1 if the firm’s TUL_LAR value 
is above the current year’s median value and 0 otherwise.
HERF Herfindahl index, which is the sum of the squared percentage of 
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shares held by each of the top 10 shareholders.
DSUP_NUM A dummy variable assigned to 1 if the number of supervisors is 
equal to or above the median value of the current year and 0 
otherwise.
DSUP_MEET A dummy variable assigned to 1 if the number of supervisor 
meetings is equal to or above the median value of the current 
year and 0 otherwise.
REFORM Dummy variable equal to 1 for the period when a listed firm was 
chosen to complete the SSSREF and 0 otherwise.
RET_ADJ Market-adjusted annual stock return, which is the difference 
between a firm’s stock return and the annual market stock 
return.
CHANGE_SALE
S
The ratio of the change in sales divided by sales of the current 
year.
MAK A comprehensive index measuring the development of the 
regional market in which the firm is registered (Fan and Wang, 
2006), where higher values indicate greater regional market 
development.
RETURN_15 15-month cumulative raw return during the interval that begins 
three months following the end of fiscal year t - 1 and ends six 
months after the end of fiscal year t.
RETURN_12 12-month cumulative raw return during the interval that begins 
three months following the end of fiscal year t - 1 and ends three 
months after the end of fiscal year t.
MARKET_VALU
E The natural logarithm of the firm’s market value.
EARN Represents the situation of firm earnings, calculated as the 
operating income of the current year t divided by total assets for 
the year t - 1
BOARD_NUM The number of directors on the board.
SUPER_NUM The number of supervisors on the corresponding committee.
NOA_ASSETS Net operating assets of year t divided by the total assets of year t 
- 1.
BOARD_MEETI
NGS The number of meetings held by the board.
RELATIVE_SIZE The transaction value of M&A divided by the acquirer’s market 
value.
